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MORAL LAW AND THE HIGHEST GOOD

A STUDY OF KANT'S DOCTRINE OF
THE HIGHEST GOOD

BY

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TO
THE MEMORY
OF
MY MOTHER

PREFACE.

The Critique of Pure Reason has found many expositors in English. Since the monumental work of Edward Caird, we have had contributions to its study from Sidgwick, Watson, Adamson, Pringle-Pattison, Bowne, Ward, Kemp Smith and others. The Critique of Practical Reason has not received anything like the same amount of attention. There is the small work of Noah Porter and the critical exposition of Caird which he fuses with the Grundlegung and subordinates to that of the theoretical Critique. The recognized English writers on ethics, *e.g.*, Green, Seth, Dewey, Mackenzie, Rashdall, etc., make numerous and extended references to Kant. But they are so cut about by criticism that it is not easy for the student to get exactly at Kant's point of view. Recently further studies in the Grundlegung (or Fundamental Principles of Ethics) have appeared, *e.g.*, by J. W. Scott.

I have sought to present a constructive exposition and criticism of the Critique of Practical Reason, setting forth the strong points of Kant's ethics in a favourable light. A careful study of his ethical system from within will reveal, I aver, a more coherent and consistent treatment than is usually admitted by his critics. I have, therefore, endeavoured to bring into prominence Kant's consistencies as against the prevailing tendency to emphasize his inconsistencies. And I have also made reference to his other ethical writings where they throw light upon the problems of the Practical Critique, and

help towards the elucidation of its meaning and internal consistency.

I regret that circumstances have prevented me from publishing in one volume a more complete analysis. It is desirable that the theoretical implications of Kant's ethical position should not be overlooked, and that an extended discussion of his concept of freedom and the categorical imperative should be included. But, in extenuation of these omissions, I would refer readers to an earlier volume on *Kant's Doctrine of Freedom* (Robertson, Melbourne, 1912) for a discussion on the theoretical foundations and to my recent monograph on the *Basis of Freedom* (Australasian Association of Psychology and Philosophy, Sydney, Monograph Series, No. 3, 1924), which contains the chapter on Kant's concept of freedom. In that little work an explanation of freedom is attempted so as to make clear the continuity of its treatment throughout the three Critiques. The appendices in the Monograph deal with Kant's views on causality and the categorical imperative. In relation to the present work the theoretical implications would be regarded as introductory; the appendix on the categorical imperative would follow ch. I.; and the chapter on freedom would follow ch. III. Several other pages of the original MS., relating to minor details of Kant's ethics, have been omitted.

Part I. of this work is primarily an exposition of the Analytic of the Critique of Practical Reason, presented with a view to the discussion in Part II., which deals with the Dialectic of the same Critique. The end of the second part contains a brief constructive review of the foundations of a teleological ethic as a basis for theism, following mainly along Kantian lines. In

various instances, *e.g.*, in the chapter on Immortality, controversial issues have been relegated to the notes, where specific references to them in the text would have interfered with the main trend of the argument.

My indebtedness to other authors in the field of Kantian criticism is very great, and I have endeavoured to make full acknowledgment of it in the notes.

To the executors of the estate of my mother (Georgina Agnes Miller), I would express my thanks for a substantial contribution to the Melbourne University Press towards the publication of this volume in memory of her whose home life exemplified the moral law in ways which Kant immortalized in his reference to his own parents as having "the root of the matter in them."

I also gratefully acknowledge a supplementary grant from the Council of the University of Melbourne.

E. MORRIS MILLER.

Hobart, November, 1928.

CONTENTS

PART 1.—MORAL LAW AS DETERMINING PRINCIPLE OF WILL.

Ch.		Page
I.	The Basis of Morality: Moral Law and Freedom ..	3
	i. Practical Principles: Desire and Moral De- termination	3
	ii. Moral Law and Autonomy of Will	15
II.	Moral Law in Action: Good Will	26
III.	Moral Law as Motive: Idea of Duty	47

PART 2.—THE HIGHEST GOOD POSSIBLE THROUGH FREEDOM.

IV.	Highest Good and its Relation to the Moral Law	61
i.	Extended Determination of the Will	61
ii.	How this Extension is Justified	84
V.	Highest Good: Its Elements	101
i.	Conception of the Highest Good: Virtue and Happiness	101
ii.	Nature of the Connection of Virtue and Happiness	112
iii.	Highest Good and Hedonism	136
VI.	Highest Good: Postulate of Immortality	144
VII.	Highest Good: Postulate of the Existence of God..	172
i.	The Moral Argument	172
ii.	Nature, Moral Teleology and God's Being..	194
iii.	Moral Order and Theism	222
	Index	229

ABBREVIATIONS

- Watson* for Philosophy of Kant as contained in extracts from his own writings, selected and translated by John Watson, Glasgow, 1897. (*C. of Pu. R.*, pp. 1-222; *Metaphysics of Morality, Grundlegung*, pp. 225-58; *C. of Pr. R.*, pp. 261-303; *C. of J.*, pp. 307-49.)
- Müller* for Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, tr. by F. Max Müller, 2nd part, Lond., 1881. (*Note*.—Where the first volume, containing 2nd ed. additions, is referred to, the volume number is given.)
- Abbott* for Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, and other works on the theory of ethics, tr. by T. K. Abbott, 6th ed., Lond., 1898. (*Fundamental principles, Grundlg.*, pp. 1-84; *C. of Pr. R.*, pp. 87-262; *Metaphysic of Morals*, pp. 265-322; *Religion*, pp. 325-60.)
- Bernard* for Kant's Kritik of Judgment, tr. by J. H. Bernard, 1892.
- Akad.* for Kant's gesammelte Schriften, h. v. d. K. Preuss. Akad. d. Wissenschaften, Berlin, 1900—(v. 5, pp. 1-163, *K. d. pr. V.*, pp. 167-485, *K. d. Urth.*; v. 6, pp. 205-493, *Metaphysik d. Sitten*.)
- Hartenstein* for Immanuel Kant's sämtliche Werke, h. v. G. Hartenstein, 8 v., 1867-68 (v. 3, *K. d. r. V.*; v. 4, pp. 1-132, *Prolegomena*, pp. 233-302, *Grundlegung*; v. 5, pp. 1-170, *K. d. pr. V.*, pp. 171-500, *K. d. Urth.*; v. 6, pp. 95-302, *Religion*; v. 7, pp. 1-304, *Metaphysik d. Sitten*.)

PART 1.—MORAL LAW AS DETERMINING
PRINCIPLE OF WILL.

CHAPTER I.

THE BASIS OF MORALITY: MORAL LAW AND FREEDOM.

I. PRACTICAL PRINCIPLES: DESIRE AND MORAL DETERMINATION.

The Critique of Practical Reason turns entirely upon the conception of moral law and freedom. Indeed, it might be said that Kant's whole philosophy is a critical justification of the practical interests of man. These appealed strongly to him. He desired to redeem the things of the spirit from the crushing necessity of the external world, and to show that there was nothing higher nor grander in the universe than the moral personality. The Critique of Pure Reason was only a stage in this great effort of Kant's. In it he had, as he thought, determined the bounds of natural necessity. Its domain was definitely surveyed. Freedom and morality exceeded its grasp. It seemed possible, therefore, to undertake an independent examination of them in the hope of placing them upon a stable foundation. A glimpse of the hoped-for land of freedom had even been obtained from the Pisgah heights of the Critique of Pure Reason. The Critique of Practical Reason might open the pathway towards the realization of the hope and establish a positive validity for the ideas of freedom and morality. In the Analytic, there are unfolded the moral law and the formal determination of freedom as a positive idea, and in the Dialectic the implications of, and the achievements possible through, freedom as a moral postulate.

Kant's preliminary task is to set forth the fundamental principles of the practical reason.¹ He broadly distinguished them according as they are dependent upon material or external conditions, and according as they are independent of such conditions, and so carry their justification within themselves. Only the latter principles does he consider moral; the former are regarded by him as coming under the understanding as the faculty of determining means.

Practical principles are defined by Kant as "propositions which contain a general determination of the will having under it several practical rules."² Any principle upon which the will acts, any reason for doing a thing either for its own sake or for something else, may be regarded as a general determination of the will. In other words, there is always some principle by which the will is determined to act; and the manner of its action, and what it results in, differ according to circumstances and require particular rules for their explanation. "A practical rule," as Kant says, "is always a product of reason."³ These rules, or principles, are either subjective or objective. One may have special reasons for undertaking certain obligations or fulfilling particular purposes; these may be peculiar to oneself. In this respect the rules are subjective, and are called by Kant maxims. But there may be at times a necessity laid upon one to act apart altogether from considerations of achievement—simply upon the *a priori* claims of right and justice. Such action is objectively necessary, and would be fulfilled, if reason wholly determined the will.

1. *Critique of Practical Reason*, Bk. I., ch. 1, §§ 1-8.

2. *Abbott*, p. 105; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 19.

3. *Abbott*, p. 106; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 20.

Hence the rule is called a law, or categorical imperative. Practical principles are thus distinguished by Kant according as they are dependent or independent of material conditions. The former are subjectively necessary, and apply to the will under specified conditions: the latter are objectively necessary, and apply under all conditions whatsoever.

Strictly speaking, the idea of a first principle, as an ultimate ground of morality, attaches only to universal practical law, or the objective condition of free will; but, as maxims, in their origination, reveal modifications of the supreme idea, or law, of morality, they may be allowed as subjective practical principles, coming under the term of general determinations of will. Maxims, therefore, which further the realization of particular objects of desire, are subjective precepts, or empirical conditions of the will's activity, and are void, in Kant's judgment, of moral validity. Maxims,* as subjective principles, are distinguished from imperatives which have immediate authority over the will and are objectively valid, holding good of all wills without distinction. Such imperatives are categorical; their justification is inherent, unmediated. An imperative is a "rule characterized by 'shall,' which expresses the objective necessitation of the action, and signifies that if reason completely determined the will, the action would inevitably take place according to this rule."⁴ But, if the determination is conditional, as means to certain acquisitions, the imperative is hypothetical, and, morally, has

*Kant also regards a maxim as being capable of universal validity. A maxim may be "fit for a law," "adapted for universal legislation," and so hold objectively under all conditions. Such a maxim, which is accepted as unconditionally binding, has intrinsic moral worth and operates as a law of morality. As such it is more than a principle. It is a categorical imperative.

4. *Abbott*, p. 106; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 20.

scarcely more weight than a practical precept. An enforcement of this kind resembles a counsel of prudence,⁵ or skill in the choice of means to one's well-being. It has not the dignity of an objective law. It is a minor principle, which the will adopts, if certain desired effects are purposed. But the mere disposition to act lacks the moral uplift of an absolute injunction, based upon law as given by reason. On the other hand, the categorical imperative is unconditionally binding; its authority resides within itself, and the will, so accepting it, acts upon the initiative of universal law. "Thus practical laws refer to the will only, without considering what is attained by its causality, and we may disregard this latter (as belonging to the world of sense) in order to have them quite pure."⁶ Accordingly, practical principles that relate to the attainment of any object are subjective, empirical, and material; whereas those that relate to the determinations of the will as such without reference to the achievement of purposes are objective and formal.

In the opening sections of the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant formulated his practical principles.⁷ He declares that all practical principles which place the

5. Abbott, p. 33; Hartenstein, v. 4, p. 264; Akad., v. 4, p. 416. "Skill in the choice of means to his own greatest well-being may be called *prudence* in the narrowest sense. And thus the imperative, which refers to the choice of means to one's own happiness, *i.e.*, the precept of prudence, is still always *hypothetical*; the action is not commanded absolutely but only as a means to another purpose."

6. Abbott, p. 107; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 21.

7. Abbott, pp. 107-8, 114; Hartenstein, v. 5, pp. 21-23, 28.—*Theorem 1*: "All practical principles which pre-suppose an object (matter) of the faculty of desire as the ground of determination of the will are empirical, and can furnish no practical laws." *Theorem 2*: "All material practical principles as such are of one and the same kind, and come under the general principle of self-love and private happiness." *Corollary*: "All material practical rules place the determining principle of the will in the lower desires, and if there were no purely formal laws of the will adequate to determine it, then we could not admit any higher desire at all." *Theorem 3*: "A

ground of determination in an object of desire are material and void of moral worth. They are all of one and the same kind and come under the general principle of self-love and private happiness. Hence the desires and inclinations are excluded from moral determination. Having put aside happiness as a determining principle of morality, he turns the will upon itself, as it were, and seeks within it (as practical reason) the fundamental law of morality, which he states as follows:—"Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold as a principle of universal legislation."⁸

Thus Kant's point of view in seeking for the foundation of morality is marked by the elimination of desire from moral determination. For him the desire for an object is merely a desire for pleasure, and pleasure is inseparably associated with the sensibility.⁹ But in so far as the will seeks to realize an object of desire, the feelings accompanying it may be regarded as having a practical, though not a moral, reference to the will's doings. Their relations to the will in this respect are conditioned by the forms of sense-experience, and have no part in the higher functions of consciousness: they do not concern the will as intelligible, but as phenomenon (*Willkür*). The feelings, aroused by desirable, or undesirable, objects, are incommunicable: they are felt, as sensed, by the individual subject, and have no value for another, except in so far as their content may be formally determined by the understanding. Further, the pursuit of pleasure is mostly disappointing, rational being cannot regard his maxims as practical universal laws, unless he conceives them as principles which determine the will, not by their matter, but by their form only." *Theorem 4: See Note No. 39.*

8. Abbott, p. 119; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 32.

9. Abbott, p. 108; Watson, p. 262; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 22; *Akad.*, v. 5, p. 22.

for its realization cannot be guaranteed, though its constant anticipation undoubtedly influences the will to acquiesce in the inner promptings of desire. But even the realization often refutes the pleasurable excitement felt in advance. However this may be, the contingent character of the feelings is sufficiently attested. This affirmation implies a similarity in all practical principles relating to feelings of pleasure and pain: they are without exception associated with some idea of material existence as the predisposing cause; and they cannot assert themselves apart from direct contact with the sensibility of the subject.

Though it is usual to distinguish between pleasures of sense and pleasures of intellect, as different in kind, for Kant the distinction is one of degree only.¹⁰ It may be true that love of self, as a motive, applies both to sensual hedonism and intellectual delights; and yet we may be permitted to separate them as different kinds of pleasurable feelings. But with Kant it is not so: pleasure becomes "practical" only as affecting the sensibility and stimulating desire, whether the originating source of the pleasure be the satisfaction of an intellectual need, or a natural want. Thus the enjoyment of enthralling emotions and the base exaggerations of sensuous indulgence, implying the common fact of a relation to objects in the world of experience, are directly associated with the sensibility of the subject, and this common experiential element determines their sameness in kind as motives, though we may maintain differences in their sources of origin. And so, whilst affirming distinctions in origin, Kant asserts all feelings of pleasure to be

10. *Abbott*, p. 109; *Watson*, p. 264; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 23; *Akad.*, v. 5, p. 23.

alike as determining principles of will.¹¹ And the will, accepting them as stimuli to action, submits to the lower forms of desire, all of which respond to external sanctions. Even admitting the desirability that every human being should be happy, Kant will not accept happiness as an objective principle of moral observance. According to him, happiness is made up of an unceasing series of pleasurable feelings aroused by the existence of the objects of one's desires.¹² The idea of happiness, therefore, loses the inherent stamp of moral worth. Its connection with the material satisfaction of wants limits its sphere to sense-dependence. It is subjective in origin, and is without that "specific direction which we require for a practical principle."¹³ It cannot affirm with the conviction of law, for the pursuit of it differs with different individuals. Thus happiness, even as a desirable accompaniment of a good man's life, is not acceptable as a determining principle of his morality.

Kant's point of view, then, with reference to desires, including the consciousness of pleasure and pain, is fixed for him by the determinations of the Critique of Pure Reason. For, inasmuch as desire means desire for objects, and objects can only exist, or be imagined to exist in experience, the "dynamic of choice," as to what we shall seek or shun, he believes, resides in the consciousness of pleasure or pain we feel or expect to feel in the existence of the object of our desires.¹⁴ Thus if the desire to seek something is merely the inner response

11. *Abbott*, p. 108; *Watson*, p. 263; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 22; *Akad.*, v. 5, p. 22.

12. *Ibid.*

13. E. Caird, *Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*, v. 2, p. 180.

14. *Abbott*, p. 113-14; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, pp. 27-28.

to an external stimulus imposed upon the self, the activity aroused in consequence is not self-originated as a deliberate act of will. Accordingly, it would appear as though desire operated externally upon the will. And so long as that is so, Kant cannot include desire in moral determination. But does this not mean the setting up of desire as a moving force like unto some phenomenon in the world of nature? In this respect we make desire a reality by itself. If we hypostasize desire in this fashion, "as we do," says Green,¹⁵ "when we talk of desire moving us to act in such and such a way, misleading us, overcoming us, conflicting with Reason, etc., then 'Desire' is a logical abstraction which we are mistaking for reality." Though it is true that desire is desire for objects, yet what underlies this desire for objects is the self as desiring. For, ordinarily speaking, desire goes beyond reaction to sense-perceptions: it springs inwardly from the subject as under the influence of a train of ideas, which may not be immediately dependent upon one's surroundings.¹⁶ And in morality, the fact of the self's responsibility for its desires renders the consideration of their acceptance or rejection as isolated phenomena nugatory, and involves the question as to how far we reveal ourselves through them.¹⁷

It is clear, then, that desires are capable of moral expression, and partake of the activity of the self. Their origin, therefore, is not external. They are rather to be regarded as arising from within the self than as being impulses mechanically imposed upon the

15. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, 4th Ed., 1899, pp. 150-51.

16. Cf. J. Ward, *Psychology in Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 9th Ed., v. 20, pp. 73-74; 11th Ed., v. 22, pp. 588-89.

17. Cf. E. Caird, *Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*, 1889, v. 2, pp. 227, 258.

self from without. The self is originally active, aggressive, conational, and in that respect desires things to satisfy its strivings. These activities are not put forth through the perception of desirable objects, nor for the sake of pleasure to be gained from their attainment or otherwise. Objects are sought, because the self needs them in order to satisfy its inner cravings for realization. The strength of such desires is not dependent upon the amount of pleasure expected from the objects. Desires have painful or pleasurable feelings accompanying them according as the self does or does not attain what it desires. The self knows what it seeks, and exerts its full strength to achieve its aims. The experience of obstacles may hinder its achievement and so occasion some painful feelings, and these may spur the self on to fulfil its desired end to the uttermost. But the feelings of pain (or of pleasure) are not the original springs of the self's activity. The consciousness of pain or pleasure as such does not compel the will to action. It is rather the self as a whole that asserts itself, and shows its aggressive character. If any object or idea of an end have influence over the self and arouse its latent energy into going order, the activity is not due directly to the objects or the idea, but to the fact that the self actively identifies itself with the object or end desired. The aim in view fits in with the original conational disposition, or character, of the self, and so is taken in and absorbed and made one with the push of its developing processes. The object of desire is not sought as merely something standing opposed to, or outside of, the self. Its true significance rather lies in the self expressing or enjoying fulfilment of the desire. The object is not to be separated from the self. The

self indeed includes the object which it desires for its self-expression.

The springs of the self's action, whether expressed as motives or desires, are not those impelled from without. They originate from within the self. Indeed they are "motives only in so far as they arise from the nature of the self, and pre-suppose the conception of it as a determining factor. From this it follows that the recognized reasons for a decision can never constitute the entire cause of a decision. Behind them there always lies the self as a whole, and what this involves can never be completely analyzed or stated in the form of definite reasons or special motives."¹⁸ Thus we cannot look within the reason for the whole explanation of moral activity. However well ideas may be organized theoretically, the activity of the self is not put forth merely to keep this organization intact, or to develop its coherence, and modify it continuously in accordance with progress in knowledge. "Certainly reason aids us in determining what is good and in deducing from our knowledge of the good conclusions as to what actions are right. But unless a man already hungers for righteousness, already desires to do whatever is right, to be whatever is virtuous, unless, that is, he possesses the moral sentiments and moral character, reason cannot impel him to do right or to desire it. To create desire is a task beyond its competence; it can only direct pre-existing tendencies towards their appropriate objects."¹⁹ But, nevertheless, although a moral action may be said not to originate from reason, yet it must be fulfilled in accordance with a rational principle. In

¹⁸ G. F. Stout, *Manual of Psychology*, 3rd Ed., 1913, p. 709.

¹⁹ W. McDougall, *Introduction to Social Psychology*, 5th Ed., 1912, p. 379; 20th Ed., 1926, pp. 325-26.

other words, the motive to action, the prompting of a desire should be capable of intellectual presentation. Upon reflection we should be able to discover some principle of reason underlying the activity, implicit within it, which, when brought to light, will unfold for us the intrinsic value or worth of the action itself. And, in this connection, specific desires (or pains or pleasures) are ruled out as guiding principles of moral activity. Here, then, we come to Kant's real objective, which is to discover the principle or law upon which moral action is founded. He was not so unwise as to deny to man the right to fulfil his desires, to satisfy his inclinations, and so forth.²⁰ The question for him was—To what extent have these actions moral significance? Or rather, more precisely, what moral value have they as determining principles of the will? And he answers rightly that they have none. Accordingly, he excluded them from all moral determination; for ethical relations go deeper than the fulfilling of desire. Why is one desire rightly satisfied, and another wrongfully so? How is this conception of right and wrong originated? Wherein lies its strength? Kant, having the far deeper problem in view, too readily discarded the overt acts of man's moral life through persistent allegiance to his theoretical conclusions, which he treated as axiomatic. But he certainly allowed that, in so far as desires do not conflict

20. *Abbott*, pp. 152, 186; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, pp. 65, 97; *Akad*, v. 5, pp. 61, 93. (Cf. V. Delbos, *La Philosophie Pratique de Kant*, p. 333)—“Man is a being who, as belonging to the world of sense, has wants, and so far his reason has an office which it cannot refuse, namely, to attend to the interest of his sensible nature, and to form practical maxims, even with a view to the happiness of this life, and if possible even to that of a future” (p. 152). But, as Kant points out, one's happiness is not the only thing of consequence. “But it does not follow that this distinction between the principle of happiness and that of morality is an *opposition* between them, and pure practical reason does not require that we should *renounce* all claim to happiness, but only that the moment duty is in question we should take no account of happiness” (p. 186). Cf. also *Bernard*, pp. 361, 409.

with moral law, they may be rightly fulfilled; but, where they are not in harmony with the law, they must be utterly rejected; if not, they are wrongfully indulged. So we cannot exclude from Kant's completed system of ethics an action accomplished with inclination. It is the admitted contrast between desires and duties that bring into relief his rigorism.²¹ Still, his conception of morality did not mean the absolute negation of all desires, but their restraint or modification in accordance with ethical principles. But may it not be also affirmed that, while the propension itself lacks inherent worth, the subject may be so developed morally that desires spring inwardly from the self, and reveal a moral foundation? The operation of the law would then be well nigh constant; and what was desired would be a consequence of the will's own activity ever conforming, and being one, with the law itself.

21. Cf. A. Messer, *Kants Ethik*, 1904, pp. 230-42; V. Delbos, *La Philosophie Pratique de Kant*, 1905, pp. 330-38; also E. Caird, *Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*, 1889, v. 2, p. 196, who points out that the weakness of Kant's ethics consists in its exclusive attention to this antagonism. All of these thinkers agree that Kant's ethics appear rigoristic, if we stress the opposition between the moral law and the inclinations, to the extent of maintaining that only such actions are moral as are done without pleasure in the doing of them. Kant did not go that far, as we have seen. But he is very "hard on" the inclinations when he regards them from the point of view of a determining principle of the will. It is this harshness, combined no doubt with his pietistic temperament, which gives rise to the impression that Kant would exclude desires and inclinations from morality altogether. But he is not a "rigorist" in that sense at all. Compare his reply to certain objections of Schiller, from which we quote the following sentence:—"If it is now asked, of what sort is the emotional characteristic, the temperament as it were of virtue: is it spirited and cheerful, or anxiously depressed and dejected? an answer is hardly necessary. The latter slavish spirit can never exist without a secret hatred of the law, and cheerfulness of heart in the performance of one's duty (not complacency in the recognition of it) is a mark of the genuineness of the virtuous disposition, even in devoutness, which does not consist in the self-tormenting of the penitent sinner, . . . but in the firm purpose to do better in the future, which, animated by good progress, must produce a cheerful spirit, without which one is never certain that he has taken a liking to good, that is to say, adopted it into his maxim." (*Abbott*, pp. 330-331.) See also *Kant's Doctrine of Freedom*, pp. 74 ff.

II. MORAL LAW AND AUTONOMY OF WILL.

As already indicated, Kant attains the conception of a positive law, determining the will of rational beings absolutely of itself, "Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation."²⁹ But how does one become conscious of this law? It is certain *ex hypothesi* that we cannot derive our consciousness of it by the mediation of sense conditions: it is not an object of experience. It is not something that comes to one fortuitously; it is of the very inner constitution of man's being itself. Everyone recognizes immediately that a "rule" that varies with circumstances or with individuals, or that cannot be accepted as universally binding, is not a moral principle. Even although in right-doing the principle of the action may not be formulated, yet on the part of the "commonest understanding,"³⁰ there is an intuitive knowledge of it as something that binds all alike in the moral life. It is intimately felt as known for what it is. It requires no training in intellectual gymnastics to realize its potency and reality. It is there in man from the beginning. He does not originate it, and yet it cannot work unless he wills it. His task is to obey it, to honour himself in honouring it, to free himself from the limits of the world of sense by enthroning it as the law of his life. A man may resist the moral law; but

29. Abbott, p. 119; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 32; Akad., v. 5, p. 31.

30. "The commonest understanding can distinguish without instruction what form of maxim is adapted for universal legislation and what is not" (Abbott, p. 115, Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 28). Cf. Paulsen, *Immanuel Kant*, p. 304.—"He sympathizes, however, with the morality of the common man, who finds as unconditionally given in his conscience the opposition of duty and inclination. One can say at once that Kant's system of morality is the restoration of the common morality of conscience with its absolute imperative, as opposed to philosophical theories of morality, which all undertake some explanation of that imperative." Also Abbott, pp. 124, 125, 126, 168, 185; Hartenstein, v. 5, pp. 37, 38, 39, 80, 96. See further, Mueller, p. 713; Hartenstein, v. 3, p. 547.

he cannot crush or eradicate it. It is not to be laid low. It may be despised; but it still operates; and it will finally come into judgment against him who attempts to set it aside. Indeed the moral law is the ultimate condition of universal order of moral beings. That moral order enters more and more into the nature of man as he unfolds himself in greater fulness. It is there for man's enrichment. Indeed the moral order of the world and the moral law are one. The law is itself that order. Without the law there is no foundation upon which morality may be built. The law is morality, and morality is the law. It is universally binding; its validity is intrinsic, residing in its pure form as law.

But Kant's conception of law, as we have seen, excludes all reference to desires or inclinations, as determining principles of morality. The law alone, purely as such, determines the will of man as a moral being. Only in so far as he fulfils the law in his daily doings can he account them worthy of being called moral. The law does not apply to what he actually does; but to the principle determining his will in the doing of what he does. It is not achievement that counts; it is fulfilment of the law as law. The question is, Can you *will* to universalize the principle of your action, not necessarily the action itself? It concerns, then, not what you desire, nor what you will or aim at; but how you desire, how you will, whatever it be that you desire or will. It is the very principle of the deed apart from the deed itself that matters with Kant. His point is that all subjective tendencies must be excluded from a moral law universally binding upon all rational beings. The law itself holds apart from particular variations of man's nature. It is the principle of the self-activity of

the will of man. The will as pure practical reason exemplifies the law, reveals the law as an original principle of morality. The moral ego is just the will under the law, the will acting in and through the law. The law then is not something given by man; not something that he comes to know, that he may add to his nature. It is his nature, if he have regard to himself as a rational being. In other words the moral law is a factum of pure reason;³¹ an original element in man's being, which the meanest intelligence may grasp and understand. Let a man recognize his rationality; let him be to himself a being in whom pure reason is an original fact, then he must realize that in him the law abides, and is unfolded to him through pure reason. In other words—pure reason is practical of itself and gives to man a universal law, which is called the moral law.³² This is an ultimate statement of the inner consistency of pure practical reason. Unconcerned with any individual preference, and unalloyed with any extraneous detail, this supreme principle of morality, formal in nature and universal in application, is the one fact of reason which has definite positive value: it carries within itself immediate necessity. But this conception of moral law concerns only the form and not the matter or content

31. *Factum*, not *Thatsache*. It is not an empirical fact as Schopenhauer (cf. *Basis of Morality*, tr. 1903, pp. 57, 65) alleges; it rather relates to the inner spontaneity of the practical reason, recognizing the fact of the law's universality apart from its actual realization. Cf. Delbos, *La Philosophie Pratique de Kant*, 1905, pp. 317, 431. Also E. Caird, *Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*, 1889, v. 2, p. 173; T. Ruyssen, *Kant (Les grands Philosophes)*, 2nd Ed., 1905, pp. 206, 217-18, who says, "By *factum* it is necessary to understand not so much something given, as an act of spontaneity analogous to that of the theoretical understanding, with this difference that the spontaneity of the understanding has reference to sense only and becomes conscious in its application to the intuitions of sense; whereas the spontaneity of the practical reason lays down the maxim of the law prior to its realization in experience."

32. Abbott, p. 120; Watson, p. 269; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 33; *Akad.*, v. 5, p. 31.

of moral action.³³ The action itself is concrete—something actually experienced, and recognized as such: it is a particular experience, and so phenomenal. Accordingly, it cannot be made a moral principle. Desire to do any act, to experience it as something achieved, must come under the determination of the theoretical consciousness; it is not capable of moral expression. What is of intrinsic moral value for Kant is the principle by which the will is determined to do the act, not the action itself. Disengage the principle from the deed exemplifying it, universalize it; and the moral law stands revealed. In this statement we have brought out the strength of Kant's conception of the moral law. To set it forth as he did was a noble achievement in the realm of ethics. But he tended to make almost too much of it as an analytical principle. It could scarcely get beyond itself. It arose in too individualistic a setting, and to operate it had to hypostasize itself. Kant's moral principle has been universally criticized as an abstraction; but this should not allow us to overlook its intrinsic greatness as a law of morality. Kant himself in formulating the law as a categorical imperative is led to give it more and more a concrete significance, as he realizes the complexity of the situation in which it operates. We need not repeat here this phase of its development

33. Cf. V. Delbos in his introd. to *Kant: Fondements, etc.*, p. 45 ff.; K. Bache, *Kants Prinzip der Autonomie*, 1909, pp. 7, 14 (*Kantstudien, Ergänzungshefte*, No. 12). Cf. also Green's criticism, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, 4th Ed., 1899, pp. 233-35. Delbos remarks that though the categorical imperative is exclusively formal, yet "formal" does not mean "empty," "without content." The moral reason determines itself by its own ideas without reference to any particular experience. In so doing the pure reason gives itself a content which is its self-activity in conformity with law. That content would be completely realized as an intelligible fact, were the will always to determine itself by the representation (idea) of laws, and never to submit to the direction of anything external to itself. Such a will would be sufficient for itself. Its respect for law, its identification of itself with the law of its activity, would constitute its own moral content; or, in other words, its content would be the "pure matter" or goodness of will in conformity to law.

as a principle, which has been dealt with in detail in the monograph on "The Basis of Freedom."³⁴

At present we recognize the immediate and universal necessity of the law itself and its relation to Kant's idea of freedom. Such a necessity is altogether different from that of a natural law, which is external and conditional. For though a natural law is a law of necessity, yet its necessity is bounded. It is applicable only within the limits of that which is conditioned by it. Dependence in the natural world is an external relation; it merely concerns the linking up of things together; and the law that binds them, viewed apart from a combining intelligence, is expressed in the form of external necessity. One thing follows on another in endless succession; its place in the series is fixed by conditions beyond its control. The pressure is exerted from without, and there is no alternative. All natural necessity, therefore, is external. Into such a sphere freedom cannot enter. Indeed there is no need that it should. Kant's point is that natural necessity rules in a world in which freedom is not. Thus it cannot gainsay the validity of any law obtaining beyond the limits of its operations. But the moral law is also a law of necessity; but its necessity is internal;³⁵ it implies self-imposition. In other words, the moral law does not impose itself upon the will from without. Submission to moral law is a direct and spontaneous act of the will itself. There is no external compulsion. If, then, one speaks of moral necessity, one means an internal constraint, a pressure that is inwardly imposed—and that

34. See *Basis of Freedom*, Sydney, 1924, pp. 65-78, Appendix III. Critical note on the categorical imperative.

35. *Abbott*, p. 65; *Hartenstein*, v. 4, p. 294.

is something altogether distinct from the element of necessity in natural law. Hence, in the world of morality, we move in a realm that is independent of natural necessity. If, then, Kant is to find a positive interpretation of freedom, he must look for it entirely within the intelligible world. There he discovered the fact of the moral law. This is unmistakable. It is immediately understood; even the commonest intelligence can easily comprehend it. Further, it is "objectively necessary." There can be no restrictions upon its applicability: it "holds for everyone that has reason and will."³⁶ Accordingly freedom is positively necessary, if the moral law be (as it is) universally binding on all without distinction. Without freedom moral law would be unintelligible. Unless the will act through freedom, its activity cannot be moral. If it were compelled to action by any impulse or desire, the direction would not be moral, but physical, and would come within the domain of natural law: whereas the morality of will is determined from within. Thus a moral action, being initiated through freedom, declares complete severance from sense control. The will that is moral legislates for itself. It cannot be imposed on from without. It directs its own activity through the moral law. It is thus morally self-legislative or autonomous. In this respect freedom expresses a positive determination. It implies something more than mere independence of sense-impulses. It unfolds a moral principle, and so exemplifies the legislative character of pure reason. Through moral law, then, freedom becomes positive; its validity as a directive principle of moral action is affirmed, and its reality as an idea of reason established.

36. *Abbott*, p. 126; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 39.

Accordingly, moral action is possible on the assumption of a self-initiating will, capable of directly imposing upon itself the principles of its activity. In other words, "a free will and a will subject to moral laws are one and the same."³⁷ This expresses the principle of autonomy, "that property of a will by which it is a law unto itself."³⁸

The sole principle of morality, then, is the autonomy of the will, by which is meant that, in any maxim of moral worth, the will shows forth of itself a universal law.³⁹ The will which is merely subject to law, because of some interest in its operation, is void of moral dignity. Moral subjection to law implies a self-imposed act of will, and, because the will is free to determine itself in accordance with a universal command, intrinsically binding on all rational beings by its mere form, it reveals in this respecting of the law the high dignity of its own nature: and, as Kant puts it, the basis of this moral sublimity⁴⁰ is the will's autonomy. If the will accept any principle of action other than one capable of universal application through its form, it becomes merely a factor of circumstance, and degrades its self-originating

37. *Abbott*, p. 66; *Hartenstein*, v. 4, p. 295.

38. *Abbott*, p. 59; *Hartenstein*, v. 4, p. 288.

39. *Abbott*, p. 122; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 35.—*Theorem IV.*: "The autonomy of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws, and of all duties which conform to them; on the other hand, heteronomy of the elective will not only cannot be the basis of any obligation, but is, on the contrary, opposed to the principle thereof and to the morality of the will."

40. *Abbott*, pp. 54, 180-82; *Hartenstein*, v. 4, pp. 284, v. 5, pp. 92-93; *Akad.*, v. 5, pp. 86-88.—"For nothing has any worth except what the law assigns it. Now the legislation itself which assigns the worth of everything must for that very reason possess dignity, that is an unconditional incomparable worth, and the word *respect* alone supplies a becoming expression for the esteem which a rational being must have for it. *Autonomy* then is the basis of the dignity of human and of every rational nature" (*Abbott*, p. 54). "This respect inspiring idea of personality which sets before our eyes the sublimity of our nature (in its higher aspect), while at the same time it shows us the want of accord of our conduct with it, and truly strikes down self-conceit, is even natural to the commonest reason, and easily observed" (*Abbott*, p. 181).

power. Even though an object sought be universally desirable,⁴¹ that does not save the situation: the sanction has an external source: it does not spring from the self-directing reason of man. Actions of this sort may involve general rules, holding good under specified limitations; but their principles cannot be ascribed to rational beings at all times without exception, and thus are without the objective necessity of a moral command. A maxim of general import may be of value as advice, but is never obligatory without qualification; and every principle of practical application, lacking categorical force, rests upon heteronomy, and is valueless for moral determination.⁴² A command of morality demands of the will instant obedience and fulfilment, and only on the principle of autonomy can a will so act.

Morality and freedom, in Kant's system, then, mutually interpret one another. Freedom is the *ratio essendi* of the moral law: the moral law is the *ratio cognoscendi* of freedom.⁴³ Without freedom morality would be engulfed by natural law: and without morality, freedom would have no positive significance at all: there would be no justification even for its assumption, for what would be the worth of being free, if there were nothing in us that demanded the exercise of our freedom? In its first signification as independence of external constraint, the idea of freedom makes possible an analysis of moral principles. The establishment of these foundations of morality would be clearly impossible without the rational

41. *Abbott*, p. 123; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 36; *Akad.*, v. 5, p. 34.

42. For detailed discussion on Kant's treatment of heteronomy and his uses of *Wille* and *Willkür*, see my *Kant's Doctrine of Freedom*, 1913, pp. 92-97 and the *Basis of Freedom*, 1924, pp. 31-32.

Nos. 43-48 omitted.

43. *Abbott*, p. 88; *Watson*, p. 268; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 4; *Akad.*, v. 5, p. 4.

pre-supposition of a free causality. We have as intelligences no arbitrament in the matter: either there is no morality of any kind, or there is freedom. Deny freedom and we deny morality: there cannot be morality without freedom. Even the world of natural necessity cannot remain satisfied with itself. An explanation of it demands conceptions (including freedom) which transcend its limits. These tendencies of the understanding, to pass beyond its own sphere, do not originate from sense-determination. Ideas of what is supersensible, of causality that is unconditioned, of the transcendental ego, and so forth, cannot be brought within the range of the understanding; they belong to reason as such. And yet they are calling (as it were) the understanding to go beyond its boundaries, and if possible take them unto itself. There is no need to repeat these matters here; suffice it to say that the needs of the understanding are not to be satisfied by mere mechanism; the laws of natural necessity cannot quench its irresistible demands for completeness, for self-realization. From the intellectual plane, then, there is a demand for what is unrestricted by sense-necessity, for what is supersensible, free. But these tendencies cannot be positively expressed within the limits of the sensible; indeed they have no place there, if the Kantian dualism holds. But this much is assured, according to Kant—the world of sense determination cannot gainsay the world of unconditioned (*i.e.*, non-sensible) causality, or freedom. Such is Kant's first, and negative, glimpse of freedom. It makes possible a moral world which can be held consistently with one of sense-determined phenomena; and the positive principle of the former may be investigated independently of the latter.

Assuming this conclusion of the former Critique that we may deal at first hand with principles transcending sensible reality, Kant analyzes the foundations of morality and unfolds its primary laws, being careful, of course, to emphasize their eminently practical character, and the inability of claiming any positive knowledge of them according to his theoretical conclusions. The result of his inquiry into moral principles is that practical reason puts us in possession of a fact, an unconditional ought, which we cannot explain in terms of knowledge, but which we must accept as practically necessary in the world of intelligible reality. This is the moral law which is directly derived from reason, and is the supreme determining principle of the will. In this respect it expresses its formally universal legislative capacity, and thus exemplifies its positive character. Such a law requires no deduction or mediated proof: it bears within itself the affirmation of its rational necessity. Or, in Kant's own words, "the moral law is given as a fact of pure reason, of which we are *a priori* conscious, and which is apodictically certain, though it be granted that in experience no example of its exact fulfilment can be found. Hence the objective reality of the moral law cannot be proved by any deduction by any efforts of theoretical reason, whether speculative or empirically supported, and therefore, even if we renounced its apodictic certainty, it could not be proved *a posteriori* by experience, and yet it is firmly established of itself."⁵⁰ Deeper than all our striving for an object of morality or highest good, there is the ever-present fact that we seek a foundation for morality in a law of right. Because Right is there, "somewhere," we go on to achieve our

⁵⁰ *Abbott*, pp. 136-37; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 50.

ideals, knowing that if we do not succeed we may yet hope to. That hope could only be taken from us if Right were liable ultimately to be overthrown, if everything implied a risk at the last; if no guarantee were forthcoming. But Right is there, and the law; and we know we shall not fail—at the last! The moral law must then be accepted as an immediate fact of the practical reason. There is no getting beyond it, any more than one can get beyond experience itself. There are no deeper foundations upon which it may be laid. The moral law itself is a *factum* of pure reason; freedom is involved in it; it alone renders possible the life that is lived in reason.⁵¹

51. Cf. Herbart, *Werke*, h. v. Hartenstein, 1851, v. 9 (*Bemerkungen u. d. Ursachen, wh. . . . prakt. Phil. srechweren*), pp. 20, 21, (*Freiheit des Willens*), pp. 258, 270, 284, etc., where, on the contrary, he affirms that Kant rests the transcendental doctrine of freedom upon the conception of duty, or the categorical imperative, as the basic principle of ethics. (Cf. H. Cohen's criticism of Herbart's contention in his *Kants Begründung der Ethik*, 2nd Ed., 1910, pp. 129, 140 ff., 249, 251, 311 ff.) But Kant holds that they are reciprocal conceptions and involve one another, and that though one may appear to be derived from the other, yet the one could not be without the other. (Cf. *Abbott*, pp. 65-69, 116-18.) Deny freedom and morality is denied; deny morality, and freedom cannot be saved. From the discussion it is clear that Kant does not "build" the conception of freedom upon that of the moral imperative. In the *Grundlegung* he seems to start from the fact of freedom and in the *Critique* from the fact of the moral law. But it is only a question of emphasis. The one is not subordinated to the other, nor is the one derived from the other. If that were so, the derived conception could not be said to possess original validity, and that Kant affirms of both of them. Herbart does not accept the validity of the conception of duty or an imperative as original. If to command is to will, then, he affirms, the will commanding cannot be superior to any other will. But how is this possible if each will is equal to every other will? An imperative can only possess original validity, if there be an original subordination of wills to a superior will, or an opposition of wills; otherwise the imperative of duty must be a derived moral command, which is what Herbart deems it to be. But this is altogether a false criticism of Kant's doctrine of the imperative. The command operates only in respect of one's own desires and inclinations and not the will of another person.

CHAPTER II.

MORAL LAW IN ACTION: THE GOOD WILL.

We have now discussed Kant's moral principle. It originates within the will as practical reason. It is clearly apprehended even by the commonest understanding. It is universally applicable. Though it may be discarded in practice, it can never be eradicated. Now, a marked characteristic of the moral law is that it expresses a causality of reason. How then does the will conform to it? What prompts its initiation? How is it sustained? What, in other words, are the subjective conditions of moral activity? Further, grant that a will conform to the law, what sort of will is it? If not, how differently will it manifest itself? In what does a moral action reside? What, in short, is the objective condition of moral activity? To answer these questions, Kant discusses the practical applicability of his moral principle, so far as it relates to the pure will. But he finds that, though his inquiry at this stage only concerns the moral possibility of the action—what conditions constitute it a moral action—still, he cannot exclude reference to its sensible manifestation. He cannot avoid regarding it as concrete, as an experienced fact of the moral consciousness; and hence he must discuss the relation between the moral conditions of the action and its realization.

In his analysis of the moral consciousness, as worked out in the *Fundamental Principles* (*Grundlegung*), Kant laid down the dictum that there is nothing good

in itself except a good will,¹ *i.e.*, a will that is good, purely as will, even without reference to what may be attained thereby. Promises of satisfaction of aims, hopes of approbation, and so forth, are eschewed. Disinterested devotion to an ideal, though it be of the most exalted type, is no guarantee that the law is the absolute rule of one's moral life. Only as the will's maxims conform to the supreme principle of morality is the moral law fulfilled; in no other way can it become good. Thus, goodness of will is the immediate consequence of moral law as determining its activity. The good, then, is the object of morality. In the *Analytic* it is not Kant's purpose to detail what the good consists of, and how its fulfilment, as a moral object, may be secured; he is here only concerned with the *a priori* determination of its form as an object of pure practical reason.

An object of experience is given in relation to consciousness, being determined by the categories of the understanding, working through the schemata furnished by the imagination. An object of will is not given; it is ideally sought, and may not even be actualized at all.^{1a} The problem of the will is not so much one of

1. Abbott, p. 9; Watson, p. 225; Hartenstein, v. 4, p. 241; *Akad.*, v. 4, p. 393.

1a. That to which a category of morality (or freedom) refers is itself the production of the category, and not something given to the latter (as is the case with the theoretical categories). Again, practical reason begins with principles, not with a given material. The materials of sense are assumed to be, in the *Theoretical Critique*, without definite determination. They become objects of experience through the application of the formal principles of the understanding. These forms or categories are in themselves "empty"; they receive their filling from sense consciousness, which becomes modified in the process. So there arises the question whether the formal principles of the moral consciousness are likewise without content? It has been stated that Kant's formal moral rationalism consists in the application of the will to the material furnished by the inclinations. (Cf. R. Strecker, *Kants Ethik*, 1909, p. 79. Also, H. Schwarz, *Der Rationalismus und der Rigorismus in Kants Ethik*, in *Kantstudien*, v. 2, pp. 50-68, 259-76, quoted by V. Delbos, *La Philosophie Pratique de Kant*, 1905, p. 331 n.) While it may be admitted that desires and inclinations are material for the activity of practical reason (cf. Messer, *Kants Ethik*,

material existence as of moral possibility.² We are not to consider whether the physical means for the realization of an object of desire are at hand or not: morally we are not directly concerned with the empirical conditions necessary for the production of an object. The will's action, in its activity, is all that is involved here. Grant we have the power to create an object desired, ought we to will the action which would achieve its realization? The actual creation of the object is a fact of experience, and the grounds of its existence may be theoretically formulated by the understanding. But the willing of the initiating action does not come within the province of experience; it is a moral problem.

The action may be determined in two ways, either by the law itself or by desire for an object whose realization is sought. In the latter instance, the action is instrumental towards an object for the sake of anticipated pleasure in its existence, and is thus void of moral value.³ On the other hand, an act of will which is the immediate consequence of practical law, irrespective of any empirical interest, inheres in the will itself, or expresses the formal nature of its activity under law. The conception of the object, thus willed in direct

p. 231), and are therefore involved in every moral action, yet, at the same time, they cannot determine the principle of such action. But without them moral actions could not take place, even as, in like manner, without sense impressions, knowledge of objects would be impossible. Still, it is not correct, in Kantian terms, to speak of an *a priori* practical principle of the will being applied to the matter of desire for the attainment of an end, for a determining principle of morality is not concerned with the actual execution of one's purposes (which involves physical conditions); *i.e.*, it has to do with the intentions of the will, and not positive achievements.

2. Abbott, p. 148; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 61; Akad., v. 5, p. 58.

3. Abbott, p. 149; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 62; Akad., v. 5, p. 58.—“If the notion of good is not to be derived from an antecedent practical law, but, on the contrary, is to serve as its foundation, it can only be the notion of something whose existence promises pleasure, and thus determines the causality of the subject to produce it; that is to say, determines the faculty of desire.”

conformity with the practical law of reason, is the pure formal idea of good. Similarly, evil is formally the conception of an object shunned as not conforming to the universal principle of reason. The ideas of good and evil, therefore, have reference to the will under the determination of the supreme law of morality. We are here concerned with will in its pure formal nature. A will that is good in itself finds its good within the sphere of self-determination, and reflects the supreme condition of the good in its internal activity. According to Kant's pre-supposition that moral determination cannot possibly be implicated with sense, the condition of the possibility of good must be the law itself; or, in other words, a will whose activity expresses the universal form of the law is a good will, and this acceptance of the moral law as the objective principle of its action constitutes the supreme condition of good as an object of morality. Good is, therefore, according to Kant, the mode of a will's action,⁴ that is, the action as expressing a universal law. Hence good is just the law in objectivity. Evil, on the other hand, may be formally expressed as aversion to law as a commanding imperative, avoidance of all inner determination. The conceptions of good and evil, then, as objects of moral action, relate to a rational agent as pure self-active will, not as striving towards an ideal, but as subsuming itself under the laws of its own causality.

But a rational being may also determine his conduct so as to achieve a useful and laudable object: such activity would be in accordance with reason, for it involves deliberation and adjustment of ends and means.

4. *Abbott*, p. 156; *Watson*, p. 282; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, pp. 68-69; *Akad.*, v. 5, p. 65.

This formal principle of consciousness enables Kant to refer to an action relatively good as distinct from an action good in itself.⁵ Welfare is in this way distinguished from good, and implies a reference to our physical condition. This relative good is phenomenal, and the maxims determining it are rational practical precepts, and not universal laws, being dependent upon particular judgments, which hold only of individual determinations. The notions of good and evil, then, are consequences of the *a priori* determination of the will through moral law; they do not refer to actually existing objects. Accordingly Kant sums them up as *modi* of will-causality,⁶ *i.e.*, of a causality determined by a rational conception of law. The good is, therefore, the activity of will inwardly responsive to universal law; it is a resultant of the operation of moral law through will.

Kant's notion of good and evil challenges all moral theories which regard an ideal, whether in the form of the perfection of our nature, the ultimate harmony of our activities, or the will of God, as the determining principle of morality. According to Kant, these ideals are the results, not the conditions, of moral activity. His moral concept is just the idea of an object as an effect possible through freedom. The idea of good and evil simply expresses the formal objective of the reason as pure will, relating to intention or moral possibility—not subserving the concrete action as a manifestation of effort towards the realization of an ideal. The will is not good because of what it performs, nor by its aptness

5. Abbott, p. 153; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 66; Akad., v. 5, p. 62.

6. Abbott, p. 156; Watson, p. 282; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 69; Akad., v. 5, p. 65.

for the attainment of some proposed end, but it reveals its intrinsic goodness by virtue of its rational submission to a moral imperative. Kant rejects the conception of a moral ideal as a determining factor in morality.⁷ In fact, he reduces it to a material principle; but he distinguishes it from a merely empirical determination of will; for he admits that the recognition of an ideal of conduct and its acceptance as a motive are rational acts. But these practical judgments involve a choice of ends; and, as deliberation upon them cannot be dissociated from an idea of satisfaction, he cannot accept them as morally determining the will. The action may result in the attainment of a relative good, *i.e.*, a good which is the means to something else; whereas a moral good is an end in itself.

Kant makes special mention of this distinction of his in what he calls the paradox of method in the Critique of Practical Reason,⁸ that the concept of good and evil must not be determined before the moral law, but only after it and by means of it. This is not the case with other systems, which attempt to find the supreme principle of moral determination in perfection, happiness, feeling or will of God. But all these are, for Kant, objects to be realized through moral law, and not determining principles of morality itself; and, further, the ideas of them vary in different individuals and races of men. Now, Kant endeavours to substantiate the paradox by considering the invalidity of supposing that he has not obtained *a priori* principles of morality. He assumes that we may begin with the conception of goodness as a moral end, and asks, can we deduce from it

7. Abbott, pp. 130, 155; Hartenstein, v. 5, pp. 44, 68; Akad., v. 5, pp. 41, 64.

8. Abbott, p. 154; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 66; Akad., v. 5, pp. 62-63.

a law of universal application, determining the will of every rational being to seek the good for its own sake? He avers that it is impossible; for any object, having power over the will, manifests the imposition of an external sanction, whose appeal rests upon an experiential basis, associated with pleasure or pain.

It may be granted that the general welfare is a desirable end, and, therefore, any action which subserves this pleasurable result may be judged good to that extent, and the judgment would reflect a rational principle, though it could not claim the allegiance of a moral command. Hence the conception of good and evil must be determined, not with reference to the existence of an object of desire, but in relation to the action of a will under a universal law. We cannot deduce the law from the good as an end; but, given the law, the will, determined by it, resolves the necessary conditions for the realization of goodness. The ideas of what is morally good, and what is morally evil, therefore, spring from the will under law, and are revealed in its actions. Hence Kant refers to these conceptions as consequences of the *a priori* determination of the will.⁹

Kant, then, regards the good absolutely as a characterization of the will's activity in conformity with the moral law. It is just the law in its objectivity. It is not a quality of the action itself, it is not a quality of an object of desire. Such would be merely a relative good in Kant's view; it is a utility, no doubt, but it does not possess moral worth. Kant thus separates himself from any teleological ethic. The good for him is not an ideal which dominates the will's activity; it is

⁹ *Watson*, p. 282; *Abbott*, p. 156; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 68; *Akad.*, v. 5, p. 65.

a consequence of that activity so far as it is conformed to the moral law; and, further, it resides within the will itself.

We may go with Kant in agreeing that the good is not mere pleasure in the attainment of an object of desire; it is not the pleasure itself that is the good. Kant is right in condemning the utilitarian conception of good. But he is wrong in accepting, as already shown, the psychological standpoint of the utilitarians that desire is desire for pleasure itself, and not the object whose realization brings pleasure with it. But it is possible for us to give up the hedonistic notion of the good, and yet accept the good not only as an end worthy of realization (which even Kant himself adopts in the *Dialectic*), but also as itself an end determining the will. And, further, we may also interpret the good as a duty as well as the law. Is it *morally* impossible to set up the end as a determining principle of the will? Is there not a common good the realization of which can be put forth as a duty for every man? In short, do we in real life divorce that which we aim at from the law of our striving? Kant certainly separates the two. But let us do him justice: he is here seeking to unfold the determining principle of morality purely as such. His problem is—what constitutes the *morality* of an action? Moral activity is his immediate concern in the *Analytic*: good and evil are concepts which relate to the will as morally or immorally active. He will extend this use in the *Dialectic* where he deals with moral achievement: the final good for man is what is morally possible of realization through freedom. But we must not anticipate him at this stage. It will suffice at present to emphasize Kant's separation of the end as good

from the will—activity as good in itself. Kant forces himself into this position by his severance of the theoretical and the practical aspects of consciousness. By limiting the knowable to the sensible, he denied the possibility of an intellectual interpretation of anything which transcended natural laws; or, in other words, the only instruments for directly determining reality, so far as positive knowledge is concerned, are the categories of the understanding. Thus, in knowledge, the conception of causality is inextricably associated with the idea of natural necessity. Should the theoretical reason conceive a free cause, the idea is merely that of natural causation untrammelled by physical restrictions, and we cannot make actual use of it within experience. But, because we can conceive of such a notion as a free causality, as not being inconsistent with natural necessity, we are enabled to work with it in a region transcending the limits of the sensible, provided we do not bring the two worlds into immediate contact with one another upon the plane of the understanding. We may relate—indeed, we cannot avoid doing so—the practical determinations of a free causality to phenomena, but we cannot by any means pass to them from the phenomena themselves. So we may practically experience a law as immediately determining the will, but a moral determination can never arise from a phenomenon. If we regard the moral good as something which we seek to realize, and if by realization we mean the process of experiencing the coming-to-be of the object, then, according to Kant, the end must be capable of being represented by the understanding: this fact constitutes it an object of the theoretical consciousness, and accordingly it ceases to have a moral significance. Kant

adopts a consistent attitude, we admit, by thus submitting himself to the inevitable implications of his dualism. But an independent analysis of the relation between the will and the good as end does not permit us to remain at peace with Kant's interpretation of it. How, then, can we reconcile the moral law with the end as a good determining the will?

First of all, it must be made clear that the ideal is not to be separated absolutely from the actual in the moral life. What we hope and ought to be is not positively something apart from what we are. It is no "cloud-cuckoo-land of subjective fancy."¹⁰ The ideal must be for us an object of consciousness; it must make its appeal through the moral reason; it is not a thing external to the will. We must here beware of the tendency to set up abstractions as independent entities. What we conceive to be our moral ideal is not an object of desire, which may be made visible in sense-experience; it is rather a conception of the self as realizing itself through the object; the ideal is just that end of conduct through which the self desires to express itself for its own satisfaction, and also in the hope of being thereby of better service for the welfare of the whole society of which it is a member. The self as it now is and the self as it hopes to be are not two separate, disjointed selves, but the one self in process of development towards a higher achievement. And in so far as our moral progress is in harmony with the moral end that we have set up for ourselves, so far is what we do in reality of one piece with what we aimed to do. There must be a synthesis of present and possible or future achievement: the two are but phases of the moral life

10. A. S. Pringle-Pattison, *Idea of God*, 1917, p. 252.

of the one self; and according as the synthesis becomes real so does the self find its satisfaction in and through the process of realization. Thus moral activity does not possess value in itself, but only so far as it is fulfilled in self-satisfaction, *i.e.*, the harmonization of the desired end of conduct with what has been attained. To be the best that one can be is a duty laid upon every man; for what is highest and best in the individual is what is of most value, both to himself and to his fellow-men. There is no power outside the man to compel him to become what he ought to be; hence moral obligation implies a law which a man must impose upon himself: he is an autonomous being, as Kant truly said. The law is not something external to the man: it is a rational inward, compelling force, which owes its strength to the nature of the ideal which he has set before himself for achievement. The ideal has power over his will because it is the man himself as he desires to be. In the ideal the desires are all harmonized and made one with the self, and obligation just means the duty laid upon a moral being so to co-ordinate his inclinations, habits, modes of life, and so forth, that they present a coherent manifestation of the dominant passion of his life. Duty, then, is truly a necessitation of law; but, as we see, of law that draws its authority from the moral ideal. The law just expresses that inner consciousness the man has that there is something which it is right for him to do, because it is good; and its strength resides in the fact that what he sees it is right to do and good to be has a power over him, possesses him, as it were, claims his allegiance, because it is the highest expression of himself as a moral and rational being.

The law of duty, then, may be thus stated—Make the ideal actual: become your best and noblest self. Such a law is not by any means heteronomous; there is no external authority here: the whole significance of the law is personal to the man himself. Be what you ought to be. Make real the highest in you, and it must follow that you become what every other morally-minded man would desire you to become. Thus your life takes on a universal character; it fulfils its mission in co-operating with all for the consummation of the good in which all may share. And just because the ideal cannot from its very nature become actual in absolute completeness,¹¹ the law of duty and obligation on man's part to fulfil it can never be transcended. To do one's duty remains a fundamental fact of the moral life, and without it that life would be vain and meaningless. Kant truly feels its sublimity, and we may go with him all the way in this regard, if we supplement his foundation by uniting the law of duty with the good as a determining ground of morality.

But Kant himself did not overlook this very point, for he was well aware that in raising the problem of an object of morality he was confronted with the difficulty of passing from an abstract statement of law and its activity to a concrete realization of it. The conditions necessary for this constitute the problem which he attempts to solve in the *Dialectic*. Here he is concerned to show that it is formally possible to fulfil a practical

11. Cf. W. Wundt, *Ethics*, v. 3; *Principles of Morality*, tr., 1901, p. 70.—"Thus the ideal as individual, as determining the tendencies of the individual existence, necessarily assumes whatever special form the ideal of universal humanity takes on, with reference to the definite limits of time and the external circumstances of life, and to the particular sphere of operation that belongs to the individual moral personality. For the ideal of the whole is not something completed, something given once for all: it is always in process of becoming, and never finished."

or moral judgment. It is a similar problem to that of the possibility of the categorical imperative. If I will the law, how may my actions, which take place in the world of sense, be made conformable to it? "Judgment depending on laws of pure, practical reason seems to be subject to special difficulties arising from this, that a law of freedom is to be applied to actions, which are events taking place in the world of sense, and which, so far, belong to physical nature."¹²

This problem of mediating between the form of moral law, as universal and independent of phenomena, and the objective results of moral action, is solved, according to Kant, by the symbolical¹⁸ representation of the connection between them. Seeing that its realization cannot be a matter for scientific determination, the principle of unity necessitates a type of the law, not a schema involving actual contact with phenomena. Being shut off from direct association with sensible existence, Kant thus looks to the pure principles of the understanding to express the formal nature of the relation. They themselves are laws determining phenomena, being applicable to actions in the world of sense, but, at the same time, these laws, if formally conceived apart from their involution with sense material, may be representative of a system of laws, obtaining in the intelligible world.¹⁹ In this way we may consider the noumenal sphere under the form of law, involving an idea of causality dissociated from physical causation. Though Kant maintains the *a priori* principle of causality as

12. Abbott, p. 160; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 72

Nos. 13-17 omitted.

18. Abbott, pp. 160-62; Hartenstein, v. 5, pp. 72-73; Akad., v. 5, p. 70.

19. Cf. L. Staehlin, *Kant, Lotze, and Ritschl*, tr., 1889, pp. 61-68, whose criticism rests upon the ground of the categories as set forth by Kant himself.

such is the same in both cases, still the nature of its reference to noumena necessitates a synthetical relation to phenomena, and in this connection the application is not to phenomena directly, but through the understanding as reflecting in its activity the pure forms of natural laws.²⁰

This formal inter-relatedness of universal laws, as an intelligible system, we may find, on analysis, represented in the world of phenomena, when regarded apart from its "filling." The similarity resides in the inner gradings of the pure frame-work, as it were, immanent in the superstructures of the two spheres of reality. Belonging to the supersensible world, we are capable, then, of acting in accordance with a moral principle, as though the constraint came from an irresistible law of nature, assuming it were possible to realize the object of the action. Purposes, or ideals, as objectives, are excluded: the original spring of the action is the formal sanction of the law; and this activity, noumenally originated, takes on a phenomenal appearance through the understanding, whose principles of unity are, in themselves, intelligible relations, in formal community with the law of freedom.

From this analysis, it is seen that Kant's explanation of the connection between will as causality and material reality resides in the formal significance of law. The bond of union is just this abstract conception—the idea of inner consistency or unconditioned necessity.

20. Cf. Fichte's fulfilment of this position in his doctrine of the self-subsistent reason. See his *Werke*, 1845, Bd. 4 (*System der Sittenlehre*), p. 229 ff. Also cf. O. Liebmann, *Kant und die Epigonen* (Neudrucke, etc., h. v. d. Kantgesellschaft, Bd. 2), 1912, pp. 80-81 (1865 Ed., pp. 81-82). For Fichte all reality is posited in and through the self-activity of the ego. Practical and theoretical reason are one. But he was merely playing with abstractions which, however compounded, could never produce the concreteness that we know reality to be. Cf. A. S. Pringle-Pattison, *Hegelianism and Personality*, lect. II.

Hence the category of causation in its theoretical use is of no avail to explain the conception of a good action as consequent upon a moral law. But, considered in itself as a principle of pure thought, it belongs to noumenal reality, and is not dependent on experience for its *a priori* relation to the unity of self-consciousness, and thus it may be regarded as having a practical value in moral activity, which, though a pure expression of law, and reflective of will as a noumenal causality, is, at the same time, phenomenally manifested in the world of experience, seeing that every determination of the will reveals, in the fulfilment of its object, a reference to phenomena, but only on the grounds of analogy.²¹

Thus Kant justifies his conclusion that the moral law as a causality of reason may be causally related to actions in the world of nature.* We may admit the consistency of Kant's argument: it is ingenious, to say the least of it. From the point of view of the theoretical reason, the world of morality cannot be directly connected with the world of nature; yet as viewed by the practical reason, a connection between the two is necessary; and there is nothing against such a connection, provided it does not upset the unbroken causal inter-relatedness of things in the sensible world. Indeed, to an intelligence which is capable of a comprehensive view, the principles of connection in the two worlds reveal a common foundation, seeing that even for a finite understanding the categories of the world of sense are not derivable from experience but are given *a priori* in pure reason. While, therefore, Kant cannot show directly how a moral causality can give rise to actions

21. Cf. V. Delbos, *La Philosophie Pratique de Kant*, p. 464.

*This last section appeared as Appendix IV., in *Basis of Freedom*, pp. 79-82.

in the phenomenal sphere, still there is nothing inherently impossible in the conception of it, and this warrants him proceeding upon the assumption in a critique of morality. Kant appears, then, to be quite within his rights in taking up the position he does, and we cannot convict him of an inconsistency in this respect. Our object has been to view the matter from Kant's own standpoint, and so to discover wherein lies his justification for setting forth a causal relation between the law as a causality of reason and actions taking place in the world of sense. His argument cannot be fully criticized at this stage, for it takes on a wider significance in the Dialectic, where we shall further discuss it. Nevertheless, it is necessary to make reference here to one or two points of criticism.

Though Kant insists upon freeing moral determination from sensibility, it cannot be asserted that he succeeds in his effort. Morality relates to the act of *willing* only, he says, and not to the object willed; and yet in actuality the one passes over into the other, or, rather, they cannot be positively separated from one another.²²

22. Cf. A. Cresson, *La Morale de Kant*, 2nd Ed., 1904, p. 143, who assumes that Kant's law of duty has direct or immediate effects in time, and that the idea of duty is necessarily phenomenal, even on Kantian grounds. Accordingly, Cresson denies noumenal freedom. But he makes a distinction between phenomenon and noumenon, which is not Kantian. Certainly, the action done from duty is phenomenal and, from the standpoint of one who observes, may be regarded as coming under the law of natural (or phenomenal) necessity. But the origination of the act—and that is the point that Kant is concerned about—cannot be phenomenal on his terms. A completely noumenal being transcends duty and obligation according to Kant, and a completely phenomenal being comes entirely under the law of natural necessity. But man is more than the latter and less than the former. It was open to Cresson to criticize Kant's fundamental position and the meaning of the terms he used, but it was not altogether fair criticism to give a meaning to a term which is not Kant's at all. At the same time, it was unfortunate that Kant should have limited the range of "knowledge." But, then, in considering his conclusions, we should remember the restricted meaning given to the term knowledge (which for him was equivalent to theoretical scientific knowledge). Still, Kant did not say that scientific knowledge was the only knowledge. He admitted that there was a practical knowledge, which showed itself, for example, in moral judgments. These

Kant himself cannot avoid, nor does he really attempt to avoid, this inherent necessity in moral experience. To put it plainly, he cannot get away from the fact that a causality of will must have reference to the realization of the object. There must be some form of causal connection between them. Or, to speak in Kantian terms, noumenal causality must be regarded as an efficient cause of phenomena. But, according to the way in which Kant has dealt with the matter in the *Critique of Pure Reason*—and he does not depart from it in his investigation of man's practical interests—phenomena are merely manifestations on the plane of the understanding of what is an intelligible reality. There is no "efficiency" here. Appearances do not signify a causal relation; the effect "appears," but the connection is not "real." There may be a logical distinction between what appears and what is real, but they are not causally connected in any real sense. To consider the appearances by themselves, apart from the reality, or that which appears, is to make of them intellectual abstractions, and attribute to them in their separateness qualities which they do not possess in their unity.

Again, though laws are formal when regarded as such, and so identical in character, still, that cannot enable us to establish a common foundation between the supersensible and the sensible, as Kant asserts. For him the world of nature is a system of law. These laws are not

practical interests of mankind were no mere fancies, but realities in which man believed with a conviction that could not be shaken. But they could not be explained in terms of knowledge, according to Kant, *i.e.*, they did not come within the purview of the scientist. Yet they were none the less real. We may rightly object to this cleavage made by Kant between theoretical and practical knowledge. But if we are to regard duty, the fulfilment of obligations, as belonging to the phenomenal man only, we should at the same time not overlook the fact that such a use of the term phenomenal does not accurately convey Kant's position.

derived from experience, though they be made manifest within experience; they are given *a priori* in the understanding itself. Now, the moral world is also a system of laws; and its laws are *a priori* and intelligible principles. Hence there is a common ground so far as law is concerned, within the understanding, between the worlds of morality and nature. But whereas laws of nature are limited to phenomena, laws of morality are unrestricted in scope: they are laws of freedom. The main difference between them relates to the limits of their operation. They are, therefore, formally the same in kind, *a priori* synthetic principles, though they vary in significance according to the reality to which they are applicable. This means that although the effect of a natural cause must always obtain within the sensible, nevertheless the effect of a supra-natural cause may also take place within the sensible, but not *vice versa*.²³ In the latter case the understanding acts as an intermediary. In short, the moral system and the natural system have a common foundation in law. But in this explanation it would appear that the mechanistic interpretation of causality predominates; no really new conception of causality is introduced into the moral or supersensible sphere, for instead of developing the significance of the causal relation or penetrating more deeply within the nature of the connection, Kant merely releases the idea of natural causality from external origination, and treats it as though unhampered by sense-conditions. But that is, indeed, to get rid of causal connection altogether. Yet surely we may advance beyond the point of view of a "typic" of prac-

23. Cf. *Watson*, p. 320; *Bernard*, p. 38; *Hartenstein*, v. 5 p. 201; *Akad*, v. 5, p. 195.

tical judgment. May we not boldly admit that the causality as manifested in the act as done is of one piece with the will-causality itself, and that they are not two distinct kinds with a common form? In short, may we not show that moral causality has a direct reference to what results from it in the outward conduct of the man? His moral interests do not abide in a world of mentality isolated from sense experience: he *achieves* them, as we say. Everyone admits this. The task is to give it a rational explanation without whittling down the meaning of the causal relation. Instead of starting, as Kant does, with a merely physical category of causation, and trying to frame another form of causality, that will not interfere with it, let us rather regard man's moral experience as an integral element of the world in which he lives.

This means that we must analyze moral causality in the concrete experience of it, and, if (as Kant himself says) the theoretical categories cannot explain the whole thing, then we must seek for a higher order of categories which is adequate to unfold the inner determinations of moral experience. In the real life of striving man is not cognizant of himself as existing in a world apart from nature; he feels himself to be in immediate or direct relation with the sensible. He does not imagine that there is one kind of causality in himself and another kind in nature, nor does he feel compelled to translate one into the other where joint action is concerned. He goes straight ahead. At times the things of the material world submit to him; at other times they bar his progress. In both experiences he views them as an intelligible being, and endeavours to understand their inner make-up—the principles upon

which they are constructed, their uses as objects of nature, and their applicability for the service of man. What may be, from a merely outward point of view, a system of movements or of objects in motion, may also, from an inner point of view, reveal a purposive tendency, which is only understandable by the human mind as a causal agent. The material things are accordingly said to have meaning or value for man; he can use them for his own ends. He may express his activities by means of them; he may adjust and readjust them until they satisfy the aims which he is seeking; or he may discard them as utterly valueless for the particular service for which he required them. Their causal connection (viewed as a physical relation) is merely an instrumentality for the working out of the determinations of the moral self. It is not so much a "typic" of moral causality as a means for fulfilling its ends, where such are realizable. On the other hand, it may prove intractable to man; it may not yield to his efforts. He may have miscalculated its significance for him; but that does not alter the fact that it involves an intelligible principle, and that a correct understanding of what it exemplifies will enable a man to render it serviceable to his will.

The world of material things is therefore organic to man's nature; it may subserve his interests; it cannot be set aside as something absolutely distinct from him, with which he may not interfere, and which has no meaning nor value for him. We have here introduced a teleological factor. It has not come upon us as a principle external to the process of nature, but as one involved in the very process themselves, for man cannot be separated in actuality from the world of nature; and a

complete understanding of nature's ways is not without significance for a true understanding of man himself. We need not further pursue this matter. Suffice it to say that we must bear in mind a distinction in Kant's point of view. He is here directly concerned with the determining principle of morality, and its consequences within the will itself. Hence he considers moral determinations as a supersensible system of things, apart from any connection (direct or otherwise) with a system of the world of sense, except so far as it may be necessary to compare them in reference to their form as a system. Though the determining principles in the two spheres are quite distinct, and the one cannot determine the other without overthrowing itself, still their effects as systems may have a common form, and it is this common form which Kant sets forth in his "typic of the moral judgment." Later on, in the *Dialectic*, he considers the realization of the moral principles in the highest good for man; there he goes beyond the pure will as such, and discusses morality as what is achieved through freedom rather than a mere possibility as in the *Analytic*.

CHAPTER III.

MORAL LAW AS MOTIVE: THE IDEA OF DUTY.

The essential thing in moral action, as Kant puts it, is that the moral law directly determines the will. The moral law, accordingly, must be the motive to morality. There can be no other motive, for if happiness, or satisfaction of desire, or some standard other than the law, move the will to action, the constraint is not moral in Kant's meaning. Similarly he maintains that mere outward observance of the law is nothing better than legal convention. Conformity with custom is not a moral initiative. In the moral life the determining principle must be the law itself.¹ All else must be in subjection to its inherent authority. Its dominance rouses an inner recognition of its worth, and its enthronement in man's rational nature gathers about it awe and respect.¹ By

1. Cf. A. Cresson, *La Morale de Kant*, 2nd Ed., 1904, pp. 164-65; R. Strecker, *Kants Ethik*, 1909, p. 28; P. Janet, *Theory of Morals*, tr., 1884, pp. 36, 38; Schopenhauer, *Basis of Morality*, tr., 1903, pp. 10, 30, 33; Fouillee, *Critique des Systems de Morale Contemporains*, pp. 236, 404, quoted by Delbos, *La Philosophie Pratique de Kant*, p. 353 n. These and other critics refer to the moral law as a sort of moral tyrant after the fashion of a political tyrant who rules arbitrarily. But surely anyone who has read Kant carefully will admit that there is nothing arbitrary about the moral law. Contingency—dictation without reason—is the last characteristic that Kant would attribute to it. He constantly speaks of the law as a fact of reason, as intuitively known to the humblest intelligence. It is certainly not something forced upon man by a superior (and exterior) will. It is a law that can only originate in a rational being, and its imposition on man is an imposition which he imposes upon himself. Only a rational being can appreciate such a law of the practical reason; it is without meaning to any other creature. It is the final authority in morality—the principle that is beyond and above every other principle, for which man cannot "give reasons"; or, in other words, man can offer no demonstrable or positive proof of its validity. Schopenhauer (cf. p. 31) asserts that Kant's imperative has its origin in "theological morals" or the "Decalogue." But Kant strongly repudiated such an origin for his moral principle and was most careful to distinguish its authority from the external sanctions of theoretical ethics. Again, the law of duty is not an imperative that commands without reasons. If so, how could Kant possibly identify it with the autonomy of the rational will? The quotation, *sic volo sic jubeo* (Abbott, p. 120) has occasioned misgivings on this score. But Kant's meaning is clear. The practical reason is originally legislative, and does not brook interference from any

its power the will subordinates the promptings of desires for satisfactions that lack intrinsic worth, and only in so far as the will's activity is determined by the law can it subdue the appeal of desire to this higher moral direction. In this manner duty or obligation dominates in man's moral life. This subjection of sense impulses may be regarded as the negative effect of the law as motive to the will. As Kant holds that pleasures come by way of satisfaction of inclinations and propensities, any restraint of them must be a withholding of pleasure, and so their non-fulfilment is fraught with feelings of pain. This restraint of desire, then, produces a negative feeling of humiliation or self-depreciation in a will that would conform to the law. But the very lowering of self-esteem has a further practical effect, inasmuch as there is felt an elevation of mind due to the removal of hindrances which bar the moral progress of the individual. This feeling of elation is a positive result of obedience to the law, and Kant ascribes to it a moral significance.² At the same time, we cannot estimate the moral value of actions from the feeling itself, nor can we deduce from its existence the conception of a universal rule of morality; still, its recognition is a positive help to moral observance, and thus it may be called a feeling of respect for the moral law. But Kant insists that this expression of respect for moral law rests simply on the ground of the law itself, and therein lies its claim to sanctity. Accordingly, the law alone determines the will to the exclusion of desires, and the will respects it as such. This intellectual feeling of reverence for the

outside influence. Such, if attempted, could only come from the sensibility, and not from the autonomous will of another rational being. And there is no need to "give reasons" to the sensibility for its subordination to the higher direction of the will.

2. *Abbott*, p. 171; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 83.

law, then, becomes a moral motive. There is nothing that more disposes a man to act morally than the awe-inspiring majesty of the law. It is not a majesty that impresses man with a sense of his own littleness; it rather tends to uplift him and render him worthy of it in the highest degree.³ The law is not something that is alien to man: it itself, indeed, is originated in reason, and makes its appeal to him through his reason. It is the expression of the way in which the highest in man should reveal itself. (The man who acts morally, *i.e.*, conforms to the law, respects his own personality, and gives it its due place in the moral order.) He feels humiliated just in so far as he realizes how holy is the life in which the law is fulfilled in its purity; but that feeling can only come to the man who compares what he might be, and ought to be, with what he is. If the law be "active" in him, he cannot be satisfied with himself; self-esteem will be utterly crushed; but he will also be inspired to do better, to become what he ought to be—to become in very deed a *man*, a moral personality.

This inner agreement with moral law as a supreme requirement is man's duty. Such a consonance of his moral motives with the law gives to him a feeling of dignity and enobles the conception of a self-legislative will (the creator's greatest gift to man). Duty is meaningless to a will that is not autonomous. Any motive, as a moral principle, loses its value if this autonomy of will be disregarded; its only right to recognition rests upon the acceptance of this property of the

3. Cf. C. C. J. Webb, *Kant's Philosophy of Religion*, 1926, who affirms that "we shall not obtain an adequate or perfectly-balanced view of his position in regard to Religion, if we ever forget that his attitude towards the Moral Law itself is essentially a profoundly religious attitude, and is quite misunderstood if identified, as too often it is, with any legalism that could be justly contrasted with a religious morality as self-complacent or unspiritual" (p. 62). Cf. also pp. 190-95.

will whereby it is a law unto itself, *i.e.*, it always acts upon a maxim which operates as a law of reason. In duty the disciplinary power of reason is made manifest to the finite personality of man. Human beings in their moral relations cannot dissolve the inner constraint of duty. What duty enjoins is man's highest achievement—to be a person. Duty is a power that elevates a man above himself as a sensible being and connects him (as Kant puts it) with a supersensible order wherein personality is supreme.⁴

“It is a very beautiful thing,” says Kant,⁵ “to do good to men from love to them and from sympathetic good will, or to be just from love of order; but this is not yet the true moral maxim of our conduct which is suitable to our position among rational beings as *men*, when we pretend with fanciful pride to set ourselves above the thought of duty, like volunteers, and, as if we were independent on the command, to want to do of our own good pleasure what we think we need no command to do. We stand under a *discipline* of reason, and in all our maxims must not forget our subjection to it, nor withdraw anything therefrom, or by an egoistic presumption diminish aught of the authority of the law (although our reason gives it), so as to set the determining principle of our will, even though the law be conformed to, anywhere else but in the law itself and in respect for this law. Duty and obligation are the only names that we must give to our relation to the moral law. We are, indeed, legislative members of a moral kingdom rendered possible by freedom, and presented to us by reason as an object of respect; but yet

4. Cf. *Abbott*, p. 180; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 91.

5. *Abbott*, p. 175; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 87.

we are subjects in it, not the sovereign, and to mistake our inferior position as creatures and presumptuously to reject the authority of the moral law is already to revolt from it in spirit, even though the letter of it is fulfilled."

Kant wins our admiration in thus setting forth the place of reason in the moral life, even though we may disagree with his exclusion of sensibility. The path of duty is open to all men alike: the impressiveness of the fact has laid hold on Kant; for only here can man attain true dignity. He need not submit to the lower or physical order of things. He can utter an "everlasting no," and he is "great" in so far as he thus asserts his moral strength. He stands, as Kant says, "under a discipline of reason." Still, that our moral actions be reasonable, that they have a foundation in law, does not warrant us in concluding that they be done without reference to sentiency. Fulfilment of duty must have something satisfying about it, even though it be but the grim determination to go on unflinchingly. On on, and ever on! That is the call man hears unceasingly beckoning him to a higher and more expansive life. And the feeling of attainment, or of having the goal within one's grasp, reinforces the self in its striving, adds new impetus to it, and gives one the consciousness of having stood one's ground and done one's allotted task. Here is a life of moral grandeur that is open to every human being. Greatness in personality is not a prerogative of the favourites of fortune; it is within reach of even the humblest. Stand true to oneself; realize that one is free and self-dependent; that even though all else fail, yet one has it in oneself to be sublime, to claim respect, to be at home with oneself, aye, and against

the world! This consciousness of "well done" is truly "the effect of a respect for something quite different from life, something in comparison and contrast with which life with all its enjoyment has no value."⁶ Still, for all that, we cannot go all the way with Kant and affirm that duty has nothing to do with enjoyment. Certainly not with feelings of pleasure as determining principles of morality. But, as we have maintained, the spring to action in the moral life cannot be a mere sense of pleasure or avoidance of pain; it is rather the conception of the self as realizing an end. And the law just expresses the fact that there is ever the "push" in one to press forward, forgetting the things that are behind. Because there is always a better for me, I must go on. If I refuse, I reduce myself to a lower order of nature; the "life of the spirit" has gone out of me; I am become as nothing. But if I insist on becoming what it is in me to become, then the law of duty dominates me, and is it not a law which I lay upon myself? But the law cannot be separated from the end, only the end can give meaning to the law. And as the end—my becoming or rather being a person—involves the satisfaction of my moral nature, the law of duty surely cannot be wholly divorced from the feeling of contentment that arises with the realization of the end. Nevertheless, the strength of the law does not depend upon joy in the attainment of the end; for even though one's life-end be written down as a failure, bringing with it dissatisfaction and despair, that does not give one a warrant to abrogate the law of duty.

Even in his own analysis of the moral motive Kant himself cannot divorce duty absolutely from feeling.

6. *Abbott*, p. 181; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 92.

He excluded every feeling from the law as a determining principle of morality; but when he considers how the law can be a motive to moral action we find him discovering it in the feeling of reverence which the law inspires in the man of duty. He endeavours to be consistent by insisting that this feeling has an intellectual origin; that it is not the result of a mere appeal to sensibility. Still, as a feeling it is related to the feelings of sense, for it arises from a consciousness of the restraint which the law imposes upon us. Our lower feelings of desire are checked; and the check may be a source of disappointment. Hence Kant cannot avoid reference to the sensibility in explaining how we come to have this feeling of respect for the law as the motive to moral action.

Another difficulty arises from the admission that moral determination implies goodness of will, which, being intelligible, is beyond the call of the sensuous; for how can Kant justify restriction of desires as a source of pain, if, indeed, the sensible consciousness has been transcended? Where is the need for this restriction? Pain and pleasure, as feelings, are related to objects of experience, which may be known to consciousness *qua* understanding, and therefore their realization and non-realization are matters of knowledge, and, on Kant's hypothesis, cannot be directly related to moral determination. But if the acceptance of the moral law, as determining the will, be due to the self-reasoned judgment of the moral consciousness, and if that consciousness exclude sense-determination, how can Kant legitimately reinstate any form of feeling as an element in the motive? First of all, let us recollect that Kant has obtained the idea of moral law by abstracting from

all sense-conditions. We have shown that in its applicability to man as a moral imperative it is void of content.⁷ How then can it be related to that out of which it came, when it has been universalized as an objective form? The moral law is utterly dissociated from sense as to its origin, and yet its effectiveness (as Kant shows) is most potent in so far as it checks and disciplines the desires and inclinations. Only as it restrains the inordinate promptings of propensity and prevents them from determining the will to act, can it claim respect; and this respect in man for the law acts as a moral dynamic; it is irresistible and compels recognition. Kant clearly acknowledges, then, the disciplinary merit of the law; it must bring order into "the manifold of desires," and thereby give expression to its unity of character. Only so can man maintain his "humanity in its proper dignity in his own person."⁸ Only so far as he recognizes himself as a person, and acts as such, can he subject the sensible order of desires to "his own personality as belonging to the intelligible world."⁹ Kant admits this to the full when he is confronted with the real man. His conviction is that "personality" is the highest expression of man's nature, and that it is not something which can be achieved by the few—by the "intellectuals," but is "natural to the commonest reason and easily observed." Any man has in him the power to fulfil the law in his person equally with every other man. Here, then, man truly finds himself; only in this way can he show forth his moral autonomy. The right is his, and the power, too!

7. See my *Basis of Freedom*, Appendix III., pp. 65-78.

8. *Abbott*, p. 181; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 92.

9. *Abbott*, p. 180; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 91.

It is good to get into close grip with Kant at his best; the downright sincerity of his conviction that the worth and sublimity of man reside in his person, and that in this respect the humblest intelligence can claim equality with the greatest, is clearly manifest throughout his ethical works. But despite all this, the rational basis for his conviction is far from satisfying, and further his conception of the greatness of man's personality as compared with all else in the universe lacks coherent expression in so far as he sets up the reason in direct opposition to the feelings, and attempts to find the intrinsic value of the moral law in reason alone. And yet when Kant analyzes the nature of the moral motive, he cannot resist relating it to the feelings and attributing its worthiness to the fact that it subordinates the feelings of desire to the higher direction of the law. Kant here requires the moral principle to do more than it has warrant, for it is purely rational in itself. It is not difficult to see how Kant has been led to give this explanation of the law in action; for the very meaning of the law signifies authority of some sort; or if it be merely a natural law, a unifying function. Now the fact of Kant's moral principle being indeed a law has rather influenced him (in spite of his austerity) to go beyond its abstract limits, and regard it (in application) as having power over that which it determines as an integrative principle; for a law is a law only relatively to the facts which it unifies or interprets. So the moral law, being independent of sense relations, would necessarily integrate the facts of the intelligible system. And this is what Kant presumes upon throughout. But, unfortunately for him, the moral law is only in absolute harmony with what it determines in so far as it is the

law of holiness, and to that extent it exceeds a man's grasp, and ceases to be a command. Still, its synthesizing tendency is manifest in man, even though his achievement does not accord in full harmony with a holy will. He is by nature a "creature," and so can never be "quite free from desires and inclinations." Thus Kant must needs "found the mental disposition of his maxims on moral obligation . . . on respect which demands obedience to the law."¹⁰ Hence we find that he is affected by a rather subtle bias towards the subjection of man's sensible being to a moral discipline; indeed, the very nature of man, the subject of morality, forces this inevitably upon him. Man's power of self-determination lifts him above the world of material necessitation; he has within the capacity of ordering his activities, and determining the significance of outward things for his inner life. Natural laws cannot wholly determine him: they may be exemplified externally in his bodily activity, but he is more than his appearance unto observers. He has a consciousness of himself for himself, and Kant recognized this,¹¹ and considered whether he could discover laws, capable of giving an objective interpretation of these higher altitudes of being. In the lower sphere it was fundamental with him to place all aspects of experience, as determined by the categories of the understanding, under the dominance of natural necessity. These phases of existence were related to one another by laws, which implied that they were not inwardly determined, but dependent upon

10. *Abbott*, p. 177; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 88.

11. *Watson*, pp. 186 ff.; *Mueller*, pp. 471 ff.; *Hartenstein*, v. 3, p. 379. "But man, who knows all the rest of nature solely as an object of sense, is aware of himself also by mere apperception, and that in acts and inner determinations, which he is quite unable to regard as due to impressions of sense."

something beyond themselves, as individual objects, for their explanation. Now, the consciousness of self implied a determination not dependent upon outward things: there was a felt integrative movement within, self-dependent, and self-originated; but, in so far as this activity did not take on objective reference in experience, it would not come under the determinations of scientific thought; and it was, therefore, of no positive value in the organization of sensuous experience. This conception of a world transcending sense plainly indicated the demand for a system of laws not limited by sense reference; and the supreme universal law of this intelligible sphere of reality Kant called the moral law.¹²

¹². For discussion of the theoretical problem involved here, see my *Kant's Doctrine of Freedom*, ch. 6.

PART 2.—THE HIGHEST GOOD POSSIBLE
THROUGH FREEDOM.

CHAPTER IV.

HIGHEST GOOD AND ITS RELATION TO THE MORAL LAW.

I. EXTENDED DETERMINATION OF THE WILL.

The Dialectic of the Critique of Practical Reason raises obstinate questionings for students of the critical philosophy. The solutions of the problems, with which it is concerned, appear to many to overthrow much that was respected in the Analytic. It is alleged that the principles of the latter are not consistently followed out, and that the dignity of the moral law is besmirched with an hedonic taint. "The old keynote sounds no longer."¹ This view is widely prevalent, and generally accepted without demur. Some critics maintain that Kant has not been faithful either to the letter or to the spirit of his ethical standpoint, while others who find points of agreement part company with any attempt to show a consistency of treatment in accord with the formal rigorism of the Analytic. Is it a fact that Kant toiled hard to construct a moral edifice of the noblest type in the Analytic, and then set about to destroy it in the Dialectic? Before undertaking a critical exposition of Kant's doctrine of the summum bonum we shall give some consideration to the relations between the conclusions of the Analytic and the problems of the Dialectic.

In the Analytic it is laid down that the moral law commands the obedience of everyone without regard to consequences. The morality of the action implies

1. James Seth, *Study of Ethical Principles*, 12th Ed., 1911, p. 422.

the "necessity of acting from duty and from respect for the law, and not from love and inclination for that which the actions are to produce."² "Duty and obligation are the only names that we must give to our relation to the moral law."³ Accordingly, the sole determining principle of moral action is independent of all desires, and resides in a self-legislative will. Any other determining principle of the will, such as desire for happiness, or perfection, has no moral significance and is summarily rejected. To seek the realization of an object of desire is to put one's self under an external constraint, and such submission is subversive of moral determination. All desires for objects are desires for pleasure in their realization; pleasure appeals to the sensibility, and depends upon the object's presence, and can only be known empirically.⁴ It is essential that a moral principle be a law for all rational beings without exception, who are capable of acting according to *a priori* practical principles. Happiness is not such a principle. Though everyone desires to be happy, it is not a duty to consult one's own happiness. Even to make universal happiness the object of one's desires rests upon empirical data, and cannot be expressed as a law of morality.⁵ Accordingly the desire for happiness is rejected as a moral principle. Momentary happiness or pleasure is relative to the wants of an individual, and their satisfaction is a matter for subjective determination; and it cannot be stated as a formal principle of morality, as the nature of the satisfaction

2. Abbott, p. 174; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 86.

3. Abbott, p. 175; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 87.

4. Abbott, p. 108; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 22.

5. Abbott, p. 125; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 38.

differs in each specific instance. The moral principle is formal and universal. Material ends, or objects of desire, cannot yield a moral formula applicable to all rational beings. Practical laws rule out all reference to ends as springs to moral action. The realization of objects of desire depends upon conditions beyond the moral law as such. Faithful observance of duty cannot guarantee the attainment of happiness. "It is but seldom possible . . . to satisfy the empirically conditioned precept of happiness, even with regard to a single purpose."⁶ It involves the question of one's capacity and physical power to realize a desired object.

The sole principle of morality resides in the autonomy of the will.⁷ Objects of desire, including happiness, as determining the will, are denied moral worth. Such, then, is Kant's position in the *Analytic*. But when we read in the *Dialectic* that the object of pure practical reason is a union of virtue and happiness, which Kant names the *summum bonum*, or highest good; and further, that the conception of the existence of the *summum bonum* may be like the law, the determining principle of the will,⁸ it would appear as if Kant had left the conclusions of the *Analytic* far behind.

Here at first sight happiness seems to be included in the determining principle of morality; and this would directly contradict the theorems of the *Analytic*, which contend against hedonism in the strongest terms. Has Kant turned completely round upon his own principles? Many have agreed that he has. And if there should be no defence for Kant's position, then he would justly

6. *Abbott*, p. 126; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 39.

7. *Abbott*, p. 122; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 35.

8. *Abbott*, p. 205; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 115.

merit the severe condemnation which Paulsen⁹ sets forth in the following remarks:—"At a later point in the Dialectic we have not the concept of 'perfection' or of a 'kingdom of rational beings,' but that of happiness suddenly reappearing from some unknown quarter, and presenting itself, after having been previously rejected as derived from sensibility, as an *a priori* necessary element of the complete good, and one that reason has to recognize in addition to virtue. One must say that anything so internally inconsistent as the Critique of Practical Reason, with its two parts, the Analytic and the Dialectic, with the form and the matter of the will, the law and happiness, is perhaps not to be met with again in the history of philosophical thought."

We may further quote from Schopenhauer¹⁰:—"Kant's doctrine of virtue, however, we do not find so pure; or, rather, the exposition remains far behind the spirit of it, and, indeed, falls into inconsistency. In his highest good . . . we find virtue united to happiness. The ought originally unconditioned does yet

9. Paulsen, *Immanuel Kant*, tr., 1902, p. 321. It is clear from Paulsen's statement that he is confusing the highest good as a moral end with any object of desire regarded as an end. If Paulsen demurs to the appearance of "happiness," it is inconsistent on his part to favour "perfection," for Kant included "perfection" under material principles, which also imply the happiness principle. The appearance of the concept of a "kingdom of rational beings" would be even more favourable to Kant, for as Koppelman (*Die Ethik Kants*, 1907, p. 72) has it, "in striving for that kingdom of completely spiritual beings, the striving for happiness and morality run together. Such a kingdom would be the highest good." Cf. also Haegerstroem, *Kants Ethik*, 1902, p. 464 n. As regards happiness "reappearing from some unknown quarter," cf. Abbott, p. 186; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 97. Cf. The effect of this statement of Paulsen's upon McDougall, who quotes it in his *Body and Mind*, p. 200, and says, "Few would undertake at the present day to defend Kant's practical reason and his proof of immortality."

10. Schopenhauer, *Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy* in his *World as Will and Idea*, tr., 3rd Ed., v. 2, p. 146. There is an able justification of Kant's procedure, which is here travestied by Schopenhauer, in G. F. Barbour's *Philosophical Study of Christian Ethics*, 1911, pp. 212-218, who also shows a similar procedure in Plato's *Republic* and in Spinoza's *Ethics*, and concludes: "But when . . . the possibility of a true morality has been established, the hope of a future life and of the reward of virtue may rightly be introduced" (p. 217).

afterwards postulate one condition, in order to escape from the inner contradiction with which it is affected and with which it cannot live. Happiness in the highest good is not indeed really meant to be the motive for virtue; yet there it is, like a secret article, the existence of which reduces all the rest to a sham contract. It is not really the reward of virtue, but yet it is a voluntary gift, for which virtue, after work accomplished, stealthily opens the hand. . . . The whole of Kant's moral theology has also the same tendency, and just on this account morality really destroys itself through moral theology."

In the same connection Cohen¹¹ maintains that the rejection of the whole doctrine of the summum bonum as consequence of Kant's ethics is necessary, if his fundamental principles are to hold good. Hegler¹² also supports the view that Kant modified the strength of his moral principles as set forth in the *Analytic*, when in the *Dialectic* he introduced the conception of the existence of the highest good (which included happiness) into the determining principle of the will, and that in doing so he departed from the central and fundamental position of his ethics.

Such criticism cannot be lightly passed by. These writers would convict Kant of an intolerable inconsis-

11. H. Cohen, *Kants Begründung der Ethik*, 2nd Ed., 1910, pp. 352-53.

12. A. Hegler, *Die Psychologie in Kants Ethik*, 1891, pp. 188-90, cf. "The strength of this (moral) principle is modified by the fact that the conception of the existence of the highest good is taken up into the determining principle of the will" (p. 188). "According to this important passage (*Religion innerh. d. Grenzen d. bloßen V., Hartenstein*, v. 6, pp. 100-101; see quotation, pp. 86-88, Kant was aware that he departed from the central position of his ethics in this extension of the determination of the will through the conception of the highest good" (p. 190).

tency^{12a}. One does not expect any thinker, even so great a philosopher as Kant, to be incapable of making contradictions. The point for consideration is not whether a philosopher has brought forth a formula without the shadow of a contradiction, but whether he has faced the facts of the situation.¹³ Does his theory really attempt to harmonize them? Has he overlooked essential points? There was no phase of human thought and activity Kant was so earnest about as morality. It was for him the supreme interest of humanity. He desired to free morality from the incursions of naturalism, and to discover a foundation for its principles that could not be shaken by the laws of natural necessity.¹⁴ This he accomplished in the *Analytic*; but he also recognized that the determining principle of morality was not merely negative in its attitude towards man's hopes and aspirations. An adequate consideration of human nature required reference to the final end of moral reason. Indeed, he regarded the endeavour to define the *summum bonum* (or object of pure practical reason) as the "business of *practical* wisdom, and this again as a science is *philosophy*, in the sense in which the word was introduced by the ancients, with whom it meant instruction in the conception in which the *summum*

12a. Cf. C. C. J. Webb, *Kant's Philosophy of Religion*, 1926, pp. 64-65, where a defence of Kant's consistency is submitted in brief—"Thus I do not hold that the Kantian doctrine of the *Summum Bonum*, which forms the transition in the *Critique of Practical Reason* from Ethics to Religion, can fairly be described as a relapse from the disinterestedness of his ethical teaching into Eudæmonism."

13. Cf. W. Koppelman, *Die Ethik Kants*, 1907, p. 67. Referring to Cohen's rejection of the doctrine of the highest good, he says, "Now it is not to be denied that thereby certain difficulties are removed and a certain avoidance of contradiction attained. But a theory is nevertheless by no means correct in that it is void of contradictions and logically consistent. Rather it depends on whether all the facts concerned have been considered and brought into harmony with one another. Otherwise the theory remains a mere product of the study, 'sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought.'"

14. Cf. F. Paulsen, *Immanuel Kant*, tr., 1902, pp. 329-330, 393.

bonum was to be placed, and the conduct by which it was to be obtained.”¹⁵

Here Kant asserts his intense interest in the supreme importance of moral principles and their highest achievements. He had in him something of the Hebrew's passion for wisdom and righteousness, and “placed the end of creation in the glory of God.”¹⁶ To justify to man his right to seek the highest good, and to live out his life in accordance with the commands of the moral governor of the universe was, in Kant's regard, the task of morality as the doctrine of the summum bonum. But he has certainly not made clear the gradations in the development of his moral principles in this connection. He progresses from the abstract to the concrete without explicit reference to his enlarged point of view, and accordingly what is intended to be an extension of his principles appears to be a contradiction of them. This abruptness of transition is a marked feature of Kant's writings. Caird¹⁷ points out, with reference to

15. Abbott, p. 203; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 113. It seems fitting to add here a further quotation revealing the exalted conception Kant had of philosophy: “On the other hand, it would be no harm to deter the self-conceit of one who ventures to claim the title of philosopher by holding before him in the very definition of a standard of self-estimation which could very much lower his pretensions. For a *teacher of wisdom* would mean something more than a scholar who has not come so far as to guide himself, much less to guide others, with certain expectation of attaining so high an end: it would mean a *master in the knowledge of wisdom*, which implies more than a modest man would claim for himself. Thus philosophy as well as wisdom would always remain an ideal which objectively is presented complete in reason alone, while subjectively, for the person it is only the goal of his unceasing endeavours, and no one would be justified in professing to be in possession of it so as to assume the name of philosopher, who could not also show its infallible effects in his own person as an example (in his self mastery and the unquestioned interest that he takes pre-eminently in the general good), and this the ancients also required as a condition of deserving that honourable title” (Abbott, p. 204; Hartenstein, v. 5, pp. 113-14).

16. Abbott, p. 228; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 137.

17. E. Caird, *Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*, 1889, v. 2, p. 143. Cf. also v. 1, pp. 228-29, and v. 2, pp. 290-91. Also A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, *Philosophy as Criticism of Categories*, in his *Philosophical Radicals, and other essays*, 1907, pp. 314-15; T. Ruysen, *Kant (Les Grands Philosophes)*, 2nd Ed., 1904, pp. 361-68.

the three Critiques, that "we cannot properly understand Kant's work, unless we take it as, which it was in his first conception of it, an organic whole; and thus correct the illusory appearance of independence which is given to parts of it by the separation of the different Critiques." In the Critique of Pure Reason, for example, he separates sense from thought,¹⁸ but the conclusions come to regarding sense cannot be read apart from an intellectual synthesis. The point is, Kant reconstructs his theories as his problem advances to the more complex or higher levels of experience. And a similar reconstruction and extension of principles have taken place in the Dialectic of the Practical Reason; but the transition from the Analytic has been exceedingly abrupt. This passing from one stage to another without a preparatory explanation may very likely account for some of the criticisms which we have quoted, alleging that happiness is suddenly introduced "from an unknown quarter." It is also a characteristic of Kant to presume upon the results of a previous work without a further reference whenever the occasion is convenient. The principles set forth in the *Grundle-gung* (Metaphysical principles of morality) are assumed throughout the Critique of Practical Reason.¹⁹ The statement in the Dialectic regarding virtue as worthiness to be happy harks back to the Canon of Pure Reason in the Methodology of the Critique of Pure Reason.²⁰ And in the Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason we find much that helps us to elucidate difficul-

¹⁸ Cf. S. H. Mellone, *Philosophical Criticism and Construction*, 1897, pp. 165-73.

¹⁹ Cf. Abbott, p. 93; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 8. Cf. also J. Watson, *Philosophy of Kant Explained*, 1908, p. 339; Kant, *Critique de la Raison Pratique*, tr. par F. Picavet, 3rd Ed., 1906, p. 306 (*Notes*).

²⁰ Mueller, v. 2, pp. 690-703; Hartenstein, v. 3, pp. 531-40.

ties in the Dialectic of the Practical Reason.²¹ Before coming to final decisions regarding many problems in Kant, it is frequently necessary to keep in mind both his earlier and later discussions.

In the light of the ultimate aim Kant had in view with reference to morality, let us see whether a strong defence cannot be stated for him in reply to Schopenhauer and Paulsen, and other critics holding similar views. We shall try and show that it is possible to justify his attitude from his own work, by attempting a reconstruction of his main argument. One may do this without being called on to accept the argument itself as a whole, for it will be seen that its roots penetrate deeply into the conclusions of the Critique of Pure Reason, and it is especially concerned with the fundamental cleavage between the sensible and the supersensible worlds.

There is one passage in the introduction of the Dialectic which has occasioned much difficulty, viz.: "It is, however, evident that if the notion of the summum bonum includes that of the moral law as its supreme condition, then the summum bonum would not merely be an object, but the notion of it and the conception of its existence as possible by our practical reason would likewise be the determining principle of the will, since in that case the will is in fact determined by the moral law which is already included in the conception, and by no other object, as the principle of autonomy requires."²² This statement is certainly deliberate, and is backed up later on in the Dialectic by several references, in which Kant makes it clear that the realization of the summum

²¹ Cf. E. Caird, *Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*, 1889, v. 2, p. 562; A. Haegerstroem, *Kants Ethik*, 1902, p. 465.

²² Abbott, p. 205; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 115.

bonum is commanded by the moral law, such as, "The moral law commands me to make the highest possible good in a world the ultimate object of all my conduct."²³ While there is here unmistakably an extension of the law, its legislation is not abrogated by any means. The determining principle of the will still resides in the law, though it is taken up into the final end of pure practical reason. Kant has elsewhere stated that the conception of the highest good as a determining principle of will, introduced another form of moral determination in addition to the moral law as such. He refers to it as an extended determination of the will.²⁴ His use of the term "extended" is an indication that he believed

23. *Abbott*, p. 227; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 135. Cf. also the following quotations:—"The realization of the *summum bonum* in the world is the necessary object of will determinable by moral law" (*Abbott*, p. 218; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 128). "We ought to endeavour to promote the *summum bonum* which therefore must be possible" (*Abbott*, p. 221; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 131). "If then the supreme good is not possible by practical rules, then the moral law also which commands us to promote it is directed to vain imaginary ends, and must consequently be false" (*Abbott*, p. 210; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 120). "But then the design of promoting the final purpose of all rational beings (happiness so far as it is possible for it to be accordant with duty) is even yet prescribed by the law of duty" (*Bernard*, p. 409 n.; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, 485 n.). "Thus reason takes for final purpose the furthering of happiness in harmony with morality. To further this so far as in our power (i.e., in respect of happiness) is commanded us by the moral law; be the issue of this endeavour what it may. The fulfilling of duty consists in the form of the earnest will, not in the intermediate causes of success" (*Bernard*, p. 382; cf. also pp. 376, 380, 387-88; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 465; cf. also pp. 464, 469-70).

24. *Hartenstein*, v. 6, p. 311 n. This reference occurs in the first part of an article by Kant, entitled, *Ueber den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, etc.*, which contains his reply to certain objections by Garve. Kant points out that not every end is moral; for the moral end must be disinterested, and the need for the final end of morality, or the highest good—that which pure reason gives to man and which organizes the whole of man's ends under a principle of unity—is a "need of the disinterested will extending itself beyond the observance of the formal laws to the realization of an object (i.e., the highest good)." This is a will-determination of quite another kind from determination of the law itself, for the duty is laid upon us to realize, to the full extent of our capacity, a world that conforms to the highest moral end. And in this connection Kant particularly distinguishes between the highest good as an end determining the will, which is at the same time an object whose realization is desirable, and the object of a pure will as conformed to this law, which is only concerned with moral possibility, and not with the moral end itself. Cf. also A. Haegerstroem (*Kants Ethik*, 1902, pp. 463-4, 474), who makes clear this distinction which Hegler and others confuse.

this enlarged conception of moral determination was not inconsistent with the formal principles of the Analytic. If the extension be justified, it implies that the moral law is not without relation to the supreme interests of humanity, that there is a constraint upon man to seek the highest good. But how does it make its influence felt upon the will? Can it be stated in terms consistent with the law of duty? The problem clearly implies that there is an object of pure practical reason which has a claim upon man's will through the moral law; and we might well consider whether this conception of an object of morality is consistent with what Kant has laid down in Ch. 2 of the Analytic concerning the concept of an object of pure practical reason.²⁵

Kant distinguishes between the conception of an object of pure reason and an object of desire existing in the world and appealing to the sensibility. What, then, is an object of pure will? Kant informs us that the objects of practical reason are those of good and evil.²⁶ They reflect the activity of will as conformed (or not conformed) to the moral law. To express the moral law as the governing principle of its activity is the object of a good will. Only the moral possibility of an action is under consideration here, not its fulfilment. Hence the objects of good and evil refer to the will's intent. "What we call good must be an object of desire in the judgment of every rational man, and evil an object of aversion in the eyes of everyone; therefore, in addition to sense, this judgment requires reason."²⁷ In other words, they may be conceived as the will's

25. Abbott, pp. 146-63; Hartenstein, v. 5, pp. 61-75. Cf. also *supra*, ch. 2, *The Moral Law in Action*.

26. Abbott, p. 148; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 62.

27. Abbott, p. 152; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 64.

revelation of itself as a pure self-determining causality (or otherwise), and so their applicability is entirely within the intelligible world. The object of the will as conformed to the moral law is just what is involved in its activity in so conforming itself: the realization of the object as desirable goes beyond the will's power as such. The object of pure will is accounted good, if it be willed under the law's determination. It is good in relation to the intention of the will apart from the conditions of its realization in the world of sense. Accordingly Kant's position here is that "the precepts of pure practical reason have to do only with the determination of the will, not with the physical conditions of the execution of one's purpose."²⁸

Kant has thus separated the sphere of human responsibility from the control of events in the world of sense. The will has it entirely in its power to will the good, but the material conditions necessary for the existence of an object of desire belong to the sensible world, and it is beyond the capacity of the will to choose or direct them. And so it may happen that the good which is willed may never be realized. If this should always occur, would the will that sought the good never feel disappointed at its non-realization? Would it be enough that man be conscious of satisfaction in the discharge of duty, and so worthy of happiness, but never under any circumstances participate in happiness? And, consequently, would it never be of interest to morality that a universal desire on the part of man could not be satisfied? Is there no power anywhere to determine the physical conditions of the realization of the good, and afford man some positive satisfaction to

28. *Abbott*, p. 157; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 69.

himself in willing the good and rejecting the evil? Now it is this reference to the realization of the object of morality that is raised in the Dialectic. How may the highest good be achieved through freedom, consistently with the moral principles set forth in the Analytic? It seems, then, a fair development of Kant's position²⁹ to consider what conditions are indispensable for the realization of the good, and how far they may be relied upon to achieve their object. Kant only raises this further problem after laying down the principles which alone can render any act of will as moral. To seek for an object of desire merely for the sake of pleasure to be derived from its existence is absolutely discountenanced by Kant. We must not consult our own happiness in the discharge of obligations.³⁰

The problem of the Dialectic then relates to the possibility of the existence of the object of pure practical reason. This object is not a mere object of sense, and accordingly, in this respect, it does not conflict with principles which Kant has unfolded in the Analytic. The concept of the summum bonum includes the moral law as the determining condition of its possibility, in addition to the desirability of its realization. In the former aspect, it conforms to the object of a pure will as laid down in the Analytic, in the latter it goes beyond this and refers to the need of promoting its existence.

29. Cf. W. Koppelman, *Die Kants Ethik*, 1907, p. 77.

30. But at the same time, as Kant himself points out in the Analytic, "it does not follow that this distinction between the principle of happiness and that of morality is an *opposition* between them, and pure practical reason does not require that we should *renounce* all claims to happiness, but only that the moment duty is in question, we should take *no account* of happiness. It may even in certain respects be a duty to provide for happiness, partly because (including skill, wealth, riches) it contains means for the fulfilment of our duty; partly because the absence of it (*e.g.*, poverty) implies temptations to transgress our duty. But it can never be an immediate duty to promote our happiness, still less can it be the principle of all duty" (*Abbott*, pp. 186-87; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, pp. 97-98).

Certainly, then, it is not a mere object of desire in the world of sense; if it be called an object of desire, it is that of a will conformed to the moral law. While, therefore, the will may be directed towards the realization of the summum bonum as the final object of morality, still this promotion of the existence of an object is not to be subsumed under an external or material principle, for it is an object the existence of which is demanded by pure practical reason itself.³¹ Its possibility is a practical necessity; it is something other than a mere object of desire as affecting the sensibility. Further, the summum bonum, as the object to which the will as moral is directed, is clearly distinguished from the object of pure will (good or evil), for the latter has no immediate concern with the world of sense experience, as it relates purely to what is morally possible. The summum bonum, as the final object of morality, is the highest achievement of the will possible in the world through freedom. In the conception of the summum bonum, then, Kant has unfolded an object of morality that is distinguishable³² from the objects of pure will, such as good and evil, and from the sensible objects of desire. He has so far considered the moral law with reference to the pure determination of will apart from any consequence or result,

31. Cf. *Abbott*, pp. 210, 230, 241, 243; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, pp. 120, 138, 149, 150.

32. But while Kant may be said to make this distinction, it does not imply that the actual *realization* of the highest good is a duty. Our duty may be fulfilled, even if the supreme end of morality be not achieved. But, according to Kant, the highest good only has value as a moral end, in so far as it determines the will which is already conformed to the moral law. In this way he distinguishes it from a mere object of desire in the world of sense, which cannot be conceived, as determining the pure will. Cf. A. Haegerstroem (*Kants Ethik*, 1902, p. 474), who maintains that the term "highest good" is but an "intensification" of the universal term, the good, by which Kant understands only the "object of a practical reason," and that the direction of the will to the highest good is only present in an interest for its realization, occasioned by the thought of the moral worth that lies in the will so directed.

such as the realization of the good itself. Now the inquiry must be pushed further. What are the conditions necessary to achieve the highest object for a will that is determined through the moral law?

It is clear that the conception of the highest good is not to be derived analytically from the moral law, for the latter is formal and determines the will independently of any object or end. But, nevertheless, "the moral law alone must be regarded as the principle on which that (*i.e.*, the highest good) and its realization or promotion are aimed at."³³ "The moral law as the formal rational condition of the use of our freedom obliges us by itself alone, without depending on any purpose as material condition, but it nevertheless determines for us, and indeed *a priori*, a final purpose towards which it obliges us to strive, and this purpose is the highest good in the world possible through freedom."³⁴ Thus Kant grounds the final end or morality upon the law. In these statements he distinguishes the highest good as a moral end from objects of desire, which belong entirely to sense experience, and are completely conditioned by laws of natural necessity. The highest good, on the other hand, is an object of will possible only through freedom; this condition gives to it its special moral significance. And in affirming that the moral law determines for us *a priori* a final purpose, the realization or promotion of which we are bound to seek, Kant may also consistently maintain that the conception of the existence of the summum bonum may be regarded as the determining principle of the will: its possibility is dependent upon the law of freedom.

33. Abbott, p. 204; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 114.

34. Bernard, p. 380; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 464.

Thus, in respect of the object of pure practical reason, Kant has not departed from the principles of the Analytic. He rather acts upon their validity in seeking an extension of the idea of the object. While Kant has no intention of sacrificing the purity of the moral law as a self-dependent principle, he finds that he cannot avoid reference to man's interest in the object of morality, and its power over him. He endeavours to reconcile his moral principles to this fact of man's nature, even in the Analytic, but he reserves the main issue to the Dialectic. Still, the problem was always before him; and in trying to solve it he does not discard his fundamental principles. In alleging that Kant drifts from his central position by regarding the highest good as the determining principle of the will, as though it were not distinguishable from a mere object of desire or from an object of the pure will as such, Hegler³⁵ rather confuses under the one term things which Kant kept apart. Kant had anticipated objections of this character in the Analytic when dealing with the object of pure practical reason. "It is only a formal law . . . that can be *a priori* a determining principle of the practical reason. The ancients avowed this error [of placing the determining principle in some objects of pleasure] without concealment by directing all their moral inquiries to the determination of the notion of the summum bonum, which they intended afterwards to

35. Cf. A. Hegler, *Die Psychologie in Kants Ethik*, 1891, pp. 188-90, 199-201, and see *supra* note 24. But Hegler (p. 200) admits that it is not the concrete end—its actual realization—which is included in the will-determination, but only the "representation of the entirely abstract end of a highest good." Kant's point of view rather is that the highest good is a concrete end, which the morally-determined will seeks to realize and believes to be possible, because the moral law itself obliges it so to do. The distinction made by Hegler implies that the highest good is not a mere object of desire for the empirical will, but he misses the point in not distinguishing it as an object of morality, which is also a determining ground, from an object of pure will as such.

make the determining principle of the will in the moral law; whereas it is only far later, when the moral law has been first established for itself, and shown to be the direct determining principle of the will, that this object can be presented to the will, whose form is now determined *a priori*; and this we shall undertake in the Dialectic of pure practical reason.’³⁶

Kant means that the object of a pure will relates to its action in willing the realization of the object, and does not concern the actual realization itself. The principles of pure practical reason have to do only with the determination of the will and not with “the physical conditions of the *execution of one’s purpose*.”³⁷ Therefore, Kant endeavours to establish these principles and demonstrate their validity apart altogether from what may follow upon their determination of the will. The moral law stands of itself without reference to objects. But the establishing of the supreme moral principle does not preclude the further consideration of its relations, not only to the consequences which arise from its operation on the will itself within the intelligible world, but also their realization as phenomena in the world of sense. Being a law of freedom, the moral principle excludes in its determination of the will any reference to happiness, inasmuch as the objects in which happiness is placed relate to the sensibility; but it does not follow from this that the supreme end of human endeavour may not include happiness, though it be conformed to the moral law as its determining principle.

In the Analytic, Kant is not directly concerned with moral actions as effects in the world of sense experience.

36. Abbott, pp. 155-56; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 68.

37. Abbott, p. 157; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 69.

He there seeks for the principle that constitutes an act of will as moral. Such a principle cannot consistently vary with any changes in the circumstances through which the will manifests its activities. It must be independent of all these changing manifestations of the will. But a moral action is something more than the principle itself in operation. The principle is only the supersensible form determining the morality of the action. Accordingly, the motive to morality would be the will's pure interest in the moral law as its determining principle, and the object of the pure (moral) will would have reference to its intrinsic worth as good will. But moral ends imply that the law is fulfilled in actions, and these go beyond mere principles of determination as such, and are represented within the world of experience. Yet, even so, the determining principles of morality undergo no modification in their reference to man; they are the same for all rational beings. But the conception of a final moral end raises the question of its relation to the moral law. It is not merely an object of desire, for it must be realized through freedom. But the idea of realization implies that it is an achievement of the will's action under moral law. It is the task of the Dialectic to discuss such consequences of moral determination which are due to the peculiar situation of man's nature. And this investigation need not necessarily contravene the point of view of the Analytic. That Kant's mind was under no delusion here may be clearly seen from the following passages from the *Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason*,³⁸ to the effect that a will acting under moral law must have regard to the results which are consequences upon such

38. *Hartenstein*, v. 6, pp. 98-99.

moral determination:—"But although morality on its own behalf needs no representation of an end, which must precede the determination of the will, yet it is very possible that it may have a necessary relation to such an end, not indeed as the ground, but rather as the necessary consequence of the maxims which were adopted in accordance with it. For no determination of the will can take place in man apart from any relation to ends,³⁹ as it cannot exist without an effect, the representation of which must be adopted for an end, though not as the determining principle of the will, nor as an end preceding the intention, but as a consequence of its determination through the law. Now, without such an end, a will could not satisfy itself. . . . Still, as regards doing what is right, morality has no need of an end, the law, which contains the formal condition of the use of freedom in general is sufficient for it. Yet there arises out of morality an end; for it is impossible for reason to be indifferent as to what answer is given to the question, What is the outcome of our doing what is right?" . . . The end here for Kant is that of the highest good in the world, the possibility of which depends upon God. "But this idea [of the highest good] practically regarded is not empty, for it supplies a natural want which we feel in thinking a final end for all our actions taken together: this can be justified by reason, otherwise it would be a hindrance to moral resolution. But the main thing here is that this idea arises out of morality, and is not its basis; it is an end which already pre-supposes moral principles in anyone who adopts it."

It may be admitted, then, that Kant is not discarding

39. Cf. Kant's reply to Garve, *Hartenstein*, v. 6, p. 311 n.; also A. Haegerstroem, *Kants Ethik*, 1902, pp. 427-28, 482 n.

his main principles in enlarging the object of pure practical reason. But when he maintains that the summum bonum may be a determining principle of the will, it is easy to understand how readily he can be charged with inconsistency. This phase of the problem will be discussed more fully later.⁴⁰ The objection has already been partly removed by pointing out that the summum bonum, as the final end of practical reason, is not a mere object of desire in the narrow sense of the term. It is far more, it includes the moral law itself as the indispensable condition of its possibility, and it is on this ground that it may be conceived as the determining principle of the will. Thus, it is not happiness as an object of desire which determines the will: it is the moral law as the supreme condition of goodness. The will that is moral seeks to realize the good. But we cannot conceive of the highest good for man without including his happiness or welfare. To aim at the realization of the highest good is a genuinely moral aspiration for man; for the determining condition of this supreme object of morality is the moral law itself. But as the highest good contains an element the realization of which is beyond man's power to achieve, Kant considers what conditions are necessary for its existence. How, then, is the existence of the highest good possible? How may the union of the supersensible and the sensible elements in the highest good be established? Such problems would not arise for beings in the supersensible world. Kant's standpoint may be logically justified, so far as he endeavours to extend the moral law and include it in the summum bonum as the determining principle of the will.

40. See *infra*, pp. 86 ff.

His procedure in the Dialectic, then, may be fairly well presented as displaying a formal consistency with what went before in the Analytic. But, while this may be so, it does not necessarily follow that his derivation of the moral law is rendered more acceptable. It has been pointed⁴¹ out that in setting up a mere formula as the foundation of morality, Kant raised difficulties which made themselves felt in the Analytic itself, and these same difficulties, as we shall see, show themselves with increased emphasis in the Dialectic. It is not so much a matter of inconsistent development in the Dialectic of principles set forth in the Analytic, as further evidence of the impossibility of attempting an explanation of morality by means of an abstract law apart from reference to a final end—especially when one is confronted with man's need of realizing the highest aspirations of his moral nature. This is clear from the fact that Kant derived his moral law in abstraction from the facts of the moral life, and then regarded it as being self-dependent; and further, that he used it to explain the very facts from which it had been originally disengaged. Though he denied moral worth to desires and inclinations, yet the moral law was considered to have power over them. The manifold of desires was subjected to the "unity of consciousness of a practical reason, giving it commands in the moral law, *i.e.*, to a pure will *a priori*."⁴² In a similar reference, he says, "For the moral law, in fact, transfers us ideally into a system in which pure reason, if it were accompanied with adequate physical power, would produce the

41. Cf. *Kant's Doctrine of Freedom*, pp. 83 ff., and the *Basis of Freedom*, Appendix III.

42. *Abbott*, p. 157; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 69.

summum bonum, and it determines our will to give the sensible world the form of a system of rational beings."⁴³ We find another instance of this kind of inconsistency in the solution of the problem of how the categorical imperative was *a priori* possible. Its possibility rested upon the principle that the world of the understanding contained the foundations of the world of sense and, consequently, of its laws also.⁴⁴ The laws of natural necessity had been restricted to the world of phenomena and could not gainsay the law of freedom, whose reality was proved in independence of the former. It was accordingly necessary that the categorical imperative, or law of duty, should be established without references to consequences in the world of sense, for otherwise it would not be a law of freedom, and morality would be impossible. But Kant went further. The impetus to seek an ultimate explanation for the world of sense in the world of freedom was logically sound in itself, but Kant's procedure was inconsistent with his derivation of the law of freedom. Having obtained it in complete dissociation from the facts of the theoretical world, he sought to make it the foundation of that world also. He had divided reality into two separate disconnected spheres, and then proceeded as though one could be the basis of explanation of the other. The problem of unifying the constituents of the highest good was but a part of the larger problem (with which Kant was all along confronted) of finding a principle of unity to bridge the separation between the sensible and the

43. Abbott, pp. 132-33; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 47.

44. Cf. Abbott, p. 73; Bernard, pp. 377, 385, 414; Hartenstein, v. 4, p. 301, v. 5, pp. 461, 468, 489. Cf. also D. Neumark, *Die Freiheitslehre bei Kant und Schopenhauer*, 1896, pp. 36 ff.; T. Ruyssen, *Kant (Les Grands Philosophes)*, 2nd Ed., pp. 321, 327, 366-67; F. Paulsen, *Immanuel Kant*, tr., 1902, p. 246, quoting passages from the *Reflexionen zur kritischen Philosophie*, ed. Erdmann, II., 1159, 1151, 1162.

intelligible worlds;⁴⁵ and it is in regard to this problem that the charge of inconsistency may well be laid against Kant. So far as the issue raised in the Practical Critique is concerned, it has reference to his establishing of the moral law in abstraction from the feelings, desires, and inclinations, and in attempting to integrate them by means of the very principle which had been abstracted from them in the first instance. Kant's moral law was a veritable abstraction, and it was inconsistent with its derivation to regard it as having power over the contents of the practical consciousness from which it had originally been separated.

Hence it is clear that the difficulties with which Kant is faced in the Dialectic have their origin in the Analytic, where he was mainly concerned with the determining ground of morality. Moral goodness resides in the will's determination through the moral law as such without reference to an end. The good consists in the will's willing to do what is conformed to the moral law. But willing in this respect is more than mere wishing or "meaning well":⁴⁶ it implies effort or determination to achieve. Accordingly the object of morality concerns what is morally possible for the good will. But moral action must have a relation to an end; for, as Kant says, without an end there can be no willing: there is no action without an end.⁴⁷ Now this reference to the end, which is to be realized through moral action, is just the issue that is raised in the Dialectic. Indeed, it was inevitable, seeing that man's nature is

45. Cf. *Watson*, pp. 310, 320; *Bernard*, pp. 11, 38-39; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, pp. 181, 201-02.

46. Cf. J. S. Mackenzie, *Manual of Ethics*, 5th Ed., 1915, pp. 271-72; also J. Dewey and J. H. Tufts, *Ethics*, 1909, pp. 244-45.

47. Cf. *Abbott*, p. 123; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 36; also *Hartenstein*, v. 6, p. 311 n.

what it is. The formalism of Kant's moral principle, which rendered it inadequate as a determining ground, will make it still more inadequate when referred to the final end of morality. Kant tries to meet the development of the moral situation in a manner similar to that adopted by him in the *Analytic* with regard to the relation between the formal law and the contents of the moral consciousness; and that, too, was the procedure used by him in the *Critique of Pure Reason* in like circumstances. Indeed, he seems to justify the reference of the moral law to the manifold of desires as being parallel to the relation of the categories of the understanding to the manifold of sense. This similarity of procedure will be referred to again; the point here is that Kant's difficulties in his *Ethics* arise from the theoretical *Critique*. Reference to the moral end cannot be avoided; and just as Kant was compelled to modify the formalism, or abstract consistency, of the moral law in the *Analytic*, so in the *Dialectic* he recognizes the necessity of extending the law, and (in Caird's words) allowing "that there is a *kind* of reference to the objective realization of the good which must be included in the motives, and that the *Summum Bonum* must be conceived as involving not only moral virtue but also happiness."⁴⁸

II. HOW THIS EXTENSION IS JUSTIFIED.

Kant's assertion that the *summum bonum* may be the determining principle of the will clearly goes beyond the moral law as such. Still the extension is not inconsistent with the principles unfolded in the *Analytic*. But mere consistency is not of itself sufficient to

48. E. Caird, *Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*, 1889, v. 2, p. 290.

justify the advance. That is no more than a logical harmonization of principles. There must be some foundation in the facts of human nature to warrant the development. The real justification for Kant's extended determination of the will should find a footing there. Can such security be obtained? And if so, can it be shown to accord with the central position of his ethics? The moral law claims man's explicit and unqualified obedience. That he obey should be sufficient for him. But Kant recognizes that there is also an inseparable tendency in man to be interested in himself: he must needs find satisfaction in himself. To release himself from the pressure of inclinations and make them subserve his moral interest cannot but give rise to a spirit of self-composure and sufficiency.¹ He finds that there is an inner strength in virtue which he realizes more and more in proportion to the hindrances which he has overcome.² Man thus comes to reflect upon the results of his moral conduct. The ends achieved through loyal submission to the demands of the law have an interest of their own. "Virtue is the moral strength of a man's will in his obedience to duty."³ Through it man reveals his loyalty to the moral law. While the consciousness of virtue thus possesses a satisfaction within itself, yet it inevitably goes beyond this and has reference to the actions of the will by which a man shows forth his mastery over his inclinations.⁴ In reflecting upon actions of this character, one may well ask, Whither do they lead? What purpose do they subserve? Can the good a man achieves through loyal observance of the

1. Cf. *Abbott*, p. 214; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, pp. 123-24.

2. *Abbott*, p. 317; *Hartenstein*, v. 7, p. 209.

3. *Abbott*, p. 316; *Hartenstein*, v. 7, p. 209.

4. *Abbott*, p. 215; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 124.

law bring him self-satisfaction? Does it ever entitle him to hope for enjoyment in the moral life?⁵ We are thus led on to the consideration of the final end of morality. What power should the highest good have over the will of man? Can any moral necessity be laid upon him to seek its realization? Kant considers that there is such a necessity, and that the moral law commands us to make the highest good the final end of our conduct. But this command involves an extension of the determining principle of the will in so far as the practical reason makes the highest good the final end of morality. But this extension does not imply the subordination of reverence for the law (as the motive for moral action) to mere desire for an object; for here the possibility of the end includes the moral law as its supreme condition, and that is the highest good. Thus the command runs, Make the highest good possible in the world your final end. This extended law, then, involves an end given by pure practical reason as according with the fulfilment of the moral law, and is therefore universal, claiming the obedience of all rational beings.

Kant's attitude towards this command as an extension of the moral law finds clearest expression in the well-known footnote to the preface of the *Religion Within the Limits of Pure Reason*.⁶ It seems advisable to quote the passage *in extenso*. "The principle that there is a God, and consequently a highest good (as a principle of faith arising out of morality) is a synthetical judgment *a priori*, which, although it is assumed only in a practical connection, still goes beyond the conception of duty, which morality implies (and which pre-supposes

5. Cf. Messer, *Kants Ethik*, 1904, pp. 242 ff.

6. *Hartenstein*, v. 6, pp. 100-01.

no material of the will, but merely its formal laws), and thus cannot be analytically derived out of it. How is such a principle *a priori* possible? . . . An end is always the object of desire, that is, of an immediate inclination for the possession of a thing by means of one's action. So also the law (which commands practically) is an object of respect. An objective end (*i.e.*, an end which we ought to have) is one which is given to us as such by pure reason. The end which contains the indispensable and at the same time sufficient condition of all others is the final end. One's own happiness is the subjective final end of every rational being belonging to the world of sense . . . and all practical principles which have this final end for their ground are synthetical, and at the same time empirical. But that everyone should make the highest good possible in the world the final end is a synthetical practical principle *a priori*, and, that, too, objectively practical, given through pure reason, because it is a principle which goes beyond the conception of duty in the world—and which adds a consequence (*i.e.*, an effect) which is not contained in the moral laws and cannot be developed analytically from them. These laws command immediately, regardless of any consequences; indeed, they require us to leave these consequences entirely out of consideration where any particular action is concerned, and make duty the object of the highest respect without setting before us an end (final end), which should enjoin, and be the motive to, the fulfilment of our duty. All men would have enough to do here, if they adhered, as they ought, to the precepts of pure reason in the law. What need they know of the outcome of their moral actions which the course of the world will bring

about? For them it is sufficient that they do their duty. . . . But it is an unavoidable limitation of man and his faculty of practical reason to have regard to the results of all his actions, in order to find in them something which can serve for an end, and also prove the purity of his intention. . . . In this end, if it is also represented to him through pure reason, man seeks something which he can love. Thus the law, which inspires in him merely respect, although it does not recognize that as a need, yet extends itself for his sake and takes up the moral final end of reason into its determining principle; that is, the principle—make the highest good possible in the world your final end—is a synthetical principle *a priori*, which is established through the moral law itself, and through which, nevertheless, practical reason extends itself beyond the law.’’⁷

How does Kant justify this extension? He first of all endeavours to make clear that this extended moral command does not introduce any new form of moral motive. That motive is still the respect due to the moral law, and not any desire for the realization of the final end; for the possibility of the highest good as the ultimate end of morality includes the moral law as its supreme condition. It is essential to the idea of a determining principle of morality that it be independent of mere objects of desire. Now the highest good as an object of practical reason is a moral end which man desires, and yet it is regarded as a determining principle of the will. How may this extension of the law be justified? There is no justification for such an extension, if the highest good be completely expressed as an object realizable in the world of sense, for such a deter-

7. For closing sentences of the note, see *infra*, p. 93.

mining principle of the will would entirely defeat the conclusions of the Analytic. And we could scarcely conceive Kant deliberately attempting to include in the determining principle of morality that matter of desire which he had so summarily rejected in the Analytic.⁸ If he speaks of an extension of the commanding principle of moral action so as to include the moral end of practical reason, we may reasonably suppose that such a moral end would not be merely an object of the sensible world. Moral observance implies something more than interest in the realization of objects of desire. So far as the highest good is concerned, it is not a mere object of sense experience; its realization involves conditions which transcend the sensible world. As a determining principle of morality it necessarily refers to something more than the satisfaction to be found in its achievement. It includes the moral law in itself as the

8. Cf. A. Cresson, *La Morale de Kant*, 2nd ed., 1904, pp. 125-32. According to Cresson, Kant's position in regard to the *summum bonum* is "bizarre" (p. 130). It is not a duty to seek one's own happiness; one's only duty is to be virtuous, to submit to the commands of the moral law; and moral good consists in doing one's duty for its own sake. Yet Kant, in the *Dialectic*, goes on to affirm that it is a duty for man to seek the highest good. By what right does he thus assert that it is a duty to seek happiness as well as virtue? Again, happiness, as the second element of the highest good, is an object of desire. But it is not possible, on Kant's principle, to prove from this that we ought to make its conquest the object of our moral efforts. How can Kant then urge us to believe that an object of our desires ought to be possible, because it is an object of desire, and that, consequently, he who would render it possible, ought to exist? Certainly Kant's position in the *Dialectic* would be strange indeed, if he there asserted that it was a moral command that a man should seek to be happy. The situation would be ludicrous in view of what he has laid down in the *Analytic*. "A command that everyone should try to make himself happy would be foolish, for one never commands anyone to do what he of himself infallibly wishes to do. We can only command the means, or rather supply them, since he cannot do everything that he wishes." (*Abbott*, p. 126; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 39.) But in extending the moral determining ground to include the *summum bonum*, Kant has not affirmed that it is a moral necessity for man to seek his own happiness. Happiness of itself is not a determining principle; it is a consequence of moral determination. The supreme condition still resides in the moral law as the determining ground of the will. The command to further the realization of the highest good can only be a command for a will already conformed to the moral law, and, therefore, as an object that is desired, it is altogether on a different plane from a mere sensible object of desire, which is absolutely excluded from all moral determination.

condition of its possibility as an end worthy of attainment. The object is thought of as being worthy of realization for a will already conformed to the moral law. Thus the interest in seeking its fulfilment lies in the will whose direction accords with the demands of the law.⁹ Ought not the will, having such a moral interest, to endeavour to bring into existence the highest good possible? And, if it be not possessed of the powers of accomplishing that end, should it not at least grow more and more worthy of eventually being able to accomplish such a final purpose, even with the aid of a higher moral power? The fact that the interest to achieve the highest possible good lies in the will already under the direction of the moral law, justifies the reference to the highest good as a determining principle of practical reason. There can be no moral worth for any will unless it is autonomous, self-legislative. But the self-legislative capacity of will should lead somewhere, should be impressed with an end worthy of the utmost endeavours of man; and herein lies that interest which prompts man to accept the highest good as a determining principle of will whose activity is grounded in the moral law. Because the highest good is an end to be realized through freedom, its realization is commanded by the moral law.¹⁰ Thus the moral law is not superseded as determining principle of morality.¹¹

9. Cf. *Abbott*, pp. 172, 267; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 84, v. 7, pp. 9-10; also E. Caird, *Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*, 1889, v. 2, pp. 453-55; and A. Haegerstroem, *Kants Ethik*, 1902, pp. 471-72.

10. Cf. *Abbott*, p. 227; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 135.—“The moral law commands me to make the highest possible good in a world the ultimate object of all my conduct.” Cf. also *Abbott*, pp. 210, 218, 221; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, pp. 120, 128, 131.

11. Haegerstroem (*Kants Ethik*, p. 490) shows that the determination of the will by the original moral law and by the extended moral law differ only according to form. Accordingly, the extension gives no new content. The pure will wills originally in conformity to law. But complete or

Kant has thus far manifested adherence to his main principles in this extended conception of the moral command. But he goes further. In the note to the *Religion Within the Limits of Pure Reason*, he shows that there is a need in man's nature which bare conformity to the law cannot satisfy nor fulfil. Man inevitably has regard to the consequences of his actions. It is a legitimate aim on his part to see that they may be justified as moral ends, conforming with the purity of his motive.¹² Is this need of man to be regarded as a thing of nought? Does its significance possess no moral worth? In determining how far consideration is to be given to this characteristic of human nature, Kant's original position should be kept in mind. The moral law is a self-dependent and autonomous principle, and, as an imperative, claims the submission of man's will for its own sake. It takes the form of an imperative because man belongs to the world of sense, and is constantly under the solicitude of desires, being inclined to seek objects for the pleasures they afford. But Kant recognizes that the observance of the moral law inspires in man feelings of reverence. The complete submission of his will to duty gives rise to an inner satisfaction. But should man have no interest in that which results from his fulfilment of the law? Cannot his achievements afford him any feelings of satisfaction, consistent with his will's subjection to the law. Even though the law be not obeyed for the sake of any good result that

absolute conformity to law is holiness. So the will willing holiness as an end of action is a will completely conformed to moral law. That the finite will advance continuously towards the attainment of holiness is only possible on the ground of a moral disposition in conformity to law. So, in order to attain holiness, the will thus wills conformity to law. Both forms of willing, then, have the same content, though differ as regards their form.

12. Cf. A. Haegerstroem, *Kants Ethik*, 1902, pp. 481-82n.

may come, still man should not be denied the right to be interested in the consequences to himself, which are likely to arise from his acceptance of the law as the determining principle of his will. From the point of view of pure practical reason, it is sufficient that man do his duty whatever the consequences; but his nature is such that it is not possible for him to act absolutely as a pure rational being. Indeed the law for him implies a moral obligation and takes the form of an imperative. In like manner the limitation of man's being constrains him to have regard to the consequences of his actions in the world, and consider how far they may afford him a satisfaction in consonance with moral determination. The man that fulfils the moral law may reasonably consider himself worthy of happiness, and even cherish the hope that his moral actions may bring him happiness. But the attainment of happiness goes beyond the moral law as such. And even if a man may not entertain this expectation of happiness for himself, he may desire its realization in the case of others on purely disinterested grounds. How may this desire be satisfied consistently with the principles of moral determination? The need is inevitable with man. Indeed, it is an expectation he might reasonably hope for. Can it be grounded upon the law? The problem arises only for man, owing to the peculiar nature of his being as belonging both to the sensible and intelligible worlds. If his supremest needs may be satisfied in the realization of the highest good, is it not then possible to extend the determining principle of morality so as to include this final end? Is it not also consistent with the moral law to command man to make the highest good possible in the world his final end?

The possibility of this extension of the determining principle of morality thus involves relations with the world of experience. And in this connection we shall further quote the concluding sentence of the note in the *Religion Within the Limits of Pure Reason*, to which reference has already been made:—"This [extension of the determining ground] is possible by the fact that the moral law is related to the natural characteristics of man, who must think in all his actions of an end beyond the law—which characteristic makes man an object of experience—and this also is only possible (in the same way as the theoretical and synthetical principles *a priori*) by the fact that it contains in experience in general the principle *a priori* of the knowledge of the determining grounds of a free will, in so far as this will, which sets forth the results of morality in its ends, confers upon the concept of morality as a causality in the world, objective though only practical reality."¹³

Here Kant states the ground for establishing the validity of the extension of the determining principle as including the final end, given *a priori* by the moral law. Kant compares the possibility of the reference of the law to the natural characteristics of man's nature, or the empirical will, with that of the *a priori* synthetic principles of the understanding to the given manifold of sense in experience. According to Kant, the sense-manifold is a multitude of sense-impressions constituting the matter of experience, and this is resolved into perceptions through the forms of space and time. The sense-perceptions cannot connect themselves with one another, and it is necessary to show how they become interrelated and combined into a system or unity. This

is done by the categories, or the integrative functions of the understanding. Their application in knowledge is limited to the world of experience: they are the *a priori* conditions of experience in which objects are known as phenomena. This experiential knowledge is only possible, then, if spontaneity of the understanding is combined with receptivity of sense; and such spontaneity implies the principle of self-consciousness.¹⁴ The combining functions of the categories proceed from the self-activity of the subject. In like manner Kant speaks of a causality of practical reason, whose determinations are possible in reference to the world of sense, but only in this respect—and that a practical relation—that it subjects the “manifold of *desires* to the unity of consciousness of a practical reason, giving it commands in the moral law, *i.e.*, to a pure will *a priori*.”¹⁵ Thus there are practical precepts by means of which the manifold of desires, constituting the empirical will, is resolved into a unity for the practical consciousness. They have “as their foundation the form of a pure will which is given in reason.”¹⁶ In this connection they have “to do with the determination of the will, not with the physical conditions of the execution of one’s purpose.”¹⁷ Accordingly, they are known immediately within the practical consciousness, for they only refer to the “intention of the will,” and not to its actual realization in the world of experience. Now, it is natural for man to consider in all his activities, What is their end or outcome? This may be said to be an *a priori*

14. Cf. *Watson*, pp. 54-56; *Hartenstein*, v. 3, pp. 106-110, 565-66.

15. *Abbott*, pp. 156-57; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, pp. 68-69.

16. *Abbott*, p. 157; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 69.

17. *Ibid.*

principle of the will in its empirical character. Without an end or purpose, there is no willing. This is the characteristic that makes man an object of experience, for the consequences of moral determination are expressed in the purposes of the empirical will, and these are presented in the world of experience. But it is just these purposes or desires of the natural man which the moral law is regarded as resolving into a unity or moral order. This is not in itself the determining principle of the will, but the result of its subjection to the moral law. Accordingly, this unity of the purposes of the empirical will, which may be expressed as objects in the world of experience, has a direct relation to the moral law as determining ground; and in this respect, it may be said with Kant that it is through the moral law (which is a fact known immediately in the practical consciousness), that knowledge of the determining ground of the will, whose ends are presented in experience, is made possible. Just as through the categories the objects of sense-perception become a world of experience, known to the understanding, and resolvable into a unity thereby, so, in a similar way, the ends that are desired by the empirical will are organized into a unity of ends for the practical consciousness through the moral law. Thus man may be determined by the moral law to seek the realization of the highest good, and this may be set forth as a synthetical practical principle *a priori*, for it goes beyond the mere determination of the will by the moral law as such. The knowledge of the ends that may be realized through this extended application of the determining ground of the will—which thus includes the conception of the existence of the highest good—relates only to what is practically

possible, and not to any theoretical determination of what can be known in the world of the understanding. Thus the validity of the extended principle, as Hägerström¹⁸ insists, is grounded upon the moral law itself, and apart from this relation it would have no moral significance at all, for the moral law is the principle of all moral knowledge. In this respect, then, it may be maintained that the issues, raised in the *Dialectic* of the *Critique of Practical Reason*, have a consistent relation with the principles of the *Analytic*. The conception of the existence of the highest good as a determining principle does not overthrow the validity of the moral law, but is rather an extension of the law, that is necessitated by a reference to the natural characteristic of man to be interested in the achievement of what is purposed by his will as conformed to the moral law. And what man is interested in he strives to realize. That is implied in the very fact of his willing the end; but his interest here is concerned with what conforms to moral determination, and not with any object of desire that may determine the will to realize it for the sake of experiencing pleasure in its possession. But Kant is still a victim to his dualistic starting-point. The moral law, which in itself is an abstraction, is treated as though it were a concrete universal, subsuming the particular desires under it. It is thus similar to the supreme category of self-consciousness, which is purely an analytic principle, obtaining apart from the particulars, to which it is inconsistently related as an integrative function of the understanding.^{18a} The validity of this extended synthetic determining ground

18. A. Hägerström, *Kants Ethik*, 1902, p. 481.

18a. See *Kant's Doctrine of Freedom*, pp. 9-14.

of the will—which signifies that the moral ideal is not something in itself apart from the moral law, but includes the law as its condition—requires a principle of unity common both to nature and morality; and thus Kant must avoid his dualistic tendency to regard them as two spheres that lie, as it were, side by side, having only the formal consistency of law in common without any real connection.¹⁹ The difficulties, then, with which Kant is confronted in his moral philosophy have their roots in his theoretical Critique: they arise from the “continuation of the error of the Critique of Pure Reason, according to which self-consciousness is reached by abstraction from that consciousness of the world of objects which yet is pre-supposed in it. . . .”²⁰ But under the stress of the moral situation Kant admits that the world of experience should be conformed to the needs of man’s moral nature, and this point of view renders necessary the conception of the existence of God. Man’s moral relation to the world of nature is not so fully dealt with in the Critique of Practical Reason as in the Critique of Judgment.²¹ There Kant regards man as the final purpose or end of creation. Through him the world of nature comes to have meaning and worth. But this is not accomplished by the mere creation of things. Worth implies something beyond the world of natural necessity. Is there any meaning in the world as a whole? What is its worth? It is clear that his question involves more than the suggestion of pleasurable existence. The world is not there for man’s comfort merely. Its purpose has a

19. Cf. *Supra*, pp. 38-45.

20. E. Caird, *Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*, 1889, v. 2, pp. 196-97.

21. Cf. *Bernard*, §86; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, pp. 455 ff.

deeper significance than that. But its purpose is not known to nature itself. As soon as we ask, "What are things there for?"²² we have asked a question which nature as mechanism cannot answer. It requires a "designedly working cause" for its explanation—and there is only one kind of being whose causality is teleological,²³ viz., man as noumenon. In and through man, therefore, the purpose of the world's existence must be revealed; and that, too, not as a being under natural necessity, but as a noumenon or moral being. For the final purpose of things transcends necessity: it should reveal their meaning and worth as a whole. And if their worth is to be their worth for man as noumenon—as independent of natural conditions, it must be expressed through freedom; man's highest worth as a moral being resides in a good will. So there cannot be a final purpose of the world without reference to good will. "Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a good will,"²⁴ and a good will appears to constitute the indispensable condition of being worthy of happiness. In other words, in man as a moral being we recognize the final purpose of creation. He contemplates the world as a system of purposes, whose meaning is made clear in the light of his moral freedom. But man is not the world's creator. How comes that to exist which he thus contemplates? How then is this system of purposes created and sustained? There must be a world-cause to account for this conception of nature as a whole. But this will not explain

22. Bernard, p. 359; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 448.

23. Bernard, p. 360; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 448.

24. Abbott, p. 9; Hartenstein, v. 4, p. 241.

man's existence as a moral being. Thus we must have a supreme cause which legislates not only for the world of nature, but also for the world of morality. There must be the one world ground for nature and morality.

If man then be the final purpose of creation, and man's highest worth is the worth of a good will, then we must needs seek a moral meaning for the world of nature as a whole, as a system of purposes or ends. How, then, can nature come to express a moral purpose? How may nature be harmonized with morality? How is it possible to accomplish moral ends? Now man, who is creation's final law, has no power over nature. "Hence the question necessarily arises, whether it [the fact of moral teleology] compels our rational judgment to go beyond the world and seek an independent supreme principle for that reference of nature to the moral in us; in order to represent nature as purposive even in reference to our inner moral legislation and its possible accomplishment."²⁵ Before this question is pressed home to an answer, let us think what we mean by man as the final purpose of the world. We mean man as under freedom, or, in other words, the moral laws. The moral law commands unconditionally without reference to any purpose or end, and the will which so conforms to the moral law is a good will. Now the possession of a good will renders one worthy of happiness. May happiness be attained? This implies something to strive for. According to the moral laws we cannot seek for pleasure merely, for that would annul morality altogether in the opinion of Kant. If happiness is to be sought, the striving must harmonize with the existence of man under moral laws: it must be involved in a final

25. *Bernard*, p. 377; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 461.

moral purpose, possible only through freedom, which is the highest good in the world. If the highest good is to be realized, the purpose of the world of nature must be harmonized with the purpose of man's moral being. But the connection cannot be represented by natural causes. We must even go beyond man, and assume a moral author of the world. Thus we find a causality adequate to connect the purposive determination of nature with moral legislation.

These remarks take us somewhat beyond the matter under consideration, and will come up for discussion in their proper order later on.²⁶ But Kant's standpoint is clear. Happiness may be legitimately associated with virtue—but it is a conception of happiness purified through the demands of the good will; and the command to realize the highest good in the world accords with the moral needs of man's nature, though the actual fulfilment depends upon a power higher than man. And so we may conclude with Dr. G. F. Barbour, "The first concern of ethical thought should be for the purity of the moral motive, and for the exhibition of disinterested loyalty to the good. But when the consequences of moral action in the world-order are taken into account, as they must be, it becomes clear that such action can only gain its end if it is supported by broader and deeper forces than that of the isolated human will; and that virtue can only come to its perfect development in a universe whose highest power favours and fosters its growth."²⁷

26. See *infra*, pp. 194 ff.

27. G. F. Barbour, *Philosophical Study of Christian Ethics*, 1911, pp. 224-25.

CHAPTER V.

HIGHEST GOOD: ITS ELEMENTS.

I. CONCEPTION OF THE HIGHEST GOOD: VIRTUE AND HAPPINESS.

In the conception of the *Summum Bonum*¹ Kant combines two elements, virtue and happiness, the one formal and the other material. The formal is the condition of the *supreme good*; the material relates to the consummation, or final end, of moral achievement. The former condition is self-dependent or unconditioned (*originarium*); the latter is the perfect or complete end (*perfectissimum*). Accordingly the *summum bonum* is a union of *bonum supremum* and *bonum consummatum*. Virtue, then, though it is the supreme condition of the good, is not itself the whole or perfect good; for, as Kant puts it, "Virtue (as worthiness to be happy) is the supreme condition of all that can appear to us desirable, and consequently of all our pursuit of happiness, and is therefore the supreme good."² But the question arises, How may happiness be united with virtue in the conception of the *summum bonum*? Will it follow as an immediate result of virtue? Or must we look for some condition beyond the good will as such? In the *Analytic*, Kant expressly discarded happiness as a principle of morality. He recognized that men desire to be happy; but happiness of itself could not possess moral significance as a determining principle of the will. It related to the consequences of moral determination. What, then, is its worth in this regard? This is the

1. *Abbott*, p. 206; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 116.

2. *Ibid.*

problem of the Dialectic which has to do with the final object of morality. Now, virtue lies in the immediate acceptance of the authority of the law. It reflects the character of the will under law. This subjection of the will under law produces the spirit of reverence for the law, but it cannot secure happiness to the individual. All rational beings, as Kant agrees, do desire happiness. Their faithful observance of the moral law for its own sake is deserving of recognition, and if they were never at any time to enjoy happiness as a just desert, we could scarcely believe that the Creator would have joy in His creation. In fact, all moral systems accept happiness as an end, and its realization is considered desirable and beneficial for the individual. Kant cannot overlook this universal feature of human nature, and seeks to justify its inclusion in the moral ideal or supreme end of moral action. How is it possible to express this union consistently with the principles as set forth in the *Analytic*? Is the one contained in the other, their union involving an identity of principle, or are they causally connected? If they be ultimately alike, the one may be derived from the other by simple logical analysis. In this case to be virtuous is just to seek one's happiness, or happiness itself implies the consciousness of a virtuous character. But this solution is unsatisfactory, for virtue and happiness are heterogeneous notions³ and are not identical in principle. The other alternative is that their union is real and synthetic; accordingly the one will be the determinant of the other as ground. Here there is a synthesis of concepts. How is it to be brought about? Whether,

3. For discussion on the heterogeneity of virtue and happiness, see *infra*, pp. 112 ff.

then, does virtue produce happiness, or happiness virtue? The latter is impossible on Kant's principles, as otherwise a feeling arising from an object of desire would determine the will as virtuous. In the other alternative—that virtue is conducive to happiness—it is clear that virtue is regarded as a determining principle, and happiness as the consequence; and thus they are heterogenous conditions and so conform to the character of the causal relation. Their union cannot be expressed as an identity: it is real and synthetical. How may their union be accounted for? First of all, we can find no solution in experience, as moral relations have no direct reference to sense perception. One must not look for any natural (causal) connection between happiness and virtue. The latter is an intelligible idea, the former is sensible. Kant's conception of happiness as involving the satisfaction of desire, is connected with the idea of physical causality. The principles of morality have only reference to the intelligible world, though the results of moral action may be typified in a perfect system of natural laws. Hence the union of virtue and happiness cannot be expressed in terms of the world of experience. Further, if their combination were merely contingent, as it would be if they were only elements in the sensible world, their union would not rest on a moral, but a physical basis; and accordingly it would possess no moral worth. If their harmony is to be justified, it must therefore be transcendental, *i.e.*, it must be shown to be practically necessary through freedom.⁴ As practical, therefore, the possibility of the summum bonum involves a necessity not conditioned by physical law: it depends on action initiated by the will,

4. *Abbott*, p. 209; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 119.

and therefore inwardly determined or free. A will that is good, or virtuous, is a law unto itself, or, rather, accepts the moral law as the motive to its activity. Now an action necessarily implies cause and consequence. Can the virtuous will of itself produce happiness directly, as an effect? If so, such a rule would imply that a moral consequence may be a mere physical effect; and that is impossible, for power to bring about a physical change requires knowledge and command of the forces of nature. Hence observation of moral law as such will not guarantee the union of virtue and happiness as the final end of moral endeavour. The will to duty is in itself neither cause nor effect of the desire to be happy; and yet both are conceptions universally applicable to man, and their union in the highest good is a practical necessity. And Kant avers that "if the supreme good is not possible by practical rules, then the moral law which also commands us to promote it is directed to vain imaginary ends, and must consequently be false." For to be virtuous, and never at the same time to enjoy a life of virtue, seems most contrary to the primary welfare of humanity; and if this disconnection were absolute, then it would appear that the destiny of the race was a most hopeless and painful riddle, and the Creator void of all beneficent intention. We are confronted here with a practical antinomy. Virtue cannot be held to be the immediate cause of happiness as an effect, for virtue is only referable to the intelligible world, and happiness is a material principle belonging to the phenomenal world. This presents a favourable path towards a solution of the antinomy. Physical necessity and freedom, according to the Critique of

Pure Reason, are not inconsistent with one another, as they are each applicable to different worlds, the one phenomenal and the other noumenal. This distinction enables Kant to resolve the antinomy of practical reason. It is absolutely contradictory to say that happiness disposes the will to observe the obligations of duty as binding on all men. But we may affirm the possibility of virtue (or the loyal devotion of will to moral law) being conducive towards happiness, though not on the grounds of natural causation, provided we can find a causality that will warrant this connection as practically necessary, and yet allow of the effect conforming to the law of natural necessity.

Now, the existence of a necessary being, though manifested in the world of outward things, is, on its noumenal side, cognizable according to intelligible relations. Similarly Kant has derived his transcendental idea of freedom. Through the moral law freedom becomes positive, and the will is a free or noumenal causality. But the effects of moral action are manifest in the world of phenomena. How may these phenomenal consequences of the will's causality as noumenal be capable of a consistent interpretation? This may be done by representing the laws of the moral system as typified through the forms of the laws of the phenomenal world, for laws as such are so far identical, no matter from what they derive their determining principles.⁶ Thus, while we cannot say that noumenal causality has direct effect upon phenomena, we may nevertheless regard the reference to phenomena as symbolical, and the fundamental sameness of form in all laws warrants their applicability; that is, as manifestations, the effects of

6. *Abbott*, p. 162; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 74.

a noumenal cause reflect phenomenal conditions, and therefore are capable of being determined by natural causation.

Moreover, in the Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason,⁷ Kant has solved the fourth Antinomy by assuming that a supreme being is the absolutely necessary condition, or ground, of the universe. The totality of phenomenal existences may be explained, as to their dependance, by a conceivable relation to an absolutely necessary unconditioned being in the intelligible world, and God may be therefore problematically conceived as the intelligent cause of nature. But man as an intelligible being is free and independent of sensuous conditions. On this side of his being his relation to the supreme being must be positively determinable according to universal law, and that is through freedom; for, being a thing-in-himself, man is not created in the sense of material phenomena, but is capable of being a law unto himself.

Here, then, the universality of law is shown to be common to both spheres under God as their supreme determining condition. And thus his existence must be necessary on intelligible grounds for the establishment of an *a priori* connection between nature and intelligence. This idea of God, as mediating between what is determined and what is self-determined, is but a more explicit statement of the practical grounds upon which the supersensible world is regarded as typified in the world of sense. We must, then, show that this idea of the existence of God, as the author of nature, is indispensable as a positive basis for the intelligibly necessary union of virtue and happiness. So long as we keep

7. *Watson*, pp. 191-93; *Mueller*, pp. 481-86; *Hartenstein*, 3, pp. 386-89.

within the sphere of phenomena we can establish no necessary connection between virtue and happiness; but phenomena do not exhaust the whole of existence. We know ourselves as noumena, existing in the intelligible world, and further, we have already seen that through the moral law the will may be so determined as to effect manifestations in the world of sense. If this be so, then it is not impossible to conceive a necessary connection between virtue (as predisposing condition) and happiness (as effect in the sensible world). But the union cannot be directly established; and we ourselves cannot therefore guarantee it, for no compliance with the moral law as such will necessarily assure happiness at all times, nor will the pursuit of happiness for itself reveal the necessity for determination of the will by a universal law. But an analysis of our nature shows us that happiness is a requirement of the fulfilment of the law, or at least worthiness to be happy; and we could not conceive of an all-wise governor of the universe, as creator and sustainer of all things, refusing this satisfaction to his creatures. Hence we may be led to suppose that the assumption of his existence, as the author of nature, will be a sufficient guarantee of the possibility of the highest good.

Kant has therefore indicated a guiding thread by following which we may attain a proof of God's existence, which is yet to be given in detail. For the present we must remain content with the indications in the Critique of Pure Reason, which point out the lines along which we are to proceed. We may be sure, then, that we can state the moral condition of the realization of the highest good, without any risk of contradiction from the phenomenal sphere. Kant's pathway towards

a solution of the Antinomy of practical reason makes it clear that according to him the realization of happiness in proportion to virtuous conduct is not to be attained in the sensible world, for in the summum bonum a super-sensible element is conjoined with a sensible; and it is this fact that is overlooked by those philosophers who regard the union of virtue and happiness as though it were a relation between phenomena and not a relation between things in themselves and phenomena.⁸ Virtue or worthiness is a supersensible notion; happiness relates to the sensibility, and accordingly the relation between them is that of the supersensible (or noumenal) to the sensible (or phenomenal). Hence happiness cannot be regarded as conducive to virtue, nor virtue as immediately conducive to happiness; for in this respect we would be regarding the connection between them as though it were phenomenal merely. If we wish to avoid this error, we must regard the disposition towards virtue as prior to and fundamentally different from the desire to be happy, however pure that desire may be. There is no other "spring to virtue" than conscious submission to and respect for moral law. To place it in any sensible feelings, such as the desire for pleasure or happiness, is usually due to presupposing the virtuous disposition in persons for whom it is wished to provide springs to virtue.⁹ A man must first "be conscious of uprightness" before it is possible for him to enjoy his moral integrity. And so, as Kant puts it, the primary question here is—How such a disposition is possible in the first instance, and such a habit of thought in estimating the worth of one's existence, since prior to it

8. *Abbott*, p. 211; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 121.

9. *Abbott*, p. 212; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 122.

there can be in the subject no feeling at all for moral worth.¹⁰ A man cannot be happy unless he is conscious of his uprightness. And it is not possible to make him virtuous "by praising to him the peace of mind that would result from the consciousness of an integrity for which he has no sense."¹¹ Happiness is always a consequence, never a determining principle of morality. The springs to virtue do not reside in the feelings. We are not prompted to do by what we feel. Kant exposes this moral illusion and makes use of it to justify his own standpoint. Respect for the law affords us some satisfaction in that we have performed our duty. This consciousness of approval follows upon our doing well. In this connection "the determination of the will directly by reason is the source of the feeling of pleasure, and this remains a pure, practical, not sensible determination of the faculty of desire."¹² This feeling is frequently confused by some as though it were an inward constraint prompting the will to action; and accordingly an act of will performed out of pure reverence for the law (which is a practical feeling) is confounded with one that reflects merely an impulse of enjoyment. "Now as this determination [of the will by the law] has exactly the same effect within in impelling to activity, that a feeling of the pleasure to be expected from the desired action would have had, we easily look on what we ourselves do, as something which we merely passively feel, and take the moral spring for a sensible impulse."¹³ For Kant, feelings are ever results, never

10. *Ibid.*

11. *Abbott*, p. 212; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 122.

12. *Abbott*, p. 213; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 123.

13. *Ibid.*

determinants of moral action; and if this distinction is kept clearly in the mind, that which is supersensible in moral action will be easily distinguished from that which is sensible. The spring to moral action is the law, and should never be reduced to the mere consciousness of a felt want. Even to act in accord with the law to avoid suffering and to acquire peace of mind is discountenanced by Kant, for according to him such action is void of moral value, even though it may appear outwardly similar to an act of will determined through the law itself. In the former case we look for a reward: in the latter we reveal sincere and pure loyalty to the call of duty against all thoughts of consequences. Feelings of pleasure are effects, not causes. "And consciousness of immediate obligation of the will by the law is by no means analogous to the feelings of pleasure, although in relation to the faculty of desire it produces the same effect, but from different sources."¹⁴ The consciousness of acting from duty cannot, therefore, be resolved into an agreeable emotion. Hence the virtuous disposition in man is to be clearly distinguished from the feelings that are associated with it. Any connection between them is accordingly synthetical, but the feeling of pleasure in doing is subordinate to the principle which determines the will to act. An analysis of the consciousness of virtue reveals an element of satisfaction in one's self that is distinct from the positive experience of happiness as following upon the accomplishment of one's moral purpose. This satisfaction, according to Kant, is negative, and may be regarded as self-contentment, implying independence of inclinations. It does not depend upon any special feelings,

14. *Ibid.*

and is called by Kant "intellectual contentment." This spirit of self-dependence wants for nothing from any external source; it is freedom from "burdensome" desires. There must be a complete mastery over the inclinations: they must be entirely subordinated to "law-giving reason alone." Morality is not fulfilled in acting upon a feeling to do what is right and just, even from considerations of mercy. Contentment is therefore no more than a negative satisfaction with one's self in being obedient to the law of morality. If this state brings enjoyment at all, it can only be that of the self-satisfaction which abides in self-sufficiency, inasmuch as one has in oneself the springs of moral uplift and righteous action. Loyal devotion to duty may therefore afford one a kind of contentment with one's existence; but cannot guarantee a positive experience of happiness. Virtuous conduct renders one worthy of being happy, but the consciousness of worthiness is not the same as the actual feelings of happiness. From these considerations Kant concludes that there is not a merely natural connection between virtue and happiness; but it is practically possible to conceive a necessary relation between them, not as between phenomena, but as between the supersensible and the sensible. This connection is purely an intelligible one, and cannot be stated in terms of theoretical knowledge. As happiness cannot be otherwise than a consequent conditional upon moral determination, it is necessary to find a ground upon which to base the union of virtue and happiness in the summum bonum. This union involves connection between the sensible and the supersensible worlds. It has been shown to be practically possible: the grounds of that possibility are now required. Accordingly, Kant seeks to set

them forth, "first in respect of what is immediately in our power, and then secondly in that which is not in our power, but which reason presents to us as the supplement of our impotence, for the realization of the *summum bonum*.'" ¹⁵

II. NATURE OF THE CONNECTION OF VIRTUE AND HAPPINESS.

The heterogeneity of the elements, virtue and happiness, has raised doubts in many minds as to whether it is at all possible to combine them into one conception, *viz.*, that of the *summum bonum*. There would be some ground for this, if heterogeneity were equivalent to incompatibility or incommensurability;¹ for in that case any combination of them would be merely a juxtaposition of elements that cannot blend.² What, then, is the nature of the union of virtue and happiness in the conception of the *summum bonum*? Is it an intimate and inward one? Or is it merely a joining together of elements entirely extraneous to one another?

Kant is under no illusion as to the difficulties of the problem from his point of view. "The *Analytic* has shown what it is that makes the problem so difficult to solve, *viz.*, that happiness and morality are *two specifically distinct elements of the summum bonum*, and therefore their combination *cannot be analytically cognized*, but must be a synthesis of concepts."³ "Now it is clear from the *Analytic* that the maxims of virtue and those of private happiness are quite heterogeneous

15. *Abbott*, p. 216; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 125.

1. Cf. H. Rashdall, *Theory of Good and Evil*, 1907, v. 1, pp. 71-72.

2. Cf. *Abbott*, p. 182; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 93.

3. *Abbott*, p. 209; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 119.

as to their supreme practical principle; and although they belong to one *summum bonum* which together they make possible, yet they are so far from coinciding that they restrict and check one another in the same subject.⁴ Virtue and happiness then are heterogeneous notions so far as they cannot be derived from one another, and consequently their connection must be synthetic. But their synthesis does not imply a merely external or mechanical connection, for such a causal relation only refers to appearances, whereas in their moral synthesis there is united a supersensible with a sensible element. The connection cannot be merely outward. There is, then, some justification for an inner form of union; for the notion of the *summum bonum* itself as the final end of morality would be impossible, if virtue and happiness, though heterogeneous as to their practical principles, were at the same time utterly incommensurable. Their commensurability as regards the final moral end is apparent to Kant, as we have seen from his extension of the moral principle to include the notion of the highest good.⁵

But it is not enough to show inner compatibility: that will not determine their fusion in the concept of the highest good. And this union is not arbitrary, but practically necessary, for the moral law commands the promotion of the realization of the highest good. It should not be overlooked that this idea of compatibility relates only to the *summum bonum* as the consumma-

4. Abbott, p. 208; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 118.

5. Cf. *Hartenstein*, v. 6, p. 99.—“It can therefore be by no means indifferent to morality whether or not it formulates a notion of a final end of all things; because only by means of such notion can a real combination of conformity to that end due to freedom and conformity inherent in nature, be made objectively practical.” •

tion of moral endeavour: it has no direct reference to the determining principle of the will.

Duty must be fulfilled for its own sake. The pursuit of virtue should be positively disinterested. But when one considers what may be the outcome of an unqualified devotion to duty, there springs forth an appeal that a life of virtue should not pass unrewarded. There is a high sense of compatibility between virtue and its appropriate consummation. It is frequently affirmed that the rewarding of virtue or the enjoying of good on account of being virtuous raises an issue that goes beyond the strict limits of morality. It is maintained that "the idea of merit is foreign to the genuinely moral consciousness." And so Pringle-Pattison,^{5a} following Bradley, considers that the question, "Why should I be moral," should not be asked at all, as it rests on the assumption that virtue is a mere means to some ulterior end (including happiness). And to be virtuous for an ulterior end is, as morally valued, not to be virtuous at all. But, on the other hand, moralists such as Kant and Sidgwick, who insist on duty or virtue as determining principles of morality, and who also affirm that duty or virtue is something good in itself, yet, at the same time, assert that the morally good man is deserving of being happy. In other words, they are of the opinion that there is some compatibility between virtue and happiness.^{5b}

What we understand by moral reward is the consciousness of achievement, the attainment of good which is enjoyed in common, which enriches the communion

5a. A. S. Pringle-Pattison, *Idea of Immortality*, 1922, pp. 178-79.

5b. Cf. J. Baillie, *Happiness Once More* in *Hibbert Journal*, v. 26, No. 1, Oct., 1927, p. 81, supporting Kant that no universe can be regarded as perfect in which perfect happiness does not follow on perfect virtue.

of those who strive to live well in the presence of all men. To be reinforced in right doing, to add from within to one's moral energy, to feel an accretion of power for service as well as to remove checks and restraints—these experiences must surely come as rewards for a life devoted to duty. And they cannot be received apart from intimate association in moral service with and for humanity. Again, these experiences must surely be expressed in the felt realization of successful achievement in the moral life which cannot be divorced from what we understand as the consciousness of well-being or happiness. These ends do not determine morality; they spring out of it; they are made by it and become of it. Hence we cannot live actually in a world of morally-abstract good or virtue absolutely dissociated from happiness. But it is also a fact that moral striving does not always bring the consummation of a happy lot. There are many obstacles in this world to the way of the perfect life in virtue. Devotedness to the demands of duty is not easily sustained. To succumb to contrary allurements is often tempting, but the end is never enduring happiness. And yet, is it not a fact that much of our unhappiness in life arises from our having done something immoral or from our being neglectful in some moral service, and so forth? We have misjudged a situation or we have not risen to an occasion. The reaction, due mainly to reflection, leads to unhappiness. But this unhappiness is not a merely negative state; it has a positive value in moral activity. It can and does awaken in us a need for a moral adjustment; and so there arises moral effort towards a better way of doing. This better way usually makes for the happiness that only virtue knows.

It is true, nevertheless, that, in shouldering great responsibilities or burdens many men and women do not wince; they accept these disabilities or "bitter injustices" (McDougall) as part of the game. Frequently these hardships, oftentimes counted as tributes to their moral strength, do but urge them to greater effort for the good of the whole community whom they disinterestedly serve. But when we take a long view of these moral situations, we come to the conclusion that what we understand by moral service is necessitated by an imperfect world, and that in moral striving we seek to help it on toward perfection. But such striving rests upon a conviction or faith in a Power⁶

6. Sidgwick (*Methods of Ethics*, 7th ed., 1907, pp. 503-09) gives some attention to this difficulty. He recognizes the need of falling back upon a religious sanction in order to remove an inconsistency in practical reason. Though we do our duty never so faithfully, yet happiness cannot be assured to us. We judge intuitively that the doing of right should be rewarded, and its violation punished. And yet what sanctions have we for assuming that this judgment shall be given effect to? The mere desire for its realization will not accomplish it, and yet we feel that it should be so. And further, as Sidgwick puts it, "It only expresses the vital need that our Practical Reason feels of proving or postulating this connexion of Virtue and self interest, if it is to be made consistent with itself. For the negation of the connexion must force us to admit an ultimate and fundamental contradiction in our apparent intuitions of what is Reasonable in conduct; and from this admission it would seem to follow that the apparently intuitive operation of the Practical Reason manifested in these contradictory judgments, is after all illusory" (p. 508). If we are to give a reasonable and consistent explanation of morality, we must somehow remove this contradiction. Accordingly, Sidgwick postulates the existence of God as a sanction sufficient to make it worth one's while to work for the general welfare of mankind (p. 506). This postulate is not necessary for morality, but only for the purpose of "rationalizing it completely." Sidgwick is less entitled to such a postulate than Kant, despite his contemptuous references to Kant's "state of mind." For if, as he maintains, virtue and happiness are not commensurable elements in the highest good,—which is (for him) universal happiness, or pleasure, then the final end of morality must be something out of all relation to what is rational, and cannot be conceived as having any claim upon man's intelligence. It is no more than a fact of reason to assert that virtue or goodness is an essential—indeed the most important—element of the highest good, and that upon which happiness, as another element, is dependent. We may reasonably and willingly disown our own immediate happiness that we may act according to right conduct or virtue, and so attain a more exalted character. And it is the very fact that virtue and happiness are not totally incommensurable elements of the highest good that makes such ethical considerations possible. Cf. H. Rashdall (*Theory of Good and Evil*, v. 1, pp. 60 ff.) for a trenchant criticism of Sidgwick.

that works for an ultimate righteousness—for a final good. As between a life of virtue and a life of evil, the issue, as Kant insists, cannot be the same. And so the “moral man, as ordinarily conceived, is the man who is able to adopt and does adopt the moral attitude in all the ordinary circumstances of his life. The completely moral man or morally perfect man is the man who would adopt this moral attitude in any possible circumstances.”^{6a} But merely to be good as such—to find in virtue as such its own perfected recompense—is surely to shut oneself from the world and dwell in a land of moral phantasy. The moral attitude is determined in reference to circumstances which it must either make or overcome. In this effort man cannot struggle alone. He must have faith that somehow good will be the final goal of ill; that the way towards the highest is not absolutely foreclosed to him who believes that the moral order shall eventually come to be. In such an order all may have joy and lasting peace. Progress towards this moral end can only be possible so long as virtue finds an inner stimulus ever to go on; and evil is checked in the heart of him whom the moral law convicts of wrong against itself. Virtue then must be constantly sustained from within to fulfil the highest good for man; but it cannot do so unaided. To supplement this lack in an imperfect world is a reward that virtue may rightfully claim as its own. But wherein resides the power to reward virtue? If there be no inner connection between virtue and happiness, then only an external bond will bring about their union, and such a situation cannot have any moral basis. But if their compatibility be maintained, their union

6a. W. R. Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, 1918, p. 576.

may be justified on moral grounds: it rests upon the power of justice as residing in the person of the supreme Law-giver.

From Kant's standpoint, as we shall see later, the conception of God as the divine law-giver is not derived from our notions of justice as legally dispensed among men. The only adequate understanding man has of God, according to Kant, is through the free acceptance of the authority of the moral law as unfolding God's will toward man. He is the searcher of all hearts, whose judgments (for men) are moral commands. And that man is good whose obedience to the moral law is self-constrained; and that man is evil who subordinates duty to his private happiness or self-love. Man is therefore divinely judged through the categorical imperative or the supreme law of morality. Thus the question arises whether the good man has any inner claim on happiness; if not for himself, then for such as deserve it with all sincerity of the moral consciousness.

It may be asked where is there any justification in Kant's philosophy for this position of an inner compatibility between being happy in doing or being good. There is no uncertainty as regards his conviction of there being an inner connection between punishment and the transgression of the moral law. But can we use this as an argument in favour of an inner connection between virtue and happiness? What is Kant's theory of punishment and how is it related to moral legislation? "Punishment, then, is a physical evil, which, though it be not connected with moral evil as a natural consequence, ought to be connected with it as a consequence of the principles of moral legislation."

Further, in the *Metaphysics of Ethics*, we find the following:—"Juridical punishment can never be administered as a means of promoting another good, either with regard to the criminal himself or to civil society, but must in all cases be imposed only because the individual on whom it is inflicted has committed a crime. . . . The penal law is a categorical imperative; and woe to him who creeps through the serpent windings of Utilitarianism to discover some advantage that may discharge him from the justice of punishment, or even from the due measure of it. . . . For if justice and righteousness perish, human life would no longer have any value in the world."⁸ The notion of punishment, then, according to Kant, cannot be united with that of partaking in happiness. The infliction of punishment must be accepted as justly deserved, and not with a view to some benevolent desire on the part of the person inflicting it. To forfeit thus one's happiness means more than injuring one's own private happiness: it implies that a law has been transgressed; for otherwise punishment might merely serve as the means of putting rational beings on the way to attain happiness.⁹ (Nor

8. *Kant's Philosophy of Law*, tr., Hastie, 1837, p. 195; *Hartenstein*, v. 7, pp. 149-50.

9. Of course, the bare infliction of punishment upon a wrong-doer may be no more than the enforcement of an external sanction by a superior power apart from moral considerations. Nevertheless, there is an intimate moral connection between the infliction of punishment and the doing of wrong, and it is in the bringing home of this relation to the mind of the wrong-doer that the moral value of the punishment lies. Any sanction to be moral must be inward, and the full recognition that the penalty was justly deserved under the circumstances, can only arise in the moral consciousness of one who realizes the righteousness of the suffering he is undergoing by way of punishment for his misdeeds. Herein we find an ethical basis for its infliction. In its essence, then, according to Professor James Seth (*Study of Ethical Principles*, 7th ed., 1911, p. 323), "Punishment is a rectification of the moral order of which crime is a notorious breach." Mr. Bradley, also, in his *Ethical Studies* (pp. 25-26) emphasises the same point of view,—“We pay the penalty, because we owe it, and for no other reason; and if punishment is inflicted for any other reason whatever than because it is merited by wrong, it is a gross im-

for Kant are rewards merely the machinery in the hand of a higher power to put creatures in the way of happiness.) This must still be admitted even if we hold to the view that punishment should be reformatory in trend. Apart from mental abnormality or subnormality, one is convinced in dealing directly with those who do wrong, that before any upbuilding or reconstructive work (reformation) can commence, there must be a definite "pulling-down" process—the wrong-doer must realize that his evil situation is the result of his own acts; that he is morally accountable despite any attenuating circumstances or other modifying conditions. Only on the basis of an inner conviction of wrong done in some form or degree—necessitating punishment through the acceptance of which the debt is discharged—can a harvest of evil be obviated and a progression towards good and for good be sustained.

It is clear, then, that for Kant there is a morally necessary connection between punishment and immorality: he who does evil should be punished. And, as a

morality, a crying injustice, and abominable crime, and not what it pretends to be. . . . Having once the right to punish, we may modify the punishment according to the useful and the pleasant, but these are external to the matter; they cannot give us a right to punish, and nothing can do that but criminal desert." The inner and moral results to the man on the infliction of punishment point beyond the mere law itself to the ends to be realized through the law,—the awakening in the wrong-doer of respect for the law, and the determination to follow its behests in future. But this reformatory or educative aspect of punishment is not its essence, but implies the ethical basis as set forth by Seth and Bradley, and can only arise therefrom after the acceptance of the punishment as a just desert. "In every punishment, as such, there must first be justice, and this constitutes the essence of the notion. Benevolence may, indeed, be united with it, but the man who has deserved punishment has not the least reason to reckon on this." (*Abbott*, p. 127.) Cf. *Vorlesungen Kants aus der Metaphysik*, h. v. Heinze, p. 723, in which Kant says that all punishments may be either pragmatism or moral, the latter signifying that he who transgresses should be punished, and that every punishment must first be just and necessary in itself, before it can be used pragmatically. (Quoted in note by Haegerstroem, *Kants Ethik*, p. 539.) Cf. also *Kant's Philosophy of Law*, tr., Hastie, 1887, p. 244; J. S. Mackenzie, *Manual of Ethics*, 5th ed., 1915, pp. 430-32; W. Wundt, *Ethics*, v. 3: *Principles of Morality*, tr., 1907, pp. 123-29; L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, 2nd ed., v. 1, pp. 117-120.

corollary, it would also appear to be a moral requirement that he who does good should be rewarded. Virtuous conduct should find its consummation in the enjoyment of happiness, and "that not merely in the partial eyes of the person who makes himself an end, but even in the judgment of impartial reason, which regards persons in general as ends in themselves. For to need happiness, to deserve it, and yet at the same time not to participate in it, cannot be consistent with the perfect volition of a rational being possessed at the same time of all power, if, for the sake of experiment, we conceive such a being."¹⁰ Again, we may quote from the Critique of Judgment: "So soon as men begin to reflect upon right and wrong, . . . this judgment is inevitable, *viz.*, that the issue cannot be the same, whether a man has behaved fairly or falsely, with equity or with violence, even though up to his life's end, as far as can be seen, he has met with no happiness for his virtue, and no punishment for his vices. It is as if they perceived a voice within [saying] that the issue must be different."¹¹ Kant is not here disowning his rigorous assertion of the principle that virtue should be entirely disinterested; that a man should perform what is right and good, apart from any direct desire to gain anything in the nature of a recompense. That, as Kant has emphatically pointed out, would reduce moral precepts to mere rules of expediency and prudence.¹² The moral act must rest upon its own intrinsic worth for its moral justification; its value as such must reside within itself. But the moral law signifies more than

10. Abbott, p. 206; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 116.

11. Bernard, p. 391; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 472.

12. Cf. Abbott, pp. 32-34; Hartenstein, v. 4, pp. 263-65.

can be stated in a mere formula; and Kant, in his doctrine of the highest good, has given a clear recognition of this fact. He is not unmindful of the strength and universal persistency of the moral sentiments underlying the conviction that it is right that a life of virtue should not be unavailing as against a life given up to wrong doing. There must be a difference, as he puts it: the issues cannot be the same. The efforts of the virtuous man should bear fruition sometimes and somewhere. In thus facing this problem, Kant was revealing his own well-thought-out resolve to set forth an adequate explanation of the universal moral sentiments of mankind—to the extent that a life of virtue should not be absolutely divorced from happiness. Sidgwick was not behind Kant in expressing similar thoughts, when he admitted the existence of “a desire, apparently inseparable from the moral sentiments, that this result [*i.e.*, that the performance of duty will be adequately rewarded and its violation punished] may be realized not only in [his] own case but universally.”¹³

Even though wrong may seem to prevail for a season, and the good be overcome, still there exists within us a deep and undying faith that the course of things will eventually be reversed, for the universe is founded on right and justice. Though all does not go well with us at the time, we yet feel the need of constant encouragement in that hope, and in the conviction that our efforts to strive according to the principles of virtuous conduct shall not go unrecognized, even when there are no apparent signs of success. We will struggle against the taunts of a hostile world, knowing that in this process our strength and firmness of character are

13. H. Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, 7th ed., 1907, p. 507.

being sifted;¹⁴ but at the same time we naturally long for some peace of mind, some inward satisfaction—not for the sake of resting in endless idleness and ease, but of attaining greater strength to go on and accomplish more. The notion of reward is not an external addition to our moral observance; it is an intimate part of our own moral nature; and Kant was but showing his fidelity to the moral facts in recognizing these sentiments of mankind, and in attempting to give them their due place in his ethical system.¹⁵ He came to admit that in the judgment of an impartial reason the achievements of virtuous living should not be wholly lost; that they should be consummated in a larger life of happiness, and utilized for the gaining of greater opportunities for moral service in the common interests of mankind. While one may not demand the recognition for oneself, yet one feels all the more justice in asserting the claims of others, that their disinterested devotion to duty should not pass away in the mere exercise of a moral restraint, but that the will so acting should find delight in moral striving, and through this conscious joy in

14. Cf. George Meredith's poem on the *Teaching of the Blows of Fortune* (in his *Poetical Works*, ed. Trevelyan, 1912, p. 576), from the *Shaving of Shagpat* (p. 246):—

Lo! of hundreds who aspire,
Eighties perish—nineties tire!
They who bear up, in spite of wrecks and wracks,
Were season'd by celestial hail of thwacks.

'Tis the thwacking in this den
Maketh lions of true men!
So are we nerved to break the clinging mesh
Which tames the noblest efforts of poor flesh.

15. Cf. *Abbott*, p. 128; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 41.—“To look, however, on all rewards and punishments as merely the machinery in the hand of a higher power, which is to serve only to set rational creatures striving after their final end (happiness), this is to reduce the will to a mechanism destructive of freedom; this is so evident that it need not detain us.” Cf. also G. F. Barbour, *Philosophical Study of Christian Ethics*, 1911, pp. 221-22; and H. L. Stewart, *Questions of the Day in Philosophy and Psychology*, 1912, pp. 249-50.

service exert itself to more exalted tasks in humanity's cause.

It may fairly be claimed, then, that just as there is an intimate connection between wrong-doing and punishment, there is a parallel relation between right-doing and reward,¹⁶ and that Kant has given an ethical basis for this doctrine. This could not be accomplished, if this conception of reward and punishment did not go beyond such sanctions, as set forth by the utilitarians, which are entirely external in their bearing upon morality.¹⁷ It should be made clear that this parallel relation between punishment and wrong-doing and between recompense and right-doing is only admissible from the moral standpoint. If the punishment is accepted merely as a juridical consequence, it has but a legal value. To be morally effective, the punishment must be accepted as deserved, and as a check against the misdeed. The vicious action is, as it were, completed or brought to a stand in the punishment. The fulfilment of the penalty should render it nugatory—indeed, wipe it out altogether. Hence a check against wrong-doing is sustained. The series of good acts may then be continued indefinitely. In this sense moral judgments (whether operating as punishments or rewards) should become inwrought in the moral texture of man's being as a developing personality. Whatever he has morally become, at whatever time he be valued, is

16. Cf. A. Messer, *Kants Ethik*, 1904, p. 250, who also quotes references from the *Vorlesungen ueber Metaphysik*; ed. Politz, pp. 242 ff.

17. Cf. J. Bentham, *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, ch. iii. To the "external sanctions" of Bentham, Mill (*Utilitarianism*, pp. 41-42) added an "internal sanction," that of conscience, but its basis is psychological, and that for Kant is equivalent to what is "external," as it involves no more than mere considerations of pain and pleasure. Cf. also J. Locke, *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. II., ch. xxi; and H. Spencer, *Principles of Ethics*, 1897, v. 1, pp. 118-24.

the fruition of moral service as ultimately determined by the law. And through the moral law he knows, as though it were by a revelation, that his actions are ever done as in the presence of the supreme law-giver, in whose impartial judgment (it is believed) virtue cannot eternally go with unhappiness and vice with happiness. With him the final issue cannot be a matter of indifference. Further reference will be made to this fact of an ethical discrimination between good and bad in the chapter dealing with the moral argument for the existence of God.

But there are some moralists¹⁸ who maintain that happiness and virtue are utterly incompatible as elements of the highest good, and that Kant would have been more faithful to his tenets in regarding them so. This would imply a want of stability in the conception of the summum bonum, and thus render it useless for the purposes Kant has assigned to it. We shall consider Hägerström's views. He points out that in the Critique of Practical Reason virtue and happiness are "two completely heterogeneous factors in the highest good without any inner connection."¹⁹ but that there is much in support of an inner relation to be found in the methodology of the Critique of Pure Reason.²⁰ In the latter, Kant's point of view is that happiness is a necessary consequence of morality. Promises and threats are connected with the moral law, which, indeed, has the character of a command because of these very threats and promises. To doubt these consequences is to doubt the

18. Cf. Cohen, *Kants Begründung der Ethik*, 2nd ed., 1910, pp. 352-53, and *Supra*, pp. 63 ff.

19. A. Haegerstroem, *Kants Ethik*, 1902, p. 532.

20. Mueller, v. 2, pp. 694-95; Hartenstein, v. 3, pp. 534-35.

validity of the moral law. And the necessary conditions for their appearance are the existence of God and the immortality of the soul—two propositions which are not to be separated from the obligations which pure reason imposes on us. Here inner connection is distinctly asserted; and the realization of the highest good is necessarily bound up with the validity of the moral law. But in the ethical writings, as Hägerström argues, Kant's starting point is that it is our duty to make the highest good in the world the determining ground; but this duty is independent of the possibility of the final end. Thus the realization of the highest good is not necessary from the moral point of view. The obligation to fulfil the law stands apart from any consequences, however necessary these latter may appear to be. The interest in the realization of the highest good is not conditioned by the expectation of happiness in proportion to one's worthiness. It is not dependent upon the worth of the end, but involved in the worthiness of the will which wills the end. Here happiness is not a necessary effect of worthiness, but merely something which is added to worthiness as an addition (*plus*),²¹ because otherwise the complete good would not be realized. From this point of view God is not regarded as rewarding the moral—rather He gives happiness to the will worthy of it, because he as moral wills that the whole possible good be realized. Thus, Hägerström concludes, it is not upon the ground of inner connection between morality and happiness, but upon that of the goodness of his will, which prompts him to the realization of all possible good, that God gives happiness to those worthy of it. Happiness and worthiness are only connected

21, Haegerstroem, *Kants Ethik*, p. 532.

in this way that happiness without the latter (worthiness) would not be a real good. Thus they are only two heterogeneous factors without any inner relation. In considering the two points of view, Hägerström²² argues that their difference is due to the fact that in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant regards the end as "primary" in its relation to the moral law, whereas in the Critique of Practical Reason it is "secondary." Thus where the law is subordinate to the end there is an inner connection; where the end is subordinate to the law the connection is external; happiness is a mere "plus" added to virtue.

But the heterogeneity of the factors, virtue and happiness, only has reference to them so far as they are regarded as practical principles: it does not mean that they are completely incompatible elements in the highest good as the final end of morality. And this commensurability has been maintained on the ground of moral justice. Though Hägerström²³ will not admit this as regards rewards, yet he bases the moral necessity for punishing evil-doers upon this very fact of justice, and not upon the arbitrary fiat of God. The necessity of punishment is immediately connected with the moral law. Hence he would affirm an intimate connection between punishment and moral transgression. Why, then, does he not affirm an inner connection between reward and moral observance? He says that rewards for virtuous conduct are not associated with eternal justice by Kant, for the conception of a rewarding justice is a contradiction in the sphere of morality. To fulfil one's duty carries with it no right to a reward. If God grants

22. *Ibid*, p. 533.

23. *Ibid*, pp. 538-544.

happiness to individuals worthy of it, he does so from grace or goodness of will, not on the grounds of justice. Hägerström²⁴ bases his interpretation upon statements in the *Metaphysics of Ethics*,²⁵ in which Kant says we cannot consistently affirm of God that he rewards by way of right what is done in accordance with duty, for that is a moral contradiction. But Kant's point of view is not, as Hägerström maintains, that rewards are external and dependent arbitrarily upon the goodness of God. Rather Kant means that man, in his relations with God, cannot claim aught as a right; towards God he has only the relation of obligation: it is his duty to do the commands of God. And Kant himself asserts in the concluding sentences of the *Metaphysics of Ethics*,²⁶ "that in *Ethics* as pure practical philosophy of inner (moral) legislation, we are only concerned with the moral relations between man and man, but that what may obtain for a relation between God and man completely goes beyond the limits of *Ethics*, and is absolutely incomprehensible by us. Whereby, then, it is maintained that *Ethics* cannot be extended beyond the limits of the duties of man towards himself and others." Within the strict limits of morality we cannot assert any right to happiness as a reward for the discharge of duty.

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 539-40. This interpretation is not consistent with Kant's point of view, for which cf. *Bernard*, p. 379n; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 463n.—"We believe we see in the case of the wicked the traces of a wise purposive reference, if we only see that the wanton criminal does not die before he has undergone the deserved punishment of his misdeeds. According to our concepts of free causality, our good or bad behaviour depends upon ourselves; we regard it the highest wisdom in the government of the world to ordain for the first, opportunity, and for both, their consequence, in accordance with moral laws." Also,—"We shall think him as *all-good*, and at the same time as *just*; because these two properties (which, when united, constitute Wisdom) are the conditions of the causality of a supreme Cause of the world, as the highest good, under moral laws." (*Bernard*, p. 373; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 458.)

25. *Hartenstein*, v. 7, p. 301.

26. *Hartenstein*, v. 7, p. 303.

What we receive from God may, in the term of religion, be said to come by grace. But that does not go so far as asserting that on the plane of morality there is no inner connection between justice and reward. Whatever be the relations of God towards us as moral beings we must conceive of him acting in accordance with moral justice: and the divine justice cannot exclude all reference to what is good for man, and what man by his actions may justly deserve. In morality we certainly do distinguish between what is man's desert in respect of honourable conduct and what in respect of dishonourable, and the outcome cannot be the same in both instances. Man does not exist that the Supreme Being may have an opportunity to show his benevolent character.²⁷ He rather feels the need within him to strive after an ideal world, in which the highest good may be realized—and that, too, a world grounded in accordance with the divine justice.²⁸ We cannot agree, then, that goodness of will or benevolence has no part or lot in justice. They are not so completely exclusive of one another, that rewards should be based on the goodness of God, and punishment on the iron law of retribution. In determining both rewards and punishments, there is surely a just consideration of claims and penalties.²⁹

²⁷ Cf. *Bernard*, p. 361n; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 449n.—“But if I ask, in reference to the final purpose of creation, why must men exist? then we are speaking of an objective supreme purpose, such as the highest Reason would require for creation. If we answer: These things exist to afford objects for the benevolence of that Supreme Cause; then we contradict the condition to which the Reason of man subjects even his inmost wish for happiness (*viz.*, the harmony with his own internal moral legislation). This proves that happiness can only be a conditioned purpose, and that it is only as a moral being that man can be the final purpose of creation; but that as concerns his state happiness is only connected with it as a consequence, according to the measure of his harmony with that purpose regarded as the purpose of his being.”

²⁸ Cf. *Bernard*, p. 392; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 473.

²⁹ Cf. *Leibniz*, *Monadology*, *Etc.*, tr., Latta, 1898, pp. 148-49, 283-87, 292-94.—“Accordingly justice . . . will, if I mistake not, be most

There is certainly some reasonableness in the apportioning of deserts; otherwise Kant's idea of happiness in proportion to virtue would be utter foolishness. The very conception of a proportion would imply an inner connection between virtue and happiness: the relation is not an arbitrary one.

Even Paulsen^{29a} admits that "there is a universal inner relation between virtue and success or prosperity or happiness, while the connection between wickedness and unhappiness is equally necessary." But there is no need to view the proportionate relation between virtue and happiness from a mathematical aspect. The idea of a quantitative relation between these two moral concepts is not thought of by Kant, though a Benthamite ethic would take some cognizance of it. The determination of such an idea breaks down in practice, as the critics of Bentham have shown. The term proportionate simply relates to inner compatibility. The more a man strives after virtue, the more pronouncedly virtuous his moral conduct becomes, the more likely it is that he is at the same time a happy man; and his happiness will be more abiding. But, as things are, it is not to be expected that his happiness will be unalloyed; it will not be unmixed with contrary trends towards dis-

fittingly defined as the *charity of a wise man*, that is to say, charity in obedience to the dictates of wisdom. . . . Charity is universal benevolence, and benevolence is the habit of loving or esteeming" (pp. 283-84). The theory of rewarding justice is at the basis of Leibniz's philosophy, and it accords with the views that are generally acceptable to mankind. It is against such naive beliefs that Dr. Bosanquet ranges himself (cf. his *Principle of Individuality and Value*, 1912, pp. 5, 15-16), where he says that "justice as thus demanded is a principle of compensation for being what you are, and cannot have a place in a differentiated universe" (p. 16). What we have to do is to get above our particular station, become "transformed" in the Absolute, and attain "central experiences," wherein the compensations needed at the exclusive level will have little significance within the inclusive whole. But the solidly-founded convictions of mankind are not to be overthrown by the skilful dialectic of an intellectualist.

29a. F. Paulsen, *System of Ethics*, tr. 1899, p. 407.

satisfaction or failure. No one, not even the virtuous man, experiences happiness without any break of continuity. Obstacles in the way of moral achievement are many; and the very hour of achievement may be coincident with feelings of despair or disillusionment. But, nevertheless, for the man of moral probity, who finds an inward peace on such occasions, there may be a re-valuing of the obstacles; they may be viewed by him as ministrants of a life of virtue. Suffering and calamity will sift moral tenacity and try its strength. Not even Kant would rationally ask that all hindrances in the way of realization of happiness should be absolutely removed. What is demanded is that the way be open to man to enjoy a life of virtue. Resolute fulfilment of duty should not be wholly foreclosed to happiness. And the general rule should be, the more virtue, the more happiness. Such happiness is not, of course, merely the enjoyment of material good fortune, of wealth or earthly prestige, for these satisfactions frequently bring with them a surfeit which ends in lassitude or weariness of the flesh. From them a moral ineptitude may result. To find moral contentment along these lines is to stultify moral endeavour itself; indeed, such striving would negate moral values altogether. Men who forget themselves in the midst of worldly success and luxury, who easily and quickly satisfy their desires, or for whom everything touched "turns into gold," have clearly deteriorated in morality as determined by Kantian standards.

Although he sometimes refers to happiness as being a state of mind which arises when everything goes or turns out according to what a man wishes, Kant never means that the fulfilment of mere wishes will bring

unfeigned happiness. Wishing for him must be determined morally. The wish of the man who devotes himself to moral striving is altogether different from the wish of the man who is merely desirous of a "good time," who solely seeks the primrose path of dalliance, avoiding difficulties and sufferings. Easy satisfactions are not moral wishes. The will that is determined morally may wish for the ordering of the world, so that what is morally possible may be readily consummated. It seeks to set up a new order of conditions for man's life. But such an effort means a never-ending struggle with actuality which is in many ways at variance with a morally developing self. And the hope of a final overthrow of evil, together with all the sufferings that go with it, lures man on in his great moral venture; and such a hope is not to be divorced from the consciousness of an eternal happiness.

To return to Hägerström's criticism. It rests, as we saw, upon an alleged difference between Kant's point of view in the *Methodology of Pure Reason* and that in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. In the former an inner relation between virtue and happiness may be maintained; in the latter the relation is an external one. Has Kant's position really undergone the change which Hägerström asserts? Is he open to the charge of inconsistency? A comparison of the *Methodology of Pure Reason* with his later ethical treatises will not bear out Hägerström's contention. In the *Methodology* Kant considered the summum bonum as determining the final end of pure reason. He clearly lays down that only the moral law as the law of freedom determines the will, independently of all desires and inclinations, and of the means of satisfying them. The moral law as

such is an absolute imperative. Any other rule or law founded upon happiness is empirical, and cannot apply in the moral employment of reason. These principles are fundamental. Now in the light of them Kant considers the end of moral conduct.³⁰ If a man devote himself loyally to duty, he is surely deserving of happiness. It is his just desert. He has not done his duty in order to be happy, but has fulfilled the behests of the law as determining the use of his freedom as a rational being. That is just what he ought to do. But if a man does what he should do, what can he infer as resulting from such conduct? The mere consciousness of virtue in his loyal observance of the law's demands may mean much to him: he has an inward satisfaction certainly of having done his duty. But if he reflect upon the ends of his conduct, he may rightly claim respect for his worthiness; but that is not the complete good which he may fairly expect, on reflection, for himself, or for others who act likewise. It is but natural that he should consider what a worthy man may hope for, and what probability there is of realizing his hopes. The questions that Kant has asked here relate to the final end of morality, not to its determining principles. If a man fulfil the law, he does just what renders him worthy of happiness, *i.e.*, what will reveal himself as a man loyal to the commands of the law. So a man should ever conduct himself as to be worthy of respect and deserve well. But to be worthy is not the whole end. The end includes that of which one is worthy—enjoyment in the fulfilment of one's duty. How may this hope of attaining happiness be connected with the law, the observance

³⁰. Cf. Kuno Fischer, *Immanuel Kant und seine Lehre*, 1 ter. Teil, 5th ed., 1909, pp. 611-13; and C. Renouvier, *Critique de la Doctrine de Kant*, 1906, pp. 129-30.

of which gives man a reasonable claim for it? Thus Kant puts the question. He certainly cannot be accused of hedonism here; and he would resent any criticism that hinted at such a reversal on his part of his own moral principles. In the *Methodology of the Pure Critique* he is not directly dealing with the determining principle of morality as such, but setting forth the conditions necessary for the realization of the ultimate end of morality. And his position here is in accordance with the *Dialectic of the Critique of Practical Reason*. These conditions for the attainment of the complete good rest upon the postulates of God and a future life. Without these pre-suppositions, the moral laws, as Kant avers, would become "idle dreams,"³¹ and they would be merely "objects of applause and admiration, not springs of purpose and action."³² The moral laws can only fulfil those purposes, which reason connects with them, if there be a supreme will comprehending all moral and natural laws within itself.³³ Even here Kant cannot stand convicted of hedonism, and one cannot see sufficient reason for Hägerström's argument that Kant rid himself of these hedonistic tendencies in his later ethical treatises, such as the *Critique of Judgment* and the *Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason*, for his standpoint in those works is still similar. In criticizing his position one must bear in mind that Kant is discussing the summum bonum, or highest good, as the final end of morality, and not as its supreme determining principle. The passages just referred to have their counterparts in the *Critique of Judgment*, where Kant discusses the question as to whether a man who does no

31. *Mueller*, v. 2, p. 696; *Hartenstein*, v. 3, p. 536.

32. *Mueller*, v. 2, p. 697; *Hartenstein*, v. 3, p. 536.

33. Cf. *Mueller*, v. 2, p. 699; *Hartenstein*, v. 3, p. 538.

believe in the existence of God and a future life would be justified in overthrowing his principles. Kant answers decidedly in the negative. Such a man would be “contemptible in his own eyes, if on that account he were to imagine the laws of duty as empty, invalid and inobligatory, and wished to resolve to transgress them boldly.”³⁴ But a truly righteous man, who believed there is no God, would not act in that manner. He would still fulfil the moral laws as having expected no advantage to himself therefrom. “But,” says Kant—and this is the point which critics, such as Hägerström, have overlooked—“*his effort is bounded*; and from nature . . . he can never expect a regular harmony agreeing according to constant rules (such as his maxims are and must be, internally) *with the purpose* that he yet feels himself obliged and impelled to accomplish. . . . The *purpose*, then, which this well-intentioned person had and ought to have before him in his pursuit of the moral laws, *he must certainly give up as impossible*.”³⁵ Only, if such a man can overcome his theological difficulty, and have faith in God, can he be enabled to realize the exalted ends which morality places before him. This fine passage, written in Kant’s best style, is a sufficiently clear commentary upon those portions of the Methodology of the Pure Critique which have occasioned allegations of hedonism against him. It is clear that Kant’s position has not undergone any radical change. Virtue and happiness are compatible with one another as elements of the highest good, though not as practical determining principles of the will.

34. *Bernard*, p. 382; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 465.

35. *Bernard*, pp. 383-4; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 466. See also *infra* p. 165. *italics mine*.

III. HIGHEST GOOD AND HEDONISM.

In a formal determining principle of morality, capable of universal application, the desire for happiness finds no recognition. And yet it is regarded by Kant as a moral command that there should be realized a final end of morality, which would include happiness; and he further affirms that its realization is only possible if the existence of God be postulated as a moral necessity. Accordingly, the virtuous man may possess himself of the faith that happiness is not a vain hope. If the moral fact of God's existence makes possible for man the attainment of happiness, will he not endeavour to subserve the behests of the Supreme Being in order that he may enjoy happiness, if not now, at all events hereafter? Can it be that after all Kant has succumbed to the allurements of hedonism? Has he, then, despite all the grandiloquent arguments of the Analytic, given back to the moral consciousness what he had previously excluded from it? It may be said that happiness is truly not bestowed as an immediate reward for virtue, but nevertheless, according to Schopenhauer, it is, in this respect, "a voluntary gift for which virtue after work accomplished, stealthily opens the hand."¹ Thus the will may be determined by the law, and so be virtuous; but it is prompted by a hidden motive to the end that the righteous are sure of a never-failing reward at the hands of the bestower of everlasting blessings. If Kant really meant this, it would surely stultify all moral conduct. On the face of it one could hardly expect that a thinker like Kant would turn completely round on

1. Schopenhauer, *Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy*, in his *World as Will and Idea*, tr., 3rd Ed., v. 2, p. 146.

his principles, particularly in this alleged underhand fashion. The fact that he never wavered in insisting that happiness can never be a principle of morality, but only a consequence of moral determination, should convince us that some explanation of the situation is possible, which will accord with the fundamental principles of the Analytic. It is clear that throughout the whole of the *Dialectic* Kant has not given a primary place to happiness. It is always conditioned, never a determining principle of the will: it is ever associated with the will's fulfilment of the moral law. So far as happiness is related to the determining principle of morality, we may say that the obedience of the law renders one deserving of happiness, but cannot of itself guarantee actual participation in it. Now, the kind of happiness Kant has in mind is associated with good conduct—with moral determination. It implies the harmony of desire with the determining principle of morality. "Happiness is the condition of a rational being in the world with whom everything goes according to his wish and will; it rests, therefore, upon the harmony of physical nature with his sole end, and likewise with the essential determining principle of the will."² It is clear, then, from this and other passages, that Kant's idea of happiness is not connected with desires of evil intent; it is only consequent upon such as are conformed to the will's direction under moral law. And the realization of this satisfaction of desire does not rest with nature, for there is no naturally-conditioned connection between obedience to the law and the world of nature, in which (for Kant) desires, wishes, *etc.*, obtain.³ If, then, hap-

2. *Abbott*, p. 221; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 131.

3. *Abbott*, p. 225; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 134.

piness is to be realized, its fulfilment must depend on a principle which, while it does not belong to the order of nature, at the same time does not conflict with that order. Though happiness is thus a consequence that has reference to sensibility, its organization cannot be determined within the world of phenomena. No mere readjustment of the surroundings of man will fulfil his desires for happiness. The source of happiness is inward, it resides ultimately in the practical consciousness that there is a God. The moral law is not done away with; it alone can determine that inner practical consciousness which reveals man's true need of having something more to live for than that the natural life has to bestow. It is no mercenary spirit which finds a moral justification for the life of virtue in the hope of immortality and the faith that the Judge of all the world will do right. For the man of virtue the original spring to moral conduct is pure; even the prospect of a glorious hereafter cannot impair the integrity of his moral principles: it rather awakens in him the consciousness that dissimulation is vain, and that any taint in the spring to virtue cannot pass undetected, and that no expectation of mere enjoyment can ever operate as a means of purifying that taint. But it also has a positive value. Having conformed his will to the moral law, man knows that he will eventually succeed in giving complete and adequate expression to the moral principle that dwells within him. Such is the happy end that awaits him, not as an external reward or something given by way of a boon or an encouragement; rather it is a moral demand, for the sake of righteousness, that there should not be one lost good, that virtue should be worthy of fruition in an immortal life. Faithful ob-

servance of the moral law as the determining principle of the will alone constitutes the worthiness to obtain these happy consequences. But worthiness does not imply actual fulfilment. It is but a formal experience of the inner disposition of the will that is conformed to the moral law.

Now, it has been objected that, if virtue carry with it worthiness to be happy, this is a retrogression in Kant's ethics. Professor G. E. Moore, in his *Principia Ethica*,⁴ says—"It is not commonly observed that if a thing is really to be a reward, it must be something good in itself: it is absurd to talk of rewarding a person by giving him something, which is less valuable than what he already has or which has no value at all. Thus Kant's view that virtue renders us worthy of happiness is in flagrant contradiction with the view which he implies and which is associated with his name—that a good will is the only thing having intrinsic value. It does not, indeed, entitle us to make the charge sometimes made that Kant is inconsistently an Eudaemonist or Hedonist, for it does not imply that happiness is the sole good. But it does imply that the good will is *not* the sole good: that a state of things in which we are both virtuous and happy is better in itself than one in which the happiness is absent." The strength of Dr. Moore's argument rests upon his acceptance of Kant's idea of good will as the "sole good" without qualification—"Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification except a good will."⁵ But the passage which contains this statement ends with these words—

4. G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica*, 1903, pp. 174-75.

5. Abbott, p. 9; Hartenstein, v. 4, p. 241.

“Thus a good will appears to constitute the indispensable condition even of being worthy of happiness.” And so Kant cannot be said to imply that the “good will” is the “sole good.” Such a good may be the supreme good, but it does not constitute the whole and perfect good.⁶ It is clear that the will, which is good in itself, is thus (formally speaking) worthy of happiness, as fulfilling the supreme condition necessary for the realization of the complete good. The idea of being worthy of happiness has no material significance, but it is just another formal designation of the condition of the will that is good in itself. Hence we can scarcely accuse Kant of inconsistency in this connection. The criticism would be effective, if by worthiness of happiness Kant meant worthiness for the sake of attaining happiness; but the attainment of happiness is not a predisposing motive to virtue. The conditions necessary for the fulfilment of happiness signify more than the formal determination of the will as implied in worthiness of happiness. To say that the good will is worthy of being happy is not giving to that will anything by way of reward. It is just stating something involved in the very idea of a good will. But if Kant associated happiness with evil intent, there might be some justification for the charge of inconsistency, inasmuch as happiness may not always be “good,” *i.e.*, the accompanying feeling, or consequence, of good actions.

In Kant’s argument, then, to be worthy, or deserving, of happiness is one thing; to *participate* in happiness according to desert is another.^{6a} The question thus

6. Abbott, p. 206; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 116.

6a. Cf. Abbott, p. 69; Hartenstein, v. 4, p. 298.—“The mere being worthy of happiness can interest of itself even without the motive of participating in this happiness.”

becomes, How may the well-deserved enjoy happiness? According to the law, one must act altogether apart from considerations of happiness. But when Kant thinks of the whole person of man, he is confronted with the fact that man has an undeniable claim to happiness, if he be deserving of it; and there does not seem to be any reason (on the face of it) why he should not enjoy happiness. Now, happiness cannot be realized as a matter of natural necessity; for what determines it does not belong to the order of nature. Hence happiness is something hoped for; its realization is not wholly dependent upon natural law. And so having regard to the needs of man, Kant puts forward the plea—Granting the moral principle as determining the will directly, may I even hope to attain happiness? The asking of this question by Kant demonstrates that the moral law as a formal principle does not account for the whole of the moral life; and this consideration reveals that Kant was aware that a mere abstract formula was not sufficient to explain morality in its entirety. And his noble inconsistency, if it may be so called, “harmonizes with the moral sense of the mass of mankind.”⁷ We find this question well put in the Methodology of the Critique of Pure Reason. “The second question asks, How, then, if I conduct myself so as to be deserving of happiness, may I hope thereby to obtain happiness? The answer to this question depends on this, whether the principles of pure reason which *a priori* prescribe the law necessarily also connect this hope with it?” If, then, happiness be included in the object—that which is fulfilled in moral observance or unqualified obedience to the law, how is that object to be realized? How is

7. G. F. Barbour, *Philosophical Study of Christian Ethics*, p. 223.

man to participate in happiness as an individual experience? It is quite clear that, in Kant's opinion, to be deserving of happiness and not to participate in happiness would imply something fundamentally wrong in the person of man. The truth of the principle of desert must either carry, or have associated, with it its own fulfilment in the experience of happiness. "But the subjective effect of this law, namely, the mental *disposition* conformed to it, and made necessary by it, to promote the practically possible summum bonum, this presupposes at least that the latter is possible, for it would be practically impossible to strive after the object of a conception which at bottom was empty and had no object." It is the latter sentence which concerns us here. The moral fact of worthiness of happiness would be self-condemned, if happiness as an object of morality were impossible. If man be deemed worthy of an object, it is not a matter of indifference to him, whether that, of which he is worthy, be possible or not. If it were not at all possible, the object of one's worthiness would be empty and chimerical. It appears, then, quite in accordance with human nature to hope for the realization of happiness, if one has proved himself worthy of it, and Kant agrees with this. It is certainly in harmony with what he has said on the matter. But it is another question as to whether the acceptance of this hope accords with Kant's fundamental principles. May the hope of happiness be necessarily connected with the moral law? Though the moral law commands the promotion of the summum bonum, still there can be no natural relation between the moral law and the hope of happiness as a consequence. But from the practical point of view it is necessary that worthiness

of happiness should find an ultimate satisfaction; and its consummation finally depends upon God. Happiness, then, is not guaranteed by morality (determining principle), but by religion (fruition). "It is only when religion is added that there also comes in the hope of participating some day in happiness in proportion as we have endeavoured to be not unworthy of it." And "when the step to religion has been taken, then this ethical doctrine may be also called a doctrine of happiness, because the *hope* of happiness first begins with religion."⁸

NOTE.—In reference to the detailed presentation of the inner trend of Kant's thought in his analysis of the relation between virtue and happiness in the concept of the highest good, as set forth in the first section of this chapter, an objection may be made that a critical examination of his use of the causal principle in this connection has been avoided. This is due to the omission of a separate discussion of the theoretical implications of his ethical theory, as indicated in the preface. For an analysis of the Kantian principle of causation together with its relation to his idea of freedom (involving the question of the interrelatedness of the sensible and the supersensible), I would refer to my monograph on the *Basis of Freedom*, pp. 13-19, 38-44, and the appendices on the Limit of Natural Causality, pp. 57-61, and on Causality and Time, pp. 61-64. See also *supra*, pp. 40-46, and *infra*, pp. 184-91, 194 ff., 214 ff., and *Kant's Doctrine of Freedom*, pp. 1-47.

8. Abbott, p. 227; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 136.

CHAPTER VI.

HIGHEST GOOD: POSTULATE OF IMMORTALITY.

We now come to the problem of the realization of the highest good. How is this final end of morality to be achieved? What are the conditions of its possibility? How far do they abide in the power of man? To what extent must his impotence be supplemented? The moral law commands the realization of the summum bonum. The first indispensable condition towards this end is that the will accord perfectly with the moral law. If this condition be impossible, then the attainment of the summum bonum is a fruitless quest: the law would be directed towards "vain imaginary ends."¹ But perfect accordance of the will with the law is holiness, and holiness is not a characteristic of man; it belongs to God alone.² With his imperfect will man must needs subject himself to the constraint of duty, and his claim to virtue just consists in his persistent endeavour to fulfil in his own person the obligations imposed on him by the moral law. But persistent endeavour is not perfect harmony of will with law. Moral perfection is God's prerogative alone. Holiness cannot be fulfilled in man. His sensible existence hinders his attainment of a state of complete conformity to law. How is Kant to get over this difficulty? He has stated that "the realization of the summum bonum in the world is the

1. *Abbott*, p. 210; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 120.

2. *Abbott*, pp. 31, 175; *Hartenstein*, v. 4, p. 262, v. 5, p. 86.

necessary object of a will determinable by the moral law.”³ This is practically necessary, and “perfect accordance of the mind with the moral law is the supreme condition.”⁴ If this perfect accordance does not come to fruition in man, but characterizes the being of God alone, how then can it be “practically necessary” as a supreme condition for the realization of the *summum bonum*? Kant finds his solution in a “progress in *in-finitum* towards that perfect accordance.”⁵ Though man cannot actually attain holiness in his own strength, his moral nature does not release him from persistent aspiration and effort towards its attainment. His duty is to strive without ceasing to bring his will into perfect obedience to the moral law. Thus his aim is to be virtuous in his intelligible character;⁶ but this requires the constancy of moral discipline, the task of which is not fulfilled, so long as man remains under the limitations of this life. In this continued effort and growth in morality he reveals his moral goodness; but it is not a completed good. He therefore claims the moral right of ever going on. This claim cannot be fulfilled unless man’s being has in it the power of an endless life. “This endless progress is only possible on the supposition of an endless duration of the existence and personality of man.” The supposition, then, of the immortality of the soul is practically indispensable to the realization of the *summum bonum*; it is connected immediately with the supreme condition of moral good-

³ Abbott, p. 218; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 128.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Abbott, pp. 354-55; *Hartenstein*, v. 6, pp. 140-42.

ness. It is accordingly a postulate⁷ of pure practical reason.

This postulate of immortality supplements man's impotence. It is only in man's power to put forth persistent effort towards the attainment of the ideal. That his moral nature cease not with the passing of his sensible existence is beyond his power to determine. It is practically necessary, therefore, that its possibility should be postulated. It is necessary for man that the path towards moral perfection be ever open; that it be possible to remove hindrances. The law cannot be made a matter of convenience. Its imperative commands are inflexibly binding upon him. No obstacle should be put in man's way so that he may have excuse to relax his efforts. The ideal must not be set forth as absolutely unattainable. Its possibility must be assured to him, otherwise his moral life would be striving "after the object of a conception which at bottom was empty and had no object."⁸ It is expressly enjoined upon man to advance unceasingly towards the highest; but his motives to action must ever reside in the unconditional conformity of his will to the moral law. In this respect man's will, if not holy as the divine is holy,

7. Cf. *Abbott*, pp. 99, 219; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, pp. 11, 128.—By a postulate Kant means a proposition which we cannot prove on theoretical grounds, but which we must practically accept as following from an unconditioned *a priori* practical law. If we connect, *e.g.*, the pre-supposition of the immortality of the soul with the moral law by a rational necessity, the attribute of unconditioned necessity attaches to the pre-supposition and it is accepted as a practical postulate. Kant distinguishes apodictic (or theoretic) certainty and practical necessity. The former has an objective reference, the latter, a subjective. A theoretical postulate must apply within positive knowledge, and be capable of establishing scientific conclusions. But a practical postulate cannot be established in this way. It is necessary to the assertion of a practical proposition and is only applicable to the subject as obedient to universal law or morality. It is a rational necessity, but subjective: it is necessary for the realization of an object determined by the moral law: that which is postulated cannot be actualized as an object of experience.

8. *Abbott*, p. 241; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 149.

may be called blessed. But an endless progress towards holiness, however sincerely and loyally pursued on his part, is not in itself the equivalent of the holy will such as it is in God Himself. And holiness of will is the supreme condition of the summum bonum. How, then, according to Kant is this condition fulfilled in man?^{8a} Man's endless progress towards the ideal of righteousness, which is absolutely fulfilled in the Supreme Being alone, is intuitively perceived by God as equivalent to conformity with the moral law. The steadfast resolve and endeavour to embody in one's self the inner pattern of a holy life, faithfully pursued with unbroken consistency in spite of hindrance, are acceptable to the Supreme Being as though effecting the realization of complete accordance of will with morality unto perfection. God, being intuitively conscious, does not perceive succession as in time like ourselves: his infinite being is not conditioned by temporal necessity: he is completely himself in the intelligible world, and in his consciousness there is no separation between conception

8a. It may be argued that in a sense immortality is here conditional upon progress in morality. Unless man grows constantly in this life from good to better, and from better to best, he cannot hope to attain immortality. The soul that is crushed by evil deeds and so makes no moral advance, has no claim upon an endless life. Indeed, it might well be asked, whether a life that is everlasting would be a boon to such a one. But we cannot adequately measure the value of the human soul by the pains and disappointments, defeats and despairings in this life. No finite individual can give an ultimate decision upon the moral worth of another's life. Only from one to whom all is open in every degree can that valuation come. And if there be not one lost good,—if good shall come to fruition at the last, is that not worth waiting for? God's patience is not to be measured by man's. Who dares to say that the day will never come, when the soul that is bowed down and darkened with false imaginings and corruption, shall come forth in its full splendour? Even in this life we see how at times virtue feeds

"A calm, a beautiful, and silent fire,
From the encumbrances of mortal life,
From error, disappointment—nay from guilt;
And sometimes, so relenting justice wills,
From palpable oppressions of despair."

(Excursion, Bk. IV.)

and perception.⁹ Hence moral progress on man's part in utter sincerity is equivalent in God's sight to the fulfilment of the law itself. But man's hope in this respect rests upon the fact that his unfaltering devotion to duty, producing in him the consciousness of having always pursued the path of right and truth in this life, stamps that consciousness of his "tried character" with the conviction that, in an endless life beyond this, he will put forth the same determined endeavour to realize his moral being in fulness, and with a better show of attainment, as being then freed from the limitations of a sensible nature.¹⁰ Thus the moral conception of

9. Cf. J. Ward, *Realm of Ends*, 1911, pp. 234-37.—"The Being to whom this intellectual intuition belongs will be creative; its objective experience will contain nothing that is merely given to it, but only what is ultimately 'posited' by it: its objects will not be phenomenal but noumenal, not independent manifestations of an Other but the creation of itself." Cf. also E. Caird, *Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*, 1889, v. 2, pp. 14, 117, 491. Cf. Abbott, pp. 194-97; Hartenstein, v. 5, pp. 106-08; also Watson, pp. 196-201; Mueller, v. 2, pp. 489-502; Hartenstein, v. 3, pp. 391-400.

10. Cf. Abbott, pp. 219-220; Hartenstein, v. 5, pp. 129-30.—"But naturally one who is conscious that he has persevered through a long portion of his life up to the end in the progress to the better, and this from genuine moral motives, may well have the comforting hope, though not the certainty, that even in an existence prolonged beyond this life, he will continue steadfast in these principles. . . ." (p. 220 n.) In this respect it might be asserted that the idea of an immortal life would "strengthen" the putting into effect of the commands of the moral law in us; though the moral law would still hold its own independence apart from this point of view. The idea put forth by Kant seems to be that one may look forward to the future state in accordance with the development of one's own personality. [Cf. A. Ruge, *Begriff und Problem der Persönlichkeit in Kantstudien*, 1911, v. 16, pp. 272-73. It would be of interest to compare with this point of view Nietzsche's doctrine of the eternal return.] In its highest form the personality of man would reveal to him the full significance of the moral law, and give it complete expression in moral action, and thus he would come to realize that death in the physical sense was but incidental to his progress towards moral perfection. Thus we may say that to some extent the hope of immortality presents a positive aspect for Kant. Cf. O. Ewald, *Kants kritischer Idealismus als Grundlage von Erkenntnistheorie und Ethik*, 1908, pp. 296-97. So also William James, while he has stated that for him immortality (meaning an eternal safety) seemed a "secondary point" (*Varieties of Religious Experience*, 1912, p. 524), and that he agreed (*Principles of Psychology*, 1890, v. 1, p. 349) with Lotze that "every created thing will continue, if and so long as its continuance belongs to the meaning of the world; that everything will pass away which had its authorized place only in a transitory phase of the world's course" (Lotze, *Metaphysic*, tr., 2nd Ed.,

an immortal life is necessary to a true estimate of man's religious consciousness, for in Kant's system religion is but an intensified development of moral principles as the commands of a supreme being. And so the postulate of immortality has a religious significance and is connected with God's existence, which is the primary postulate of pure practical reason.

The strength of Kant's postulate of immortality rests upon his conviction that the moral ideal must be possible of attainment for man. That conviction is drawn forth from a felt need—that the consummation of man's

1887, v. 2, p. 182), yet possessed a sympathetic attitude towards the ordinary religious beliefs of mankind, and understood how many persons could receive a renewed and increased impetus towards strenuous living through faith in God and a future life—beliefs which Mr. Bradley and Mr. Bosanquet have greatly undervalued (cf. *Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life* in his *Will to Believe, and other Essays*, 1911, pp. 210-13). Mr. Bradley is very emphatic against accepting immortality as strengthening in any way the moral life. "But the demand for future life, I shall be told, is a genuine postulate, and its satisfaction is implicated in the very essence of our nature. Now, if this means that our religion and our morality will not work without it, so much the worse, I reply, for our morality and our religion. The remedy lies in the correction of our mistaken and immoral notions about goodness" (*Appearance and Reality*, 2nd Ed., 1908, pp. 507-08). Mr. Bradley's objection would hold, if the longing for a future life were merely for the sake of a reward for doing good in this life. Most men would rather face extinction than accept morality on such terms, and Kant would be among them. If there be at all any moral discrimination between right- and wrong-doing even in this world—and that is a foundational element in religion—it is morally reasonable that, if the world should not provide the means for the complete fulfilment of what is right and good, there should be another form of existence in which its possibility might be assured. An inclusive view of the absolute, such as the Neo-Hegelians put forward, is not altogether favourable to the idea of personal immortality, for the evil may exist along with the good, justice with what is injustice, quite indiscriminately, within the being of the Absolute. What is here maintained, as against Mr. Bradley, is that the belief in immortality renders more consistent and intelligible the hopes and fears that make us men (cf. J. M. E. McTaggart, *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, 1901, pp. 43-44). If our religious ideals are not to end in an ultimate scepticism, if the convictions of what is desirable in this life and beyond, on the part of ordinary men and women, are to be respected by philosophers, then we can scarcely treat them in the manner that is characteristic of Mr. Bradley and Dr. Bosanquet. And such was not after the manner of Kant, who, towards the close of his great Critique, could affirm that "in matters which concern all men without distinction, nature cannot be accused of any partial distribution of her gifts; and that with regard to the essential interests of human nature, the highest philosophy can achieve no more than that guidance which nature has vouchsafed even to the meanest understanding" (*Mueller*, v. 2, p. 713; *Hartenstein*, v. 3, p. 547).

life should be commensurate with his possibilities. But an endless progress—mere persistency in moral endeavour—is not sufficient of itself to satisfy this fundamental human need. If the moral subject is only capable of an infinite progress towards holiness, it would appear that the realization of the highest good would not be fulfilled. Kant, as we have seen, meets this difficulty by maintaining that “the infinite being, to whom the condition of time is nothing, sees in this to us endless succession a whole of accordance with the moral law, and the holiness which his command inexorably requires, in order to be true to his justice in the share which he assigns to each in the summum bonum, is to be found in a single intellectual intuition of the whole existence of rational beings.”¹¹ God, therefore, has regard to man’s moral disposition as such, and sees it as a whole from the beginning; whereas actually man is progressing in time towards its complete realization.

It is necessary that man be persistently striving to fulfil the law, and so at every moment reveal the pure strength of his moral disposition to one who can search within.¹² But it is not the consciousness of God’s intuitive knowledge of him that should constrain man’s will to accord with the law—the resolve to act morally must spring from within the man himself, and for the law’s sake only. It is this activity of will which is known to God through an intellectual intuition, and on account of which he accepts man’s will as holy. If this moral activity did not exist, there would be no effort on the part of man to conform his actions to the dictates of the moral law. It is this latter operation

11. *Abbott*, p. 219; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 129; cf. also v. 6, pp. 161-73.

12. *Abbott*, p. 356; *Hartenstein*, v. 6, p. 142.

which takes place in time, but the inner spring is "out of time"¹³—as being morally determined—and so intuited intellectually by God.

It should be pointed out that for Kant an endless succession of efforts is the phenomenal aspect of man's moral nature, who, as a free and self-originating subject, is also noumenal; and it is the noumenal in man that God is intuitively conscious of. Difficulties are easily raised in this connection, if we overlook this important Kantian distinction, and regard the limitless duration of moral actions as though that expresses the full moral significance of the situation.¹⁴ If we view endless progress merely from the standpoint of an observer, then it appears that progress *ad infinitum* implies

13. In saying that the "inner spring is out of time," we merely conform to Kant's distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal. Time, in the phenomenal sense, relates to succession, and quantitatively determines the length of interval between succeeding events. Hence that which initiates an action, gives rise to it spontaneously, must be non-phenomenal, and so "out of time" in the abstract sense of the word. Phenomenal time thus relates only to the abstract order of succession apart from reference to that which undergoes change in its successive states. We may say, then, that the noumenal is "out of time" or "timeless" only from the standpoint of the phenomenal; or, in other words, we view the supersensible through the eyes of the sensible. But the noumenal subject, or free casuality, is not changeless, but expresses its changes in time, or "passes from phase to phase in time" (A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, *Hegelianism and Personality*, 2nd Ed., 1893, p. 183, cf. also pp. 236-37). In this respect time cannot be apart from the subject that experiences its "duration" and changes in time. "What the term duration ultimately represents is our immediate subjective experience as actively striving and wearing on: it implies the actual living, which only is actual in so far as it is not homogeneous and empty, but full of changes endured or wrought" (J. Ward, *Realm of Ends*, 1911, p. 306; cf. also Note 23 *infra*).

14. Cf. T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, 4th Ed., 1899, §§ 187-90, pp. 222-26, who points out that a process *ad infinitum*, without reference to an end, cannot be a process of development at all. "If there is a progress in the history of men, it must be towards an end consisting in a state of being which is not itself a series in time, but is both comprehended eternally in the eternal mind and is intrinsically eternal" (p. 224). But *re* Green's "eternal" being timeless and changeless, see Note 13 *supra*; and cf. the criticisms of A. S. Pringle-Pattison in *Hegelianism and Personality*, 2nd Ed., 1893, pp. 25-38, 179-83, 226; also W. R. Boyce Gibson, *Philosophical Introduction to Ethics*, 1904, pp. 138-54, and further B. Bosanquet, *Value and Destiny of the Individual*, 1913, pp. 277-82, who rather regards the "goal of development" to be not "*our* personality," but "*a* personality."

advance from one stage to another; and such can only take place in time, as otherwise the fact of progression is negated; and accordingly there is no attainment of a final stage, complete and perfect, in which the progression as a whole may be summed up. For this would require going beyond the series itself, and so reaching a "timeless" state from which all the restrictions of sense would be entirely removed. But the removal of the limits of sense-experience renders the idea of progress meaningless, as the form of time is an essential condition of all progression. If, then, progression necessarily takes place in time, man cannot in this life attain unto perfect accordance of the will with the moral law; and if after death he is freed from the limitations of the sensible world, his existence is accordingly timeless, and in consequence the idea of progress *ad infinitum* is no longer required. Thus the conception of an unceasing progress would only have reference to man's moral development in this world. And so Kant's statement that "endless progress is only possible on the supposition of an endless duration of the existence and personality of the same rational being,"¹⁵ would but hold, provided that death did not entirely remove man from the restrictions of his sensible nature. Hence, from this point of view, the only conclusion is that of Caird,¹⁶—"If passion, as passion, is essentially at variance with the law of reason, so that a *progressus ad infinitum* requires to be resorted to as the only way of realizing the latter in the former, that means that the realization can never be attained; for infinite time is not enough for an impossible task. But it means also that the

15. Abbott, p. 218; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 128.

16. E. Caird, *Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*, 1889, v. 2, p. 303.

task cannot even be begun; for not a single step can be taken towards the reconciliation of absolute opposites. If, on the other hand, there is no such essential opposition, the *progressus ad infinitum* is unnecessary.”

But Kant was not unaware of these difficulties which were involved in a merely phenomenal interpretation, for, as we have seen, he sought to solve them by supposing that the Infinite Being regarded the endless succession of human strivings as a whole and so accepted the moral disposition for the accomplishment itself. In this solution the main stress is laid upon inner experience and the idea of endless duration is subordinated to it.¹⁷ Thus, from Kant's own explanation, immortality has reference to something more than duration, as implying mere endlessness; it is ultimately connected with the existence of God. While we may not altogether accept the form of the dependence as set forth by Kant, still the fact of the moral guarantee residing finally in God, as the supreme law-giver and eternal judge, satisfies the demand of morality, and the subsumption of the postulate of immortality under that of the existence of God seems to accord with Kant's other references to the matter. Still these difficulties which Kant has raised by his dualism have led some critics to deny altogether that it is necessary for Kant to postulate the endless continuance of the soul in order to ensure man's attainment of holiness. According to them, it is clear that the moral disposition itself is the important thing. Hence, if man's endeavour to live well be the outcome of an unqualified acceptance of the moral law as the law of the will, what further condition

17. Cf. Hegel, *Logic*; tr. from the *Encyclopaedia*, Wallace, 2nd Ed, 1892, pp. 175-76, who misses this point in Kant's explanation.

is needed?¹⁸ The actual duration of the effort is a secondary matter, if the purity of the motive be assured and acceptable to God. So long as man abides faithful to the moral law in this life, the fact of his striving to be holy will be acceptable to God as equivalent to the deed, and so an endless duration is not necessary to achieve a life of virtue, well-pleasing to God. The following passage from the *Religion*¹⁹ is sometimes quoted as affirming this conclusion: "Now the difficulty arises in respect of how the disposition can be taken for the act, which in every moment (not upon the whole, but in every point of time) is imperfect. The solution of it depends upon the fact that while the act, as a continual and unending progress to the better, ever remains imperfect according to the valuation which restricts us

18. Cf. J. G. Fichte, *Vocation of Man*, tr., 1906, p. 141-42.—"I am immortal, imperishable, eternal, as soon as I form the resolution to obey the laws of reason; I do not need to *become* so. The supersensible world is no future world; it is now present; it can at no point of finite existence be more present than at another; not more present after an existence of myriads of lives than at this moment. . . . By that resolution I lay hold of eternity, and cast off this earthly life and all other forms of sensuous life which may yet lie before me in futurity, and place myself far above them. I become the sole source of my own being and its phenomena, and henceforth, unconditioned by anything without me, I have life in myself. My will . . . is this source of true life, and of eternity." Cf. also C. C. Everett, *Fichte's Science of Knowledge*, 2nd Ed., Chicago, 1892, pp. 151-60. Fichte thus sublimates Kant's dualism altogether, and reduces nature entirely to a creation of thought, nature being merely the self-limitation of the ego. What are looked upon as natural restrictions upon self-conscious activity are but illusions, whose deceptive character is revealed in the self-determination of the absolute ego. One may readily agree with the spirit of moral earnestness in Fichte's doctrine without going as far as accepting its form of subjective idealism. At the other extreme we find Hegel, who affirms, "Spirit is immortal; it is eternal; and it is immortal and eternal in virtue of the fact that it is infinite" (*Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, tr., 1895, v. 3, p. 302). But spirit for Hegel does not mean an individual personality, but the absolute spirit of which man's spirit is a mere differentiation. It is not the real living self of which we are immediately aware in our purposive activity, but the logical self,—an abstraction such as the *Bewusstsein ueberhaupt* hypostasized into a reality. Accordingly, immortality is a timeless form of the absolute spirit, and does not refer to the future, being a present quality. Such a conception cannot comfort us with the hope of personal immortality. Indeed, Hegel does not give the idea of immortality a conspicuous place in his system.

19. *Hartenstein*, v. 6, pp. 161-62; cf. also *Abbott*, p. 356; *Hartenstein*, v. 6, p. 142.

to time-determinations in the conception of cause and effect; and while we must regard the good manifested in us, *i.e.*, as an act, at every moment as inadequate for a holy law, yet because of the supersensible disposition from which it is derived, we can think of the endless progress towards conformity with a holy law as though it were judged a completed whole by one who postulates the intelligible principle of the heart. Thus man, despite his continual shortcoming, may still expect to be well pleasing to God on the whole, at whatever point of time his being may be cut off." Thus, according to Kant, man is capable of progressing from lower to higher degrees of perfection, but can never hope to fully express perfection in his own being, as progress consists in a series of actions taking place in time; and is accordingly phenomenal, while perfection is noumenal. Man may then go on advancing endlessly towards the better, but cannot attain actually unto the highest. He may earnestly desire to fulfil the ideal of holiness in his will-determination, but the conditions of his being render the representation of his moral purposes inadequate to express the noumenal character of the ideal. On his part, then, there is the moral fact of the resolve and the effort to attain; but the conditions of finitude rule out realization. That is the condition so far as man's present life is concerned. Still, if continuance of being after death be allowed man, is he just to go on as before, ever advancing endlessly towards the goal of perfection, but never actually attaining it?²⁰ Mere re-

20. Cf. B. Bosanquet, *Value and Destiny of the Individual*, 1913, pp. 271-89. Mere prolongation of existence is not enough to satisfy our longing for immortality. "What we want is never merely something more, but always something better, if only in its greater security" (p. 274). "What we really care about is not a simple prolongation of our 'personal' existence, but, whether accompanying prolongation or in the direct form

lease from the sensuous conditions of this life will not suffice of itself to enable man to attain the highest moral perfection, for his nature may still partake of the finite though existing under other conditions; and furthermore the removal of the restrictions of time regarded as phenomenal does not imply for Kant the cessation of

of liberation, some affirmation of our main interests, or some refuge from the perpetual failure of satisfaction" (p. 276). But how is the "greater security" to be attained? In what way can we "affirm our main interests"? Only in so far as we realize that our personal existence has no value for itself,—regarded as a "formal" or "exclusive" self, it is a contradiction,—but "really falls within the substantive self," which is "the entire self-maintaining content or living world which alone gives significance either to our exclusiveness or to our universality" (p. 227). Or, as Bosanquet puts it metaphorically in a well-known passage of his other volume of Gifford lectures, *Principle of Individuality and Value*, 1912 (p. 372-73), "We, our subjective selves, are in truth, much more to be compared to a rising and falling tide, which is continually covering wider areas as it deepens and dropping back to narrower and shallower ones as it ebbs, than to the isolated pillars with their fixed circumferences . . . Accordingly, what we really care for, when we desire continuance of existence, is not "the unbrokenness of the link of personal recollection;" rather, "it is the security, the certainty of the realization of what we care for most, in the Absolute; and this does not mean in a remote and supernatural world, but in the fullest experience and throughout the universe of its appearances" (*Value and Destiny of the Individual*, 1913, pp. 288-89).

But man's conviction (as we have upheld it) is that the world is founded upon a moral reasonableness, and that, on the strength of this foundation, he bases his assurances that what he has morally achieved in his own person,—what in him is deepest and best,—will be conserved, and indeed is an integral part of reality itself. His personality does count now, and will count at the last as something worthy of life eternal, and it will not be subsumed within a larger whole,—which is tantamount to being lost. The fact of moral striving is real, because the individual who strives is real, and is not a mere naive idea or illusion, the deception of which is revealed by the white and stainless radiance of the absolute. For Dr. Bosanquet only the absolute is real and individual: finite individuality is in itself illusion; it requires the confirmation of the whole of which it is a part. True individuality for him is logical self completeness; and only one individual comes up to that standard, the absolute itself. The destiny and value of the finite individual is determined by the absolute whole. The value of any experience the finite self has achieved depends upon its transmutation through the Individuality of the whole. In all this Dr. Bosanquet is loyal to the Hegelian tradition, which seeks to transcend the dualism to which our human nature commits us. But we cannot reach the point of view of an absolute synthesis. That is beyond our ken. We are finite, and, we cannot overcome this fact of our finitude which pervades all our knowledge. We cannot argue from the standpoint of a completed whole. So much Kant has laid down for us. Rather we must accept what is given to us in immediate experience. The real is not anything that we can create: it is there for us, given for us to interpret: it cannot be made by us through thought-determinations. Hegelianism can only remain in its elevated intellectual plane by overthrowing the ladder by which it climbed. There is nothing to be gained by endeavouring to disguise our limitations. In perception we make an immediate reference to reality, and that enables us to recognize our own separateness from

progress,²¹ for in the immortal life, which is not in time in the phenomenal sense, the agent is still conceived as seeking opportunities for the attainment of moral perfection. What Kant implies here seems to be that man can never hope to rid himself of finitude either in the present or the future state; he will be limited by conditions that do not apply to the infinite being.²² Hence the perfection of holiness that is God's can never be man's in actuality, though he may devoutly strive to be perfect in his moral nature as even God himself is. This moral striving on man's part should have no ending. To one who observes this ceaseless progress of man towards the realization of holiness, only the fact of the endless succession of moral actions, involved in such an endeavour, would be apparent; but the supersensible disposition would not be discerned. That is a reality

others and the external world. This recognition is common to us all. For us then the individual is real; apart from the individual, the universal (or thought construction) is but an abstraction. The universal is what is possessed in common by individuals, and constitutes them a whole. But the universal is no more real apart from the individual than the individual is real apart from the universal. The individual can only make himself known to others through the universal. Our personality is expressed through universal terms in order to be understood by others; but the forms of expression are not the whole of our personality. There is something unique about it which cannot be wholly revealed to another. Dr. Bosanquet reaches his position by disowning the reality of the individual in the sense in which it is known to us, and making it merely a phase of the life of the absolute which for him alone conforms to the true type of individuality,—logical self-completeness (cf. W. Caldwell, *Pragmatism and Idealism*, 1913, pp. 202-03; A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, *Hegelianism and Personality*, 2nd. ed., 1893, pp. 125-27, 135-387, 226-228; Also his illuminating chapters on the *Absolute and the Finite Individual* in his *Idea of God*, 1917; W. R. Boyce Gibson, *Philosophical Introduction to Ethics*, 1904, pp. 138-50).

21. cf. J. Ward, *Realm of Ends*, 1911, p. 301.

22. cf. J. Royce, *World and the Individual*, 2nd. ser., 1901, p. 446, who holds that the "human individual," temporally regarded, is a "finite being," and that the completed Self, the Ethical Individual in the eternal world, is infinite, but that it differs from the Absolute Self in being *partial*, in requiring the other individuals as its supplement, and in distinguishing itself from them in such wise as to make their purposes not wholly and in every sense its own." Without quarrelling with Royce's phraseology, we may accept the truth in his statements that a distinctive individuality is possible for man in the spiritual order, which is more than is usually granted by the absolute idealists. Cf. W. James, *Pluralistic Universe*, 1909, pp. 173-74.

which transcends the limitations of sense-observation—the merely phenomenal. The consummation of this moral persistency displayed in a series of efforts toward the better could only be unfolded to one who could regard them as a whole. Such a Being must be greater than man who does not lose his finitude. He must be also a moral being, if he is to “see in this endless succession a whole of accordance with the moral law.” Now how is such a conception determined? How are we to show that the series of actions implied in moral progress can be surveyed as a completed unity by God? Kant has here raised the world-old problem of the relation of the temporal to the eternal.²³ But it is rather

23. There are some aspects of the problem of the relation of the temporal to the eternal or timeless experience that have importance for ethics, in so far as it has reference to such questions as the relations between progress and perfection, freedom and fore-knowledge, the nature and goal of the self, and the moral order. Professor Royce (*World and the Individual*, 2nd. Ser., 1901, pp. 133-51) endeavours to show that the temporal order when viewed in its wholeness is an eternal order. Every conscious being, having an end to achieve, has not fulfilled itself, and accordingly puts forth efforts to attain his purposes. In this respect he has a temporal aspect and so lives in time. His full realization of himself is not yet, but is to be. This future state he desires to reach is not external to the process of striving but includes it. The past, present and future experiences of the individual are included in the conception of his final fulfilment. Even a finite being then may view his experiences either as a series of successive states of consciousness, or as a whole having a definite meaning relative to the purposes or interests of the individual himself. The conception of a temporal order as a whole takes on a non-temporal significance. And so, according to Royce, if we enlarge this conception to be that of an infinite mind, *i.e.*, where all limitations are removed, we get instantly the conception of an “eternal order.” The eternal subsumes within itself all distinctions of past, present and future, or, in other words, the temporal order as a whole is identical with an eternal order, and accordingly “the whole content of this temporal order is at once known, *i.e.*, consciously experienced as a whole by the absolute” (p. 138). This is what Royce in another place calls “eternal knowledge” (p. 374).

If there is, as Royce says, only a difference of span between the temporal and eternal, then there is no fundamental difference between the nature of the unity as grasped by the finite and as grasped by the infinite. But in a succession of ideas or events realized as a whole, there must be some modifying influences exercised by the later events upon the earlier; and the unity must necessarily involve some “transformation” in the series. This would be especially marked in the case of divine knowledge, as otherwise, in the words of Dr. Bosanquet (*Principle of Individuality and Value*, 1912, p. 388), “omniscience would then see in any lapse of successive events nothing more than a finite being would see so far as he followed the identical lapse.” The meaning of a totality of experience for an absolute mind must involve a transfusion and deepening of what that

doubtful whether it was really necessary for him to use it in this connection. What was of importance to him here was that man's moral sincerity in his effort to attain the highest should be proved, and his claims to a future life, wherein he may realize his purposes, made good. He has unnecessarily encumbered his moral problem with metaphysical implications involved in the relation of a temporal series of events to a non-temporal whole. This is largely due to his approach to ethics from an epistemological standpoint.

The important point for Kant, in his solution of the matter is how the "disposition can be taken for the

totality must mean for a finite mind; for the infinite cannot contain a mere aggregation of experiences of finite minds. In the completed experience there must be involved the meaning of the events as they were graspable by finite understanding, or in so far as they expressed the purposes of the human intelligence, and something more,—the meaning these experiences have in their relation to the supreme mind.

But another difficulty arises as regards time. The succession of events takes place in time, but the experience of the succession as a unity is non-temporal, or, in other words, the completion of the series—regarded as a whole—is something fixed in the mind as having a definite meaning for the individual recognizing it. Such a conception is only timeless in the sense that it is an abstraction from the actual elements; it is only an idea, not the actuality. In this respect the mind, reviewing the temporal situation, is playing the part of an observer, and assumes itself to be out of the time-relation, to which the events are conformed. But it must be remembered that time in this sense means no more than the "abstract form of alteration or succession" (J. Ward, *Realm of Ends*, p. 471; cf. also pp. 305 ff., and 314 ff.).

So far as we are then considering what may be called a system of inter-related events, we have abstracted the mind observing from the events observed; and such a self may be called timeless, for it is separated in thought from the actual events; and, strictly speaking, these events, reflected upon as a systematic whole, exist only for thought, and are accordingly abstractions. Human experience, as concrete, then, cannot be out of all relation to time; it exists in time—indeed, "if we give up time, we move out of reality altogether." (A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, *Hegelianism and Personality*, 2nd Ed., 1893, p. 183). Hence the conception of a temporal order in its entire unity as identical with the eternal order, i.e., as a static (timeless) whole is an abstraction, and does not apply to the real world of events at all. (Cf. also Professor Pringle-Pattison's chapter on *Time and Eternity* in his *Idea of God*, 1917.—"Time is not an element in which consciousness passes, or a procession which passes before consciousness; it is simply the abstract form of the living movement which constitutes the reality of conscious life" (p. 356). "Time is the abstraction of unachieved purpose or of purpose on the way to achievement. . . . The eternal view of a time-process is not the view of all its stages simultaneously, but the view of them as elements or members of a completed purpose. Then only can we be said to see them 'as a whole.'"—p. 358.)

act"? The actions are phenomenal, and, however extensively repeated, can never lose their phenomenal and so temporal character. But these actions spring from a moral disposition. How may that be known? The mere observation of actions will not enable one to appreciate the meaning and moral worth of the noumenal causality that gives rise to them, and to view an endless succession of actions as an infinite span would imply that God acted the part of an observer. This attitude of mind towards events in time has no immediate moral significance, for the determination of what originates them cannot be arrived at from an external point of view. "A whole of accordance with the moral law" must imply will-determination and be noumenal in character; and so mere duration or prolongation of actions is not necessary to reveal such a moral disposition. It will be immediately manifested in the character of the will; and that is directly known to God to whom man's inner being is entirely open.²⁴ And this is the point upon which Kant no doubt lays stress, and which he sets forth in the passage quoted from the "Religion Within the Limits of Pure Reason."

According to Messer²⁵ and others, the proof of immortality as set forth in the Dialectic depends almost entirely upon the need of endless duration in order to get rid of hindrances to the moral life; whereas, if God Himself looks inwardly upon the heart, and judges

24. Cf. *Bernard*, p. 373; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, 458.—" . . . we shall think of this Original Being as *all-knowing*: thus our inmost dispositions (which constitute the proper moral worth of the actions of rational beings of the world) will not be hid from Him." Cf. also *Mueller*, v. 2, p. 699; *Hartenstein*, v. 3, p. 538.—" . . . omniscient, that it may know the most secret springs of our sentiments and their moral worth."

25. Cf. A. Messer, *Kants Ethik*, 1904, pp. 259-61; G. Galloway, *Philosophy of Religion*, 1914, p. 568.

man accordingly, the necessity for a progress *ad infinitum* has vanished. Thus the length of duration is not of primary importance to God Who judges; what matters is the rooting of the endeavour in a truly moral disposition, and so it is unnecessary, according to Messer,²⁶ to ground the postulate of immortality upon the first moment of the highest good. But, on the other hand, we would insist (with Kant) that this moral disposition should somehow be conserved, and the striving of the will thereto should be continually sustained. What support, then, can man claim to this end? Something more is required than the bare consciousness of attaining a truly moral disposition. In Kant's explanation of the postulate, we have found that he closely associates it with religion. In this connection immortality must mean more than mere endless duration of existence: it has reference to the "unbroken continuance"²⁷ of a character "tried" in relation to virtue and not found wanting. This immutability of purpose demands the wages of going on. This view is also brought out very clearly in the passage in the "Religion Within the Limits of Pure Reason,"²⁸ where Kant deals with the difficulties involved in man's effort to attain unto

26. Cf. A. Messer, *Kants Ethik*, 1904, p. 260. Cf. also Kant's statement in the *Lose Blaetter*, h.v. Reicke (G.22 III., 72), quoted by Haegerstroem (*Kants Ethik*, p. 494) and Messer (*Kants Ethik*, pp. 260-61).—"That the will be directed towards the highest good, it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God, and even to believe in a future life. But the latter is a belief of the second rank, for it is not necessary that we should exist, or exist eternally, but that we should live well—that so long as we live, we conduct ourselves worthy of living. . . ." Here it appears that the postulate of immortality does not stand alone, but is dependent upon that of the existence of God. This dependence is also clearly implied in Kant's elucidation of it. Both Haegerstroem and Messer note that the postulate is not given an independent significance either in the *Critique of Judgment*, or in the *Religion Within the Limits of Pure Reason*, but is treated entirely in subordinate connection with the main problem of the existence of God.

27. Abbott, p. 219; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 129.

28. Cf. Hartenstein, v. 6, pp. 163-66; cf. also Note 10 *supra*.

holiness. He points out that a man should persevere towards the good unceasingly, and show himself so faithful as even never to fall, or, if he fall, to raise himself again through the power of the law. The more he conforms to the law as determining his will, the more he will strengthen his disposition to press forward and to keep himself moving, even in this life, along the path of virtue. And so, if there be a future life, he will accordingly be capable of going on, though with increased power, and, released from the hindrances of the sensible world, finally consummate his moral striving in a life accordant with holiness in the judgment of the supreme law-giver. It is thus clear that in Kant's mind the postulate of immortality does not stand alone; it is directly connected by him with the theistic postulate. And this is an important consideration to be borne in mind in determining how far Kant is justified in postulating immortality as necessary for man's reaching unto the highest possible good.²⁹ In his other writings Kant rests the proof of immortality upon the existence of God, and this dependence is at all events implied in the Dialectic of the Critique of Practical Reason, and it gives the postulate whatever value it has.³⁰

This dependence of the postulate of immortality is also clearly shown as regards the second element of the highest good. In respect of its possibility, we must transcend the limits of the sensible world. There can be no complete union of virtue and happiness in the world of sense, and this must be in a world to come, where man is released from sense experience. Kant

29. Cf. H. L. Stewart, *Questions of the Day in Philosophy and Psychology*, 1912, pp. 246-48.

30. This was also Hegel's view. Cf. his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, tr., 1895, v. 1, pp. 74, 314.

hints at this in expressing the necessity for the connection with the intelligible world in order to find the possibility of the summum bonum in contrast to "the philosophers of both ancient and modern times [who] have been able to find happiness in accurate proportion to virtue, even in *this life* [*i.e.*, in the sensible world]."³¹ The interdependence of the postulate of the existence of God and immortality is also very conspicuous in the following passages from the Critique of Pure Reason:—

"As we are bound by reason to conceive ourselves as belonging to such a world, though the senses present us with nothing but a world of phenomena, we shall have to accept the other world as the result of our conduct in this world of sense (in which we see no connection between goodness and happiness), and therefore as to us a future world. Hence it follows that God and a future life are two suppositions which, according to the principle of pure reason, cannot be separated from the obligation which that very reason presses on us."³²

"It is necessary that the whole course of our life should be subject to moral maxims; but this is impossible, unless reason connects with the moral law, which is a mere idea, an efficient cause, which assigns to all conduct in accordance with the moral law, an issue accurately corresponding to our highest aims, whether in this or another life. Thus without a God and without a world, not visible to us now, but hoped for, the glorious ideas of morality are indeed objects of applause and admiration, but not springs of purpose and action, because they fail to fulfil all the aims which are natural to every rational being, and which are determined a

31. Abbott, p. 211; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 121.

32. Mueller, v. 2, pp. 695-96; Hartenstein, v. 3, pp. 535-36. As regards Kant's alleged hedonism in these quotations, see *supra*, pp. 136 ff.

priori by the same pure reason, and therefore necessary.'³³

Here Kant is questioning as to what value a life of virtue would have without the consciousness of endless life as something more than a possibility. Immortality by itself may not be absolutely necessary that morality be possible, but the issues of morality would become far more complicated and far less easy to reconcile with human aspirations without the hope of immortality. Still, even those who maintain that there is no God, and that this life is all, may truly endeavour to fulfil their lives here in accordance with the moral law; but, as Kant points out, in referring to "a righteous man" in this connection, that the high moral purposes of our earthly life would lose much of their meaning and value, and be shattered by an inner inconsistency,³⁴ if they were not dependent for their realization upon the very conviction of God's existence, which such thinkers have attempted to disown. "We may, then, suppose the case of a righteous man (*e.g.*, Spinoza?) who holds himself firmly persuaded that there is no God and also (because in respect of the object of morality a similar consequence results) no future life; how is he to judge of his own inner purposive destination, by practice? He desires no advantage to himself from following it, either in this world or another; he wishes rather disinterestedly to establish the good to which the holy law directs all his powers. But his effort is bounded; and from nature, although he may expect here and there a contingent accordance, he can never expect a regular harmony

33. *Mueller*, v. 2, p. 697; *Hartenstein*, v. 3, p. 536; cf. F. Paulsen, *Immanuel Kant*, tr., 1902, p. 266.

34. Cf. G. Galloway, *Philosophy of Religion*, 1914, p. 569; also H. Rashdall, *Theory of Good and Evil*, 1907, v. 2, pp. 216, 266; C. F. D'Arcy, *Short Study of Ethics*, 2nd Ed., 1912, pp. 222-25.

agreeing according to constant rules (such as his maxims are and must be, internally), with the purpose that he yet feels himself obliged and impelled to accomplish. . . . The purpose, then, which this well-intentioned person had and ought to have before him in his pursuit of moral laws, he must certainly give up as impossible. Or else if he wishes to remain dependent upon the call of his moral internal destination, and not to weaken the respect with which the moral law immediately inspires him, by assuming the nothingness of the single, ideal, final purpose adequate to its high demand (which cannot be brought about without a violation of moral sentiment), he must, as he well can—since there is at least no contradiction from a practical point of view in forming a concept of a morally prescribed final purpose—assume the being of a *moral* author of the world, that is, a God.”³⁵

Kant makes it quite clear that immortality is essential to the moral life as a life of achievement. Men are not moral because they are immortal or desire to become immortal. Kant would not tolerate such an interpretation of the postulate. It is only necessary, according to him, to render worth while a life of moral endeavour. What would be the value of it all, if it ended in dust and ashes? The good man achieves should

35. Bernard, pp. 383-84; Hartenstein, v. 5, pp. 466-67. Kant may be justified in regarding Spinoza's conception of God as non-theistic. Cf. Mueller, p. 543; Hartenstein, v. 3, p. 420.—“As we are accustomed to understand by the concept of God, not only a blindly-working eternal nature, as the root of all things, but a Supreme Being, which, through understanding and freedom, is supposed to be the author of all things, and as it is this concept alone in which we really take an interest, one might strictly deny to the *Deist* all belief in God, and allow him only the maintaining of an original Being, or a supreme cause. But as no one, simply because he does not dare to assert, ought to be accused of denying a thing, it is kinder and juster to say, that the *Deist* believes in a God, but the *Theist* in a living God (*summa intelligentia*).” Cf. in *re* J. Martineau, *Study of Spinoza*, 3rd Ed., 1805, pp. 327-50; also, on the whole passage quoted, C. C. J. Webb, *Kant's Philosophy of Religion*, 1926, pp. 82-86, 179-80.

surely be preserved. Morality is not for a day but for all time, and that, too, not as the possession of a whole of rational beings, but of the individual himself. If, then, the realization of the good, its conservation and ultimate triumph, are to be possible for man, Kant asks for the guarantee. Can it be made rationally acceptable? The highest good can only be realized by a truly moral being. Hence evil or immorality in man must be ultimately overcome, but man is not capable of achieving this on his own unaided resources. He alone can determine whether he will make himself worthy of the good: the moral condition rests with himself. But the actual attainment does not lie in his unassisted capacity. That is Kant's position; and in this respect he is in accord with Christian doctrine. "Supposing that a supernatural co-operation is also necessary to make a man good or better, whether this consists only in the diminution of the obstacles or in a positive assistance, the man must previously make himself worthy to receive it and to *accept* this aid (which is no small thing), that is, to adopt into his maxim the positive increase of power, in which way alone it is possible that the good should be imputed to him, and that he should be recognized as a good man."^{35a} Evil must be ultimately eradicable, then, according to Kant. There must be a final discrimination between what is evil and what is good. That God is, stands as an acceptable guarantee of this. Hence the way is ever open to man to purify the bad taint that is in him; and in his efforts he need not be unassisted.

It should further be made clear that for Kant the attainment of a holy will, or God's recognition of the

35a. *Abbott*, pp. 352-53; *Hartenstein*, v. 6, p. 139.

sincere disposition to attain, must not be regarded as conditioning immortality. To affirm this is to assert that immortality is conditional, and bestowed upon man as an act of grace by God. Hence some souls would be destined to destruction, and others to eternal existence, according to a divine judgment. That is not Kant's view. Man's claim to immortality rests upon the fact that he is a moral being; that every man has something of morality in him, which is worthy of preservation, and of ultimate purification. And so the point is, what rational guarantee has man that his moral progress implicates an eternal hope? If he can only advance from good to better, is it ever possible for him to attain the best? This is a pressing question, in view of the fact that the best is not reachable by him under existing conditions. Is it to be absolutely foreclosed to him? Kant's answer is that the highest good is possible for man. He may not actually fulfil it, for circumstances beyond his control may hinder him; but if there be in him the sincere and pure-hearted disposition to attain, a downright persistent effort to succeed, and a recognition that he does not contend alone with the principalities and powers of evil that oppose him, he can rest assured that he cannot fail, for there is a Being who is supreme above all, "eternal in the heavens," who knows him through and through and intuitively his progress in the moral life as a whole from the beginning. While, then, from man's finite point of view, persistency in moral endeavour is the rule of his life, yet his worth is not determined by what he has already attained, but also by what he is on the way to attain, and is within measurable hope of attaining. But without the faith that man's life in fulness transcends this

bourne of time and place, morality would become a despairing torment to him whose soul aspires upwards to the infinite.

Kant's argument for immortality has a close relation to the common feelings of humanity. It would have been more satisfactory had he been enabled to use the emotional side of our human nature even to better purpose than he did, but his theoretical philosophy prevented him.³⁶ We feel intimately that death cannot end all; our higher feelings revolt at such a thought. These emotions do not arise "out of the mere sense of loss, but out of a consciousness of reason baffled and spiritual ideals mocked."³⁷ The righteous man has an ideal,

36. Cf. *Mueller*, v. 1, pp. 504-06; *Hartenstein*, v. 3, pp. 287-88. This important passage, which occurs in Kant's refutation of Mendelssohn's proof of the permanence of the soul, is worth quoting in full.—"Nothing is lost, however, by this with regard to the right, nay, the necessity, of admitting a future life, according to the principles of practical, as connected with the speculative employment of reason. It is known, besides, that a purely speculative proof has never been able to exercise any influence on the ordinary reason of men. . . . The proofs which are useful for the world at large retain their value undiminished, nay, they gain in clearness and natural power, by the surrender of those dogmatical pretensions, placing reason in its own peculiar domain, namely, the system of ends, which is, however, at the same time the system of nature; so that reason as a practical faculty by itself, without being limited by the conditions of the latter, becomes justified in extending the former, and with it, our own existence, beyond the limits of experience and of life. According to the *analogy with the nature* of living beings in this world, in which reason must inevitably admit the principle that no organ, no faculty, no impulse, can be found, as being either superfluous or disproportionate to its use, and therefore purposeless, but that everything is adequate to its destination in life, man, who alone can contain in himself the highest end of all this, would be the only creature excepted from it. For, his natural dispositions, not only so far as he uses them according to his talents and impulses, but more especially the moral law within him, go so far beyond all that is useful and advantageous in this life, that he is taught thereby, in the absence of all advantages, even of the shadowy hope of posthumous fame, to esteem the mere consciousness of righteousness beyond everything else, feeling an inner call, by his conduct in this world and a surrender of many advantages, to render himself fit to become the citizen of a better world, which exists in his idea only. This powerful and incontrovertible proof, accompanied by our constantly increasing recognition of a design pervading all that we see around us, and by a contemplation of the immensity of creation, and therefore also by the consciousness of an unlimited possibility in the extension of our knowledge, and a desire commensurate therewith, all this remains and will remain, although we must surrender the hope of ever being able to understand, from mere theoretical speculation, the necessary continuance of, our existence."

37. S. S. Laurie, *Synthetica*, 1906, v. 2, p. 354.

which the world of mechanism cannot respect nor understand. He has in his moral purposes transcended the limits of that world, and a sure faith in God would claim for him the right to go on—not as permitting the mere continuance of living itself, but as presenting greater opportunities for service, and for the completion of purposes. Annihilation would put an end to all exalted striving, if there were no possibility of a future life. The conviction is deeply rooted in man's being, and no ethical system would be complete without finding a place for it. And Kant was not far out, after all, in associating the immortality of the soul with man's need for moral development,³⁸ for the consummation of his life in a holy and blessed existence. Death certainly is real, but life would be a sorry illusion if death, as a mere physical phenomenon, brought down the curtain upon all things. In that case the universe would be lost in irrationality and chaos; life would be purposeless. If the moral life be real, then death cannot end all.³⁹ Such a conviction would scarcely arise, if all our hopes were realized here. It is from our defeats and failures, and from disappointments at the non-fulfilment of cherished plans and aspirations, which seem stamped with all the purpose of a divine authority, that we become conscious of utter weakness and inability to consummate our life's purpose in the world of time and place as we experience them.⁴⁰ We believe in our own

38. Cf. J. Seth, *Study of Ethical Principles*, 12th Ed., 1911, p. 457.

39. Cf. E. Caird, *Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*, 1889, v. 2, pp. 308-09.

40. Cf. S. S. Laurie, *Synthetica*, 1906, v. 2, p. 368. But Dr. Bosanquet (*Value and Destiny of the Individual*, 1913, pp. 273-74) fails to appreciate this naive argument from the point of view of the individual experient, and regards it as of the "nature of a bargain." He maintains (p. 274) that this desire for continuance of life is, when understood, that

ideals; they are rooted and grounded in our rational nature; they are no mere illusions and fancies of a deluded mind.⁴¹ Our hope of existence after death has therefore a reasonable basis in our own convictions, and the stronger our will to accomplish our ideals, the firmer our confidence that they shall be realized, even in a world beyond the grave. This moral demand is not a claim on man's part for a reward that will recompense a life of virtue and strenuous activity for right in the present world. The future life which the virtuous seek is not something extraneous, or added, to that which they now live.⁴² The higher existence is sought as subserving the interests of the moral ideal, as giving ampler scope for its realization, or even as opening a way towards a purer conception of it, and so energizing the

for the satisfactory and self-contained whole. But surely the longing is for something more than a logical ideal, a mere intellectual conception of completeness. Only a truly theistic faith will satisfy such a desire in us. Because we believe in God, and because we believe His life to self-complete, all-mighty and all-good, we also have the conviction that man's life may develop more and more into perfection; and its moral incompleteness demands other conditions of existence than are represented in this life. We feel within ourselves, though far from fulfilment, "the power of an endless life"; and because we have the assurance that there is a perfect life, we fight our way on, in spite of defeats, knowing that our moral gains will be conserved, and that at the last our humanity will be perfected in him who is the lord of life.

41. Cf. A. S. Pringle-Pattison, *Idea of God*, 1917, p. 245.—"Is it not just the power of framing (and consequently of following) an ideal which constitutes man's nature as a rational creature—which makes him more than an intermittent pulse of animal desire?" Cf. also pp. 251-52—"Hence the ideal is precisely the most real thing in the world; and those ranges of our experience, such as religion, which are specifically concerned with the ideal, instead of being treated as a cloud-cuckoo-land of subjective fancy, may reasonably be accepted as the best interpreters we have of the true nature of reality.

42. Reference may be made here to Leibniz's faith that "immortality without recollection is quite useless," and that the soul is "destined to preserve personality and remembrance," also an "identity moral and apparent to ourselves in order to constitute the same person capable consequently of feeling chastisements and rewards" (cf. Leibniz, *Monadology*, etc., tr. Latta, 1898, p. 225 n.; and *New Essays Concerning Human Understanding*, tr. Langley, 1896, pp. 53, 245). For Leibniz the principle of justice was founded in goodness and love, and hence his moral conception of reward, which is not extraneous in character, but intimate with the moral nature of man, for "moral qualities are turned into natural" (cf. *Monadology*, pp. 268-70, 292-93).

soul to a greater degree for moral action under conditions worthier far than what obtain here. These actions are by no means brought forth to gratify the personal whims of any being; they spring from the depths of the human soul, already much engrossed in the struggle of humanity towards a better and more excellent way of life. There is nothing mercenary or ignoble in this hope of an eternal existence. "It is not a question of private wishes or of extraneous rewards; it is a question of the status of a rational free agent who has chosen or is capable of choosing the moral ideal as his end. The ideal is there and is to be realized: it is rational to believe this and all that it implies, if it is rational to believe anything."⁴³

43. J. Ward, *Realm of Ends*, 1911, p. 425.

CHAPTER VII.

HIGHEST GOOD: THE POSTULATE OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

I. THE MORAL ARGUMENT.

Kant postulates the existence of God as the necessary condition for the possibility of the second element of the summum bonum. In this respect he would seem to treat the two elements of the highest good, virtue and happiness, as though they could be considered entirely apart from one another, and as though separate and distinct conditions could be found for their realization. While he does distinguish between the elements, and base upon each of them a different postulate, still on his own showing the postulates are not independent of one another, and the element of happiness is discussed from the standpoint of its dependence upon virtue.

Happiness has not an independent value, but is only a consequence. If it be regarded apart from moral determination and treated as a physical need, the possibility of its enjoyment by man rests entirely upon nature, and the probability of his realization of it is very remote. For in this respect nature is most unaccommodating.¹ She dooms man to destruction in her cataclysms along with the lower creatures, and much misery and suffering are brought upon him in consequence. Even were the mechanism of nature entirely under man's control, it would not suffice as a means for the attainment of happiness, for man himself cannot definitely make up his mind as to what will completely

1. Cf. *Bernard*, pp. 350, 383; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, pp. 441, 466.

satisfy his physical need, and his ideals of happiness vary with his different interests.² And his realization of it in the possession of any object of desire or attainment of any purpose, would not be lasting, owing to his restlessness and craving for more; further, these efforts to acquire things for enjoyment awake evil passions and jealousies, and so prove a stumbling block to many in the quest.³ And however beneficial nature might be, she cannot of herself aid man in his endeavour to attain satisfaction in life. So long as man considers himself externally dependent upon nature for the realization of his ends, he will fail, for nature cannot be relied on to guarantee the fulfilment of his wishes.

Man's desire for happiness in some form or other is universal. How is he to realize it? If it be hopeless to look to nature, can he depend upon morality to satisfy him? A life of virtue will at all events render him worthy of happiness; so much rests in man's power to accomplish; but fulfilment of the moral law cannot guarantee to him actual participation in happiness. A man can then at least so live that he be worthy of happiness. He should even learn to benefit from his disappointments and the want of harmony of nature with his aspirations, and use these experiences as incentives to the development of his own moral powers.⁴ Hence

2. Cf. J. Dewey and J. H. Tufts, *Ethics*, 1909, pp. 272-73.

3. Cf. Bernard, p. 354; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 444.

4. Cf. Bernard, p. 358; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 447.—"The beautiful arts and sciences . . . win us in large measure from the tyranny of sense-propensions, and thus prepare men for a lordship, in which Reason alone shall have authority; whilst the evils with which we are visited, partly by nature, partly by the intolerant selfishness of men, summon, strengthen, and harden the powers of the soul not to submit to them, and so make us feel an aptitude for higher purposes, which lies hidden in us." Cf. also Hartenstein, v. 4 (*Idee zu e. allgem. Geschichte, etc.*), p. 146.—"It seems that it does not at all matter to nature that he should live happily, but that he should press forward so far as to make himself, by his conduct, worthy of life and happiness." Further, in the same essay (pp.

it will come home to him that enjoyment is not the true end of life, nor that which gives it its highest value. Life's true value resides in what a man gives to it, and does for himself, independently of what nature may contribute or withhold. Neither nature nor morality can guarantee to man the fulfilment of his longings for happiness. Kant insists, then, that happiness cannot be a moral principle, and that, if it is to be attained at all, it must be a consequence of morality. Upon what moral ground, then, does its realization depend? The consciousness of virtue is not sufficient for this purpose. It indeed implies worthiness to be happy. Now, if worthiness be at all a moral claim for happiness, there cannot be an indiscriminate distribution of it, but a rational apportionment in accordance with right conduct. The enjoyment of happiness is never, in Kant's mind, dissociated from the moral life. Accordingly the ground for the realization of happiness as an end of morality must unite worthiness on the one hand with the satisfaction of desire on the other. This involves the idea of a harmony between the world of nature, in which satisfactions are realized, and moral principles the observance of which determines worthiness. It is not possible to ground the basis of their union in man,⁵ for his

146-48), Kant goes on to show that the resistance of his fellows forces a man within himself and awakens his slumbering powers, so that he may develop his capacities for the highest services of humanity. Were this not so, he would probably live a life of Arcadian simplicity in idleness and easy contentment, and thus the moral strength of his nature would have remained undeveloped. Man wills harmony, but nature disharmony, and thus she urges him on to the complete fulfilment of his natural capacities. This attitude of nature towards man reveals the ruling guidance of a wise creator. All depends on the man himself. He must make his own contribution to life, irrespective of what nature imparts or withholds. In this connection Kant recognizes the significance of the social basis for morality to a far more adequate extent than he did in his derivation of the categorical imperative. He rather presumed upon the fact that man as a moral being was a member of society and not an isolated unit in his applications of the moral law.

5. Cf. *Bernard*, pp. 387-88; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, pp. 469-70.

existence, being partly sensible, is to that extent dependent upon the world of nature, and, accordingly, not a cause of it; and further, the moral law cannot of itself produce happiness as a consequence of its acceptance by the will. "There is not the least ground, therefore, in the moral law for a necessary connection between morality and proportionate happiness in a being that belongs to the world as part of it, and therefore dependent on it, and which for that reason cannot by his will be a cause of this nature, nor by his own power make it thoroughly harmonize, so far as his happiness is concerned, with his practical principles."⁶ The moral law as such merely determines the will as moral; it does not constitute in itself the conditions necessary for the realization of the objects of a will so determined. These conditions go beyond the moral law. They also exceed man's powers, for he cannot work his will in the sensible world so as to make it completely conform to his purposes. Are we, then, to say that happiness is not possible for man, neither in this life nor beyond? Certainly it is within man's power to fulfil the law, and although happiness does not necessarily follow in consequence, the will that so conforms itself to the law is deemed worthy of being happy. That is all that Kant will allow to be within man's unassisted capacity. If he is to enjoy happiness there must be some means of supplementing his impotence. But is that necessary? Is it really a moral necessity that man should realize happiness?⁷ Happiness is not a means to morality, nor

6. *Abbott*, p. 221; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, pp. 130-31.

7. Cf. *Abbott*, p. 15; *Hartenstein*, v. 4, p. 247.—"To secure one's own happiness is a duty, at least indirectly, for discontent with one's condition, under a pressure of many anxieties and amidst unsatisfied wants, might easily become a great temptation to transgression of duty." Cf. also *Abbott*, pp. 298-99; *Hartenstein*, v. 7, p. 192.

can it be a determining principle of the good will. This absolute denial doubtless raises questions as to what achievements will result from a life devoted to duty. Is enjoyment of moral observance possible even by way of what is accomplished? Is such enjoyment positively divorced from moral ends? It would seem at all events that if happiness is to be achieved in any wise, it must result from morality somehow.

It is at this point that Kant must needs ask himself, What is the end of morality? Though a man may not seek any advantage to himself in revering the autonomous character of his will and acting in accordance with it, yet as a rational being he should ask himself, What do I achieve?⁸ Does the moral law become for my moral consciousness both determining ground and end? Morality resides in the "consciousness of righteousness beyond everything else"; but at the same time the moral nature of man must be capable of determining him to become the "citizen of a better world which exists in idea only." That he should strive actually to be what he ought to be, even here and now, if that be possible, should appeal to the moral judgment of any man. Hence morality as an end must include the principle of a causality according to freedom, or man's capacity to fulfil his highest hopes, to realize desires that spring from his moral life. What this means is that morality is more than mere practical activity; it certainly has reference to that which results from the determination of the will. For the will strives to accomplish something, and thus we have a moral action. In this striving of the will there is implied something

8. Cf. *Mueller*, v. 1, pp. 504-06; *Hartenstein*, v. 3, pp. 287-88; cf. also *Mueller*, v. 2, pp. 690-91; *Hartenstein*, v. 3, pp. 532-33.

more than the mere causality of the moral law itself; it has reference to the purpose that is expressed through its achievement. How is such a purpose moral?⁹ The purpose or end is not moral in itself. The morality of an action lies in the will's willing it in conformity to law, irrespective of its realization. That which is realized, or whose realization is hoped for, is the end of the will. Now if the end be the accomplishment of the moral determination of the will, so far may it be called a moral end. But it must not be overlooked that this achievement of a moral purpose may not bring happiness with it; it may require self-resignation, even the sacrifice of one's peace of mind. Yet withal that cannot be final. Surely morality cannot be equivalent to suffering. Pain and distress and all that comes in their train may be disciplinary towards man's moral development, but cannot be the equivalent of morality.¹⁰ Kant's appeal here is to the facts of our human nature. He asks for an impartial judgment. A man who respects morality in the highest degree may acquiesce in its observance, bringing upon him some measure of suffering; but he will never agree that others should be denied happiness in following the path of duty;¹¹ if their faithfulness to morality is received with indifference, and if they find no satisfaction anywhere, the injustice of the situation, so far as it affects others, is a source of grief and profound anxiety to himself. And the question would arise, Is the world founded upon right? Is the good divorced absolutely from happiness? The solution of this problem goes far beyond man's capacity.

9. Cf. *Hartenstein*, v. 6, pp. 100-01. See *supra*, pp. 86-88.

10. Cf. *Bernard*, pp. 353-58; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, pp. 443-47.

11. Cf. *Mueller*, v. 2, p. 697; *Hartenstein*, v. 3, p. 536; cf. also *Abbott*, pp. 123, 206, 304, 312; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, pp. 36, 116; v. 7, pp. 197, 205.

From a human point of view there is an inner need (necessitated by morality) that man should enjoy some measure of happiness in the moral life;¹² but the circumstances of the world in which he lives are not wholly within his control, and this discrepancy denies him the surety of attainment of inward peace and joy. He may, of course, experience transient gleams of blissfulness, but they come and pass; there is no abiding place for happiness in the world. And the power to realize happiness does not reside in man himself—in his faithfulness to the moral law. And yet the moral life may rightly claim happiness as its due, and in man's nature there is an elemental need for satisfaction and contentment. If the quest of happiness be an utterly fruitless one, if pain and suffering are the constant accompaniments of morality, and the world be dark with griefs and graves, man's lot is surely without hope and meaning. But his spirit rises against acquiescence in such an end. It cannot be, if there be right and justice anywhere, even though veiled for the time being. Happiness is a need of man's nature, and its ultimate satisfaction is a hope he feels that he cannot dispense with. How is it to be realized? It certainly implies a final harmony between moral law and the world of nature. And that is what Kant has put forward in his statement of the highest good—the furthering of happiness in harmony with morality.¹³

This implies that there must be a practically necessary connection between the supersensible and sensible elements in the *summum bonum*; for we have in this moral end transcended the limits of the world of nature

12. Cf. *Abbott*, p. 298; *Hartenstein*, v. 7, p. 191.

13. Cf. *Bernard*, p. 382; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 465.

and man; natural causes cannot reconcile the moral ends of freedom with their realization. How is this connection, then, to be brought about? We must go beyond man and nature; we must of necessity assume the existence of a transcendent power as the ground for the common foundation of the world of morality and nature. It is not enough to assert the necessity for an intelligent cause of the world, for although such a cause would be rational, it is not necessarily moral; it is no more than the conception of a world-designer. Something more is required. "Now this supreme cause must contain the principle of the harmony of nature, not merely with the law of the will of rational beings, but with the conception of this law, in so far as they make it the supreme determining principle of the will, and consequently not merely with the form of morals but with their morality as their motive, that is, with their moral character."¹⁴ That the world of nature harmonize with morality, the Supreme Being, who is nature's lord, must also be its moral author and law-giver. Hence the existence of God is postulated¹⁵ to satisfy a fundamental moral need in man's nature. But Kant hastens to assure us that such a postulate is not an objective necessity of practical reason: it has not the objective value of the moral law or the consciousness of duty, which is a self-subsistent

14. *Abbott*, p. 221; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 131.

15. It should be noted that the postulates apply within the moral sphere, i.e., to pure reason as practical. They "supplement the impotence of pure reason" in its speculative aspect. These foundations of morality cannot be established for the purpose of theoretical knowledge, though their existence is necessary for morality. We know nothing further about them, and cannot use them as instruments of knowledge. They only guarantee man's capacity to moral action as supreme beyond natural law. Natural law is not ultimate: it subserves the mechanical operations of the universe of scientific knowledge; but man transcends these relations, being free to pursue his own ends as a moral agent. This fact gives a subjective character to these postulates: we are not bound by an objective necessity to assume their existence, for if we were, they would come within the domain of physical law: we are not compelled by any duty to suppose the existence of anything.

fact of morality. It arises solely from the subjective need¹⁶ of man's moral nature to reconcile a discrepancy in its moral life which cannot be removed or satisfied in any other way. It cannot be demonstrated as a fact of either the moral or the theoretical consciousness: it is a thing of faith—something which man must needs postulate, as otherwise the moral life would be wanting in consistency and be much restricted in its fundamental significance for man.¹⁷

Such, then, appears to be Kant's moral argument for the existence of God. Many may not agree with this rather favourable interpretation of it. The references show that the points of the argument have been put forward by Kant in his various ethical treatises, and they

16. Cf. *Abbott*, p. 222; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 131.—"It must be remarked here that this moral necessity is *subjective*, that is, it is a want, and not *objective*, that is, a duty, for there cannot be a duty to suppose the existence of anything (since this concerns only the theoretical employment of reason." Cf. also *Bernard*, p. 381 n.; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 464.—"This moral argument does not supply any *objectively-valid* proof of the Being of God; it does not prove to the sceptic that there is a God, but proves that if he wishes to think in any way consonant with morality, he must admit the assumption of this proposition under the maxims of his practical Reason. We should therefore not say: it is necessary *for morals*, to assume the happiness of all rational beings of the world in proportion to their morality; but rather this is necessitated *by* morality. Accordingly, this is a *subjective* argument sufficient for moral beings."

17. Because the Stoics and the Epicureans refused to accept the postulate of God's existence as necessary for the possibility of the *summum bonum*, Kant maintained that they were unable to solve this problem. Both schools considered man a law unto himself. The Epicureans sought his moral ends in personal happiness, and regarded this as his highest good: the Stoics excluded happiness altogether, and strove after virtue only, and expected to attain it in this life. But in the Christian conception of morality the *summum bonum* takes the form of a kingdom of God. For the Christian the moral law is holy, and should be respected by man, and be unconditionally obeyed by him. But reverence is not happiness, though it does indeed produce a condition of worthiness. Now the Christian life is fulfilled in the kingdom of God wherein nature and morality are harmoniously represented, and thus their mutual correspondence guarantees the realization of a happy state of being as the normal result of persistent progress in devotion to the strict demands of the moral law. Though the complete adjustment of the conditions whereby happiness will always be proportionate to virtue is not possible in this life, yet the fact of God's existence guaranteeing their ultimate harmony raises the hope that serene unbroken joy will be attained in eternity, where God's holy law is fulfilled unto perfection. Thus the existence of the supreme author of the universe is only postulated with reference to the final attainment of perfect good and complete happiness.

have been fused together in order to outline a coherent statement. It may be agreed that in this way one has toned down the harshness of the dualism of the Critique of Practical Reason, which is so dependent on the theoretical conclusions of the Critique of Pure Reason, and that one has permitted Kant to weld in many facts elicited from a psychological analysis, which do not belong to the original setting of his argument. There may be a certain justification for this general criticism of the situation as a whole, especially if one starts out from the fundamental separation of the worlds of the supersensible and the sensible, so characteristic of the Kantian philosophy. But while it is necessary to keep the theoretical dualism in view—and Kant, as we have seen, never really got beyond it, in spite of his assertions of a common principle or a common root—yet, from the moral plane, it may be possible to reveal an inner consistency in Kant's argument. This does not imply a consistent point of view throughout the whole proof, which must take in both the theoretical and the moral standpoints. And Kant's fundamental failure will be found within the theoretical sphere rather than within the moral. If we confine ourselves to the moral consciousness, there seems to be a good deal to justify, on Kant's behalf, an inner moral demand for the existence of God. We shall first give this phase of the argument some further consideration before going on to deal with the difficulties underlying the relations between the theoretical and the moral planes.*

*As the result of a long-standing practice, we speak of arguments for, or proofs of the existence of God. These arguments or proofs have been much discussed throughout the centuries. And if we relied entirely upon them, it would be questionable at times whether we were left with God in the heavens or not. But we are assured that God's own existence (His existence for Himself) does not depend on the fact that our finite intelligences can, consistently with all the vagaries of our reasonings,

An inner moral necessity for the existence of God must imply a refutation of the objection that the God Kant has revealed to us is external to the world, whose law-giver he is. In this connection some repetition of

present a coherent and convincing argument that he exists for us. The universe (including personality, consciousness) is here; we are in it and of it. We did not make it. We do not have immediate awareness of its origin or beginning (even assuming these concepts apply). Our intelligences are not adequate to deal with absolute origins or beginnings. To explain or to grasp intelligibly the nature of the very act of creation goes beyond our finite limits. It requires a higher order of intelligence than ours, though not necessarily an intelligence that is completely incommensurable with ours. We do find that the universe responds to our intelligence so far as we have capacity to interpret its processes. But we only meet it (as it were) in parts, phases, processes. And no one of us can even synthesize all that has been ascertained. Knowledge as a whole does not subsist in any one human being; each of us knows only in part. Hence it may be that arguments which are framed to present a consistent proof of the existence of God may even fail of their purpose, for they themselves are but creations of human reason which, despite our absolute need of trust in it (else the universe would cease to exemplify a rational order), never seems to present an argument receivable as infallible by all men at all times.

It may be said that proofs of the existence of God are mere logical lubrications. We argue from a "quality" to a "quantity" which manifests it. We presume that there is purposiveness in world-processes, and so advance to a Mind from which the purposes proceed. There may be logical consistency in this based upon a knowledge of how our own reason works. But at the same time it should be recognized that to admit processes is necessarily to admit that of which they are processes, and also that some created being seeks to prove of itself that there is a supreme creative being. We cannot get round the definite fact of our creaturehood and finitude. Still nevertheless our reason insists upon a logical presentation of an argument or proof of the fact that the universe as presented to personality cannot produce itself, but must have been itself produced. But what manner of production it was our intelligence cannot fathom. Our reason "detects" what we call purposiveness in it; we name the category to indicate what we find. It is a way of interpreting processes. What this means is that we can only know the workings of the highest being in terms of what we know of the highest in ourselves. We can do no other. And yet we do not attain a final unanimity. And when there is imposed upon us a rational constraint to fuse the conception of the highest completed purpose with developmental processes, to unite the conception of the one supreme being with what is "opposed" to Him as an act of His own creation, to establish co-operation between the eternal mind and an infinite number of finite minds believed to be, and accepted as, morally free or self-determining, it is not to be wondered at that we are left in wonderment. (And for almost all men, in view of this experience, worship is an avenue to spiritual satisfaction.) But we may add that it is less mystifying to assume that God has so created us that we are able to reason about Him and His ways as we do, and that what seem to be so utterly opposed, as, *e.g.*, mind and matter, are not in their eternal significance existences that can be absolutely separate; for the abstraction-working devices of our intelligence enable us to reduce the hardest masses and imponderables in creation with an effectiveness that has nothing commensurate with it in the mechanical contrivances man has made. Our intellectual powers of abstraction and synthesis are among the greatest of miracles, and by means of them the divine being has enabled us to penetrate further into the inmost core of reality than we are probably aware of.

former arguments may be necessary in order to unfold an inner harmony between virtue and happiness; for, on the strength of this commensurability between the two elements of the highest good, it appears possible to show God's being as a moral and rational demand on the part of man's nature, and thus deny that it is postulated merely as a *deus ex machina* to combine elements that are incompatible with one another.¹⁸

Separating the spheres of the practical and the theoretical, Kant confines his investigation to the practical alone. In the world of freedom (as being completely independent of sense determination) the moral law commands absolutely, and accordingly autonomy is the sole determining principle of morality.¹⁹ Still, Kant also avers that the faithful obedience to the law determines within us the consciousness of mastery over inclinations—a sort of intellectual contentment, rather negative in tone, yet somewhat akin to happiness, though happiness is more positive.²⁰ At all events, the point here is that the operation of the law through freedom becomes “capable of an enjoyment.” In the moral sphere Kant shows that there are consequences which have moral worth. But, at the same time, the principles of morality are self-dependent, and determine the will apart altogether from the achievement of purposes: still, it is not denied that these principles may effect consequences which possess worth. What is denied is that any end or purpose can determine moral action. The morality of the will's action depends solely upon its acceptance of the

18. Cf. E. Caird, *Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*, 1889, v. 2, pp. 303-04; J. Seth, *Study of Ethical Principles*, 12th Ed., p. 422; et al.

19. Abbott, p. 122; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 35.

20. Cf. Abbott, pp. 287, 301; Hartenstein, v. 7, pp. 179, 194-95. Cf. also reference to Kant and Schiller, in my *Kant's Doctrine of Freedom*, pp. 81-83.

moral law as such. It is the principle of self-legislation in the individual which constitutes his doings as moral. Now it is the results of moral determination that are the special concern of the Dialectic. How far may they be said to have moral value? If considered as determinants of moral action, they possess no value whatsoever; but that does not preclude them from having worth as something achieved through moral determination.

What, then, from the moral point of view, is moral achievement? How may it be stated in terms of the law of freedom? The object of morality, it is clear, cannot be explained from a theoretical point of view, for that only has reference to an object entirely under the laws of natural necessity, and so absolutely without moral significance. Now, happiness is an object whose achievement is universally desired, but happiness of itself is not an object of morality²¹ from Kant's standpoint, for it is sensibly conditioned, and therefore dependent upon what is beyond man's power to control. But if it can be shown that happiness may result from supersensible conditions, then it may be possible that it has some moral significance as an element of the highest good possible in the world through freedom. The will that is determined by the moral law is in all

21. The object of morality is not the same as an object in the world of sense. Cf. *Bernard*, p. 406; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 483.—"Objects, which in reference to the use of pure practical reason, that is in conformity with duty, must be thought *a priori* (whether as consequences or grounds), but which are transcendent for its theoretical use, are mere *things of faith*. Of this kind is the *highest good* in the world, to be brought about by freedom. The concept of this cannot be established as regards its objective reality in any experience possible for us and thus adequately for the theoretical use of reason; but its use is commanded by practical pure reason in reference to the best possible working out of that purpose, and it consequently must be assumed possible. This commanded effect, *together with the only conditions of its possibility thinkable by us, viz., the being of God and the immortality of the soul, are things of faith (res fidei)*, and of all objects are the only ones that can be so called."

respects a good will. In this obedience the will reveals itself as virtuous, and therein finds its own reward.²² Goodness is therefore the object of a will under law; and is the universal form of the object of morality. Thus, if happiness is to be included in the object of morality, it must be conformed to the activity of the good will. This would not be possible, if happiness and goodness were utterly incommensurable. Their incompatibility is most marked, if they are regarded separately as practical principles, for in this respect their spheres of interest are utterly disparate. Happiness of itself refers to sensibility, or the world of phenomena; virtue or goodness of will is entirely noumenal. But in man neither can obtain completely of itself. If the former wholly prevailed, man would not be higher than the brute creation, and so lack morality: if the latter exclusively predominated, he would be elevated above the ordinary human plane and take on some form of divinity. In man, then, virtue and happiness may be united; and their unity cannot be a mere combination of parts external to one another, otherwise the being of man would be split into utterly disparate divisions. Now, how is the relation between them determined? It is clear that the one must be subordinated to the other.²³ According to Kant's formal criterion of morality, happiness cannot be the determining principle, but it may well be dependent upon man's virtuous conduct. The

22. Cf. *Abbott*, p. 287; *Hartenstein*, v. 7, p. 179.—"In fact, when the thinking man has conquered the temptations to vice, and is conscious of having done his (often hard) duty, he finds himself in a state of peace and satisfaction which may well be called happiness, in which Virtue has her own reward. Cf. also *Abbott*, p. 301; *Hartenstein*, v. 7, pp. 194-5.

23. Cf. *Abbott*, p. 343; *Hartenstein*, v. 6, p. 130.—"Hence the distinction whether the man is good or bad must lie, not in the distinction of the springs that he adopts into his maxim, but in the *subordination*, i.e., which of the two he makes the condition of the other (that is, not in the matter of the maxim, but in its form)."

problem for Kant is to show how happiness can be so related to virtue in man. The moral law cannot give rise to happiness directly: it determines in man goodness of will or virtue; and virtue is the object of the moral law; as object virtue is also regarded as worthiness to be happy.²⁴ Happiness is the desire of every rational being; but observance of the moral law cannot of itself fulfil that desire; and yet it is a rational demand that happiness be attainable. Now Kant is quite clear on this point that the realization of the highest good, including happiness, takes us beyond the mundane conditions that govern our life. If man were left to fight out the battles of his moral life in his own strength, and if nature were to become overwhelmingly hostile to his highest interests, moral progress would well-nigh cease; the hopelessness of it would quench the very soul of man. There can be no advance here unless we can avail ourselves of the faith that there is a moral and rational foundation for the world of nature. Kant recognizes this need of man's moral life, and he presumes upon it throughout his practical philosophy, although his theoretical system precludes a real harmony between the world of nature and morality. This phase of his ethical situation will be examined later. At present it will suffice to say that Kant realized that the highest good could not be achieved by man in his own strength; he must rely on some transcendent power. And the fact that there is an inner connection between virtue and happiness bears in this direction, as it must imply some form of moral government for the world; and from this we must reach unto the principle that there is a

24. Cf. A. Ruge, *Begriff und Problem der Persoenlichkeit in Kantstudien*, v. 16, 1911, p. 269.

Being that orders that government. If then we conceive him to be a Ruler that governs according to morality, it cannot lay with him arbitrarily to inflict punishments or confer rewards; for moral justice is not determined by "arbitrary ordinances." As man grows in self-discipline and puts forth his powers towards the realization of the ideal good, he accepts the restraints and obligations imposed upon his activities, which thus become more and more conformed to what is best for himself and his fellows in the moral order. This is how Kant puts the matter in his Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View,²⁵ and it certainly fills up a lacuna in his argument as unfolded so tersely in the Critique of Practical Reason. The inner connection between virtue and happiness roots itself then in the being of God as the sovereign law-giver, who determines objectively the consequences involved in the connection. There is here an inherent moral necessity to assume the existence of God, for the required synthesis is not external, as though uniting objects in the world of phenomena. It would be so, if virtue and happiness were utterly disparate, and could not be united in the final end of morality. This inner synthesis of the elements of the highest good must to some extent justify a moral demand for the existence of God. If it be correct to affirm that there is an inner connection between happiness and virtue on Kant's grounds, then it is unnecessary that God should be brought in to bestow happiness upon man by way of mere condescension, as though it were an unexpected addition to his moral experiences. Here happiness is not a "plus," but a consequence rationally connected with virtue in the mind

25. *Hartenstein*, v. 4, pp. 146-47.

of the supreme law-giver. Man does not exist that the Creator may show his benevolence.²⁶ Happiness would rather follow as a consequence of virtue provided there be an adequate cause to bring it about. The principle of this connection goes beyond man, for he cannot effectively predispose the phenomenal world to suit the requirements of his moral nature;²⁷ and if happiness be a deserved consequence of moral endeavour, morality must in some way determine phenomena.²⁸ But if the world of nature is to express the consequences of moral determination, its ultimate foundations must harmonize with the principles of morality, *i.e.*, the ultimate ground of nature must be moral.²⁹ And so God, as the author of nature, must be postulated as the condition of this harmony. "Now, the supreme cause must contain the principle of the harmony of nature, not merely with a law of the will of rational beings, but with the conception of this law, in so far as they make it the supreme determining principle of the will, and consequently not merely with the form of morals, but with their morality as the motive, that is, with their moral character."³⁰

Granted that there is a principle of harmony, or inner connection, between virtue and happiness, and granted that this principle cannot reside in man, as he has no ultimate control over nature, it is found that the

26. Cf. *Bernard*, pp. 361 n., 373; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, pp. 449 n., 458.

27. Cf. *Bernard*, pp. 354, 358-9 n.; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, pp. 443-44, 447 n.

28. *Abbott*, p. 73; *Hartenstein*, v. 4, p. 301; cf. also *Bernard*, pp. 377-78, 383, 385 and 414; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, pp. 461-62, 466, 468, 489.—"All facts belong either to the *natural concept* . . . , or to the *concept of freedom*, which sufficiently establishes its reality through the causality of Reason in regard of certain effects in the world of sense, possible through it, which it incontrovertibly postulates in the moral law" (414).

29. Cf. E. Caird, *Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*, 1889, v. 2, pp. 311, 430, 449, 469.

30. *Abbott*, p. 221; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 131.

principle rests in God as the author of nature, and in this respect God's existence is a moral necessity.³¹ This conception of an inner moral demand for the existence of God is not generally accepted.³² Edward Caird, amongst others, has condemned Kant's postulate in this connection. "While, according to Kant, the realization of the moral law is completely attained in the character of a rational being whose will is directed to its fulfilment, without reference to the attainment of any external result, and hence without happiness, it is yet conceived as the desert of happiness. And from this arises a necessity for a God, as a *deus ex machina*, to realize the combination of the two terms, virtue and

31. Cf. *Abbott*, p. 221; *Bernard*, pp. 375, 384; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, pp. 130, 460, 467.

32. The moral law is a law common to all rational beings, including God. In God it is completely fulfilled and is holiness; in man it is not completely fulfilled, and his moral life is in consequence an effort to fulfil. The moral law then is fundamental. It is not something imposed upon man by any superior power, even God Himself. In this respect God and man are at one with one another, and moral communion is possible between them. The law then is an original fact of morality: it does not require to be created. It is an element of God's own nature; it is an original foundation of the moral universe of which man forms a part. Though the law is a rational principle common to God and man, yet God and man are not consequently on an equality. Man is finite, though the infinitude of God may be partly unfolded in his rational nature. Man is a creature of God's holy will, and in that respect depends upon God for the origin and sustenance of his being. And the law that is the law of God's being is thus the law of man's being. But the law is not imposed by God upon man. Man must find it and establish it within himself; if he cannot do that, he is not a rational creature. Hence in the Analytic Kant was entirely concerned with showing the originality and underived character of the moral law as a principle common to all rational beings. If there be this principle in man; if the universe of which man forms a part is a moral universe, then the author of the universe must be assumed to be a moral being; as otherwise morality would be an absurdity. It is morally necessary to assume the existence of God. No one will deny the fact of morality. Given, then, a moral universe, any moral being belonging to it must assume a moral author for its origin. But that universe is not perfected in man. The completeness is a far-off divine event in the realization of which both God and man are concerned. The highest or supreme end of morality is a purpose the fulfilment of which cannot be attained apart from God. It is an inherent moral necessity to assume God's existence. Without God moral values would not be conserved. We must find in Him a rational ground for their harmonization with the world of nature in which they are realized as moral actions. In other words, the natural world must be given a moral valuation. Kant's need of God's existence, then, is not quite as "external" to his morality as it is usually supposed to be.

happiness, which are indifferent to each other—a combination which, therefore, must be external.”³³ This *deus ex machina* idea rests upon the conclusion that virtue and happiness are, according to Kant, completely heterogeneous or incompatible elements, which can only be combined together by an external synthesis. We have noticed how strong this appearance of disparateness is, if we have regard to the separate spheres of interest of happiness and virtue; but this is only so as long as we consider their interests from the point of view of a determining principle of the will. Their seeming externality disappears when they are referred to as elements of the highest good; for herein they belong to the object of morality. We have a noumenal element connected with a phenomenal in the single conception of the summum bonum; and such connection cannot be external, as though it were a synthesis of objects in the world of phenomena. This conception of an inner unity between virtue and happiness renders Kant’s postulate of the existence of God as necessary for the realization of the highest good, as it harmonizes nature with morality, and is accordingly practically, or morally, justifiable. This inner moral connection is, according to Kant, unassailable by the speculative reason: it depends upon moral grounds alone. “Now in respect of the first element of the summum bonum, namely, that which concerns morality, the moral law gives merely a command, and to doubt the possibility of that element would be the same as to call in question the moral law itself. But as regards the second element of that object, namely, happiness perfectly proportioned to that worthiness, it

33. E. Caird, *Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*, v. 2, p. 304; cf. also J. Seth, *Study of Ethical Principles*, 12th Ed., p. 422.

is true that there is no need of a command to admit its possibility in general, for theoretical reason has nothing to say against it;³⁴ but *the manner* in which we have to conceive this harmony of the laws of nature with those of freedom has in it something in respect of which we have a choice, because theoretical reason decides nothing with apodictic certainty about it, and in respect of this there may be a moral interest which turns the scale."³⁵ Kant has recognized as a moral necessity that in God there is united the conception of the ground of the world of nature and of the final end of morality.³⁶ Kant's difficulty as it appears to us is not moral so much as theoretical: it relates to his fundamental dualism, the mechanical separation of the noumenal and phenomenal worlds, and the consequently inadequate reconciliation of freedom and necessity. His practical philosophy has revealed difficulties in his theoretical foundations which he attempted to remove to some extent in the teleological principles set forth in the Critique of Judgment. In his appeal to an impartial reason that it were but right that man's need of happiness should be fulfilled, especially in view of the constancy and persistency of his efforts to attain the highest good, Kant has subjected his thinking to the fact that man's conscious activity is directed towards ideals. Man is a being that frames ends for himself and puts forth his moral and mental strength and energy in order to realize them. These facts are easily obtained from an analysis of human experience. Now such an effort cannot be without worth and mean-

34. Cf. also *Bernard*, pp. 381-82, 385-87, 392; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, pp. 465, 468-69, 473.

35. *Abbott*, p. 243; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 150; cf. also *Abbott*, p. 244; *Bernard*, p. 410; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, pp. 151, 486.

36. Cf. *Abbott*, pp. 221, 225-26, 243, 244; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, pp. 131, 134-35, 150, 151.

ing; it surely cannot end in utter failure; for what is most real in his moral experience would be valueless. Man recognizes a deep, persistent need for the attainment of the ideals that sway his conduct; he may not realize them in full, but he feels that what he does achieve has some part in the reality that is the basis of all moral effort and achievement. This unfaltering conviction implies that the highest in man has meaning for the Supreme Being; that the human will may act in mutual support with the divine, and that what is thereby achieved cannot be lost, but is worthy of being conserved. So progress in morality is assured.

This analysis of human experience shows that man's striving towards the ideal cannot rely upon his own unassisted strength for success. He must needs have faith in a higher power. God's existence is a moral necessity for man. It is clear that in this connection Kant has felt the full pressure of the facts of psychology, and has submitted to them. He has discovered that ideals exert power over a good man's life, and that their influence must be taken into account as factors in his moral development, inasmuch as they have an educative purpose in lifting man to a higher plane of being. Can Kant maintain this point of view consistently with the fact that the spring to moral action resides in the law only? Any determination of the will by ends as objects of desire subverts the principles of morality as unfolded in the *Analytic*. The extension of the determining principle to include the highest good, but only provided that the law is its supreme condition, was a logical development of the principles of the *Analytic*, in view of the fact that man is a being whose conduct has reference to ends as ideals. How, then, may man

achieve his moral ideals? What are the necessary conditions? Here Kant has felt the subtle influence of psychology, and permitted himself to arrive at conclusions based upon an analysis of the needs of human nature, and a conviction of its reliability in matters of faith and conscience. Kant's procedure, while seemingly sound, raises some obstinate questionings, when one remembers that the moral law was determined in abstraction from inclinations and desires. Here we find it set up as involved in an end which includes the satisfaction of man's moral needs. Feelings, which were regarded as without value as determining principles of the will, are of significance from the point of view of the ends to be achieved in moral action. We have, therefore, a law, which is derived by a process of abstraction from the moral consciousness, determining the will towards the realization of the very ends of that consciousness from which it had been disengaged. This diremption Kant effected in defiance of the psychological facts of will, which he respected in his determination of the ends of morality. He is certainly on safe ground in refusing to base the fundamental principle of morality upon mere psychological analysis, for the moral law is not factually derived. But it is impossible to operate a general principle apart from the facts of experience that are to come under its direction, and in this connection Kant was more loyal to human nature than to his own principles. Still the root of his difficulty was not so much a moral as a theoretical one, and penetrated to the dualistic foundations of his critical philosophy. Accordingly we again find ourselves confronted with the ever-recurring want of an inner coherence between the supersensible and the sensible worlds. And yet it

seems apparent that Kant throughout has presumed upon the harmony of nature with morality;³⁷ and this is what he chiefly relies upon in the moral argument for the existence of God, which we are considering. The problem has been extensively dealt with in the Critique of Judgment. There we shall find Kant's final explanation of his mode of reconciling nature with freedom and morality. Can we affirm that on Kant's principles the supersensible and the sensible have truly a common ground in the being of God? Kant's own conviction is clear; but whether his explanation is adequate is a matter which we must now determine.

II. NATURE, MORAL TELEOLOGY AND GOD'S BEING.

We shall accordingly turn to the consideration of the problem as set forth in the appendix to the Critique of Judgment. Kant's problem concerns the difficulties which underlie the relations between the theoretical and the moral worlds in the critical philosophy: these difficulties come from the theoretical side. We shall, therefore, approach them from that standpoint, and endeavour to follow Kant's point of view throughout.

The understanding cannot resolve the world of nature into a unity. In its explanation of natural processes it proceeds in an indefinite regress, but can never attain to complete determination. The world of nature considered as a mechanism is no more than the system of things subject to the laws of natural necessity in their interaction with one another. The inter-communication of causes and effects may go on indefinitely: there is no end to the many combinations that may be effected. Every object is then regarded as a link in the chain of

37. *Abbott*, p. 221; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 131.

an unending succession of events, and there is no cause within the series that can explain the series as a whole. The only unity or whole that may be said to obtain in nature, according to man's cognitive faculty, is just the whole resulting from the addition of part to part, or the combined effects of mutual concurrences.³⁸ Mechanism excludes reference to any unity outside the series, *i.e.*, to an idea of purpose or end. But our reason has an irresistible tendency to ask—What are things there for? Has their mutual interactions any meaning for the whole? Can their arrangements be instrumental to express the idea of purposiveness? Whither do they lead? Can they subserve the interests of an intellectual being? Now, in this respect, the parts in the world of nature are represented as dependent upon a whole—as being “the products of a cause whose determining ground is merely the representation of its effects,”³⁹ *i.e.*, it implies a purpose. If a whole be regarded as the sum total or products of the parts, we view it from the mechanical standpoint: there is no purpose involved here. But if the parts obtain their meaning as parts within a whole—as being determined by the idea of a whole, we view it as displaying design or purpose. This is, according to Kant, a subjective point of view: it has no objective reality in nature itself. Such a unity cannot be found in nature, for it transcends natural necessity: there is no object in the sensible world that corresponds to it: it is not a perception but a conception. By means of it the reason seeks to systematize the events and happenings in the world of nature according to the idea of purpose or end. This is what Kant means

38. *Bernard*, p. 323; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 420-21.

39. *Ibid.*

by reflective judgment—viewing particular facts in the light of ends, bringing them under higher and more general rules. It is merely a subjective principle of judgment: it regulates our attitude of mind towards nature: it “merely represents the way in which we must necessarily proceed in reflecting on natural objects, with a view to a thoroughly connected experience.”⁴⁰ Through this means we may discover purposes underlying the multifarious events in the sensible world, and these purposes may reveal a constructive order or design. But at the same time it must not be forgotten that such a design is not inherent in the natural world: it is an idea which the reason brings with it, as it were, in order to determine some satisfactory explanation of nature. One cannot demonstrate such a purposive tendency in the world of objects itself. It may therefore be concluded that “it is at least possible to consider the material world as a mere phenomenon and to think as its substrate something like a thing in itself (which is not phenomenal), and to attach to this a corresponding intellectual intuition (even though it is not ours). Thus there would be, although incognizable by us, a supersensible real ground for nature, to which we ourselves belong.”⁴¹ Hence nature may be judged from two distinct points of view, the one mechanical (and objective), the other teleological (and subjective). We must not regard these as reinforcing one another. In Kant’s opinion they cannot be fused; each must be considered on its own merits, and, if each of them be used within its own peculiar province, they must be held as not inconsistent with one another. This idea of purposiveness

40. *Bernard*, p. 316; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 416.

41. *Bernard*, p. 325; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 422.

arises from an inevitable need of human reason. No complete explanation can be afforded by natural causation for the origin and development of such products as organisms.⁴² Our reason must needs ask for another kind of cause implying intelligence or design in its operation. But this necessity is purely subjective. Accordingly, each mode of explanation regarded by itself is exclusive of the other. Now, if we are to attain to the idea of a ground which may be compatible with both points of view, we may seek a principle that "lies outside both, but yet contains their ground." This higher principle of the explanation of nature, which is thus "common to the mechanical and teleological derivations, is the *supersensible*, which we must place at the basis of nature, regarded as phenomenon."⁴³

This supersensible unity cannot be a determinate concept, for it does not come within the field of the theoretical understanding: it is a subjective point of view, which arises out of the needs of pure reason, for on no other ground can it account for the possibility of organized beings in nature. Mere mechanism is not adequate to explain purposes. While, then, mechanism and physical teleology may be united under a common principle, there can be no substitution of the one for the other in the explanation of particular laws of nature.⁴⁴ Mechanism cannot be used to explain what is possible only by design, nor *vice versa*. But we may subordinate mechanism to teleology. We cannot say how far the principle of mechanism may be extended: we can but go on using it as far as we possibly can—but we inevit-

42. Cf. Bernard, p. 326; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 422.

43. Bernard, p. 330; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 423.

44. Bernard, p. 331; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 426.

ably find that it cannot adequately explain things, neither as regards their origin nor development, for which another principle is required. And therefore we are forced by the constitution of our cognitive faculty to subordinate the mechanical mode of explanation to the teleological. Thus we may view natural products from both points of view without interchanging the principles of explanation. Even though a designedly-working cause may use the material of nature for the construction of its purposes, "for where purposes are thought as the grounds of the possibility of certain things, we must assume a means (thereto) whose law of working requires *for itself* nothing pre-supposing a purpose, which law consequently can be mechanical, and yet a cause subordinated to designed effects,"⁴⁵ yet there is no absorption of the one in the other, no substitution of principles, but merely a change of perspective. The two ways of representing the possibility of objects of nature are not blended together by our human reason.⁴⁶ From our point of view they are two incompatible explanations. The ground of their compatibility lies beyond each of them, and is found in a supersensible understanding.

A further question now arises, What is the nature of the supreme ground that must be pre-supposed to account for nature as a constructive order of events? Within the limits of physical teleology, it may only be assumed that such a ground must be a designedly-working cause proportionate to the effect to be accounted for—*i.e.*, we can only infer a designing intelligence;⁴⁷

45. Bernard, p. 332; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 427.

46. *Ibid.*

47. Bernard, p. 364; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 451.

we cannot presume to have attained to the idea of a supreme cause as the *original* ground of nature in accordance with a final purpose. Thus far Kant has advanced. He leaves aside mechanism as inadequate to furnish him with the idea of a world-cause, and seeks a solution along the pathway of physical teleology. Here he reaches the concept of a supersensible ground, but he cannot proceed further in that direction. Still something has been gained. Nature can be regarded in the light of ends, and a supreme intelligence conceived as its ground. Leaving aside the principle of physical teleology, Kant continues his survey along other lines. He enters the realm of ends, and asks whether nature has a final purpose. What is its supreme end? This question, it must be remembered, passes beyond the standpoint of physical and natural teleology: it concerns the relations between man's moral being and the world of nature. Man has a felt need to view the world as a system implying meaning or worth. The mere contemplation of nature as it is cannot of itself give it value. Man is not in the world merely to behold it as an intelligent spectator: he is there to act upon it, to realize his purpose within it. Through him the world of nature comes to have a significance which neither mechanism nor physical teleology can reach. The supreme purpose of nature then surpasses mere contemplation or knowledge: in fact, it is something distinct from a logical point of view which cannot rise above mechanism. For the same reason it cannot signify an arrangement of objects for man's convenience and pleasure. No—the supreme end of nature can only be revealed from the point of view of the practical consciousness. It is not a matter of getting a deeper insight

into natural processes; for such knowledge is on the same plane as mechanism. Man is a moral personality. As such he can frame ends for himself, and seek to realize them in accordance with morality.⁴⁸ This moral teleology is not dependent in its origin upon natural conditions: it abides within the will of man himself. It implies that the worth man has he gives to himself; it is a determination of his freedom. The practical consciousness of his own freedom in the setting up of moral ends is projected by man into the world of nature, and by means of it he interprets the activity of organisms.⁴⁹ They are not mere machines; they have organizing and reproductive powers, and so are inwardly directed towards ends. But this internal purposiveness is not final, for it cannot express self-determination. That alone belongs to a moral being. Accordingly it is in and through man's personality that the final purpose of nature may be regarded: the realization of the ends of the moral law expresses the highest meaning that nature may attain unto. Nature is not an absolute or final end, for it subserves the interests of morality. "The world has as its end to become the theatre, the instrument, and the object of morality."⁵⁰ Or, as Kant puts it, "This moral teleology, then, has to do with reference to our own causality and purposes, and even to a final purpose that we must aim at in the world, as well as with the reciprocal reference of the world to that moral purpose and the external possibility of its accomplishment."⁵¹ Thus, if the attainment of the final end of morality be at all possible—

48. Bernard, p. 371; Hartenstein, v. 5, pp. 456-57.

49. Bernard, § 64.

50. P. Janet, *Final Causes*, 2nd Ed., 1883, p. 424.

51. Bernard, p. 377; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 461.

and the moral law cannot direct us to vain imaginary ends—the world of nature cannot be altogether dissociated from morality. A moral teleology implies that the world of nature must be responsive to the demands of morality. And so moral teleology is connected on the one hand with the self-determining moral subject, and on the other hand with nature as the world in which the purposes of morality are realized.⁵²

There must be, then, an ultimate harmony of nature with morality: the world of nature must be conformed to the existence of moral beings. But how is this unity to be established? "There must, therefore, be a ground of the *unity* of the supersensible which lies at the basis of nature, with that which the concept of freedom practically contains; and the concept of this ground, although it does not attain either theoretically or practically to a knowledge of the same, and hence has no peculiar realm, nevertheless makes possible the transition from the mode of thought according to the principles of the one to that according to the principles of the other."⁵³ Throughout his whole philosophy, despite its dualism, Kant has felt the need for a final unity or common ground between nature and morality or freedom.⁵⁴

The world of nature implies purposiveness: as a whole it cannot be explained by mechanism, *i.e.*, according to the law of natural causality, which applies to a

52. Bernard, p. 378; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 462. For further treatment of this theme see my *Basis of Freedom*, pp. 39-50.

53. Bernard, pp. 12-13; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 182.

54. Cf. Mueller, pp. 588, 594-5, 721; Hartenstein, v. 3, pp. 461, 465, 553. —"The highest formal unity, which is based on concepts of reason alone, is the *systematical* and intelligent unity of things, and it is the speculative interest which makes it necessary to regard all order in the world as if it had originated in the design of a supreme wisdom" (p. 588). "The legislation of human reason (philosophy) has two objects, nature and freedom, and contains therefore both the law of nature and the law of morals, at first in two separate systems, but combined at last, in one great system of philosophy" (p. 721).

world of things in externality from one another. But if we are to regard things as related to one another, in accordance with some inner principle or purpose, we require a different kind of causality to account for them.⁵⁵ In this respect we must needs think of them as expressing a unity for an intelligence that is not discursive as ours is. From this point of view it seems possible to conceive a supersensible substrate for the world of nature as a whole, but we cannot "demonstrate" any object to which such a conception will correspond, *i.e.*, we cannot state this idea as a fact of knowledge. This higher unity of nature and its laws according to purpose can only be accounted for on the assumption of a designedly-constructive causality. Accordingly this supersensible ground of nature brings the world of sense into harmony with the conception of freedom. Thus a common unity of principles may be said to obtain between nature and freedom—and so morality. The means, then, by which Kant has been enabled to attain this point of view is the subjective idea of an inner purposiveness in nature. From a lower point of view, that of the realm of nature, there is no possibility of bridging the gulf that separates the phenomenal world from the supersensible. But from a higher, and distinct, point of view, that of the realm of freedom, it is possible to conceive of a free cause having an affect in the sensible world. "The effect of freedom is the ultimate end which ought to exist as a phenomenon in the world of sense, and the condition of its possible realization is presupposed as existing in the nature of man as a sensible being."⁵⁶ Here we find the assumption upon

55. *Bernard*, p. 323; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 420.

56. *Watson*, p. 320; *Bernard*, p. 38; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 202.

which Kant has proceeded in setting forth his moral argument for the existence of God in the Critique of Practical Reason.

Mechanism cannot gainsay teleology; but may even be subordinated to a cause acting in accordance with purposes, and the effects of freedom may be realized as phenomena in the world of sense. It may then be possible for nature to express a final purpose as having meaning for the moral personality of man. But man is not his own creator, nor that of nature. He cannot be the ultimate source of things. But his moral nature demands the realization of the highest good possible in the world through freedom. This moral demand possesses a practical necessity for man, and its attainment must accordingly be possible. Assuming the adaptability of nature to moral purposes, or the ends of freedom, it is also possible to assume a moral world-cause, or God, as the ultimate ground of the "possibility of the unification of nature with its inner ethical laws."⁵⁷ Kant has ever insisted that his moral argument should be kept distinct from the physico-teleological proof. The former supplies what is wanting in the latter; it does not fill up the lacunae, so as to fuse them both into one united argument.⁵⁸ The moral does not reinforce the physical: it is entirely additional upon the latter. The physico-teleological ground cannot be regarded as implying a theology; the steps to the idea of God as ground, or author of the world, must be derived "from quite another quarter."⁵⁹ The principles of nature and freedom are heterogeneous as modes of explanation, and

57. *Bernard*, p. 392; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 473.

58. Cf. *Bernard*, pp. 418-19; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, pp. 492-93.

59. *Bernard*, p. 421; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 494.

furnish two different kinds of proof, and the one cannot be derived from the other.⁶⁰ And yet Kant admits that the fact that nature reveals purposes arrests the attention of reason, and so renders it "more susceptible of the moral proof,"⁶¹ and may even to some extent serve as a "desirable confirmation" of it; but the moral argument can in no wise be regarded as dependent upon the physical order. It would preserve all its strength, even if from that order there could not be inferred any ground for an intelligent cause, for it would find in the "concept of freedom, and in the moral ideas founded thereon, a practically sufficient ground for postulating the concept of an original Being in conformity with these, *i.e.*, as a Deity, and for postulating nature as a final purpose in accordance with freedom and its laws."⁶²

The outstanding feature of the argument for the existence of God is its ethical starting point. Kant discarded the physical side altogether, and considered the moral order in its entire independence. The moral law exists in its own right, and commands categorically. The appeal is to immediate experience in conscience. The moral law is a given fact in the moral consciousness. This experience is unique in man. The obligatory character is indispensable, and has an inner strength that makes itself felt against all tendencies to disown allegiance to it. But fulfilment of the moral law extends beyond the law itself as the determining principle of the will, and the will is confronted with the fact of striving towards an ideal or moral end. And the problem arises—How is the final end of morality to be rea-

60. Cf. *Bernard*, p. 420; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 494.

61. *Bernard*, p. 419; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 493.

62. *Bernard*, p. 420; *Hartenstein*, v. 5, p. 493.

lized? This end is the highest good possible in the world through freedom. Now the possibility of the summum bonum implies a principle of harmony between nature and morality. Both the supersensible and the sensible are reconciled through teleology, and their reciprocity necessitates a common foundation in the existence of God. Kant then throws the whole weight of the argument upon the moral needs of man. These come home most intimately to him, and cannot be brushed aside as of no significance. He has a felt conviction that the realization of good must be ultimately possible; that there is a principle of righteousness discriminating good and bad, and preparing the way for the final triumph of what is just and good. However he may falter in his devotion to the ideal, yet he ever feels that it has power over him as a moral being, and demands of him his loyalty in its service. And this unswerving faith can only reside in the conviction that there exists a supreme moral being for whom man's disinterested striving towards the good is not a thing of nought, but has its foundation in reality itself. Herein we find a directly moral claim for the existence of God, and Kant has made full use of this fact of our moral consciousness.^{62a}

This, then, in general terms, is Kant's approach to theism. Though he calls it a moral proof, it is not meant to be a proof in the scientific sense. It cannot be accepted as a demonstrable certainty; it is, after all, but a "venture of faith"—yet withal it arises from a faith which is unquenchable, and without which man's life would be shattered by a hopeless pessimism and despair. Though nature appears in some respects as man's enemy,

62a. Cf. R. G. Collingwood, *Reason is Faith Cultivating Itself*, in *Hibbert Journal*, 1927, v. 26, No. 1, pp. 9-11.

yet may not this fact minister to man's moral needs in the way of discipline? The experience of nature's hostility, as well as his own propensity to succumb to the promptings of the "flesh," should surely "strengthen and harden the powers of the soul not to submit to them, and so make us feel an aptitude for higher purposes which lies hidden in us."⁶³ Because of this relation to man, nature cannot be ultimately antagonistic to his final moral end, but should rather be regarded as instrumental towards the attainment of the purposes of a moral agent. The intrinsic value of our lives rests with ourselves and not with nature;⁶⁴ we should strive to fulfil our moral ends even though the whole world of nature were against us, and through our independence of such opposition show that nature herself ministers to our moral development. There is then a moral necessity to go beyond this enmity of nature towards man, and seek a deeper foundation for the moral life, *i.e.*, a principle by means of which nature shall subserve the moral interests of man. We must needs postulate then that the universe is moral as well as rational: that "morality is the nature of things." Were the Supreme Intelligence in whose being the universe finds its ultimate ground not also moral—were active moral reason (to use Campbell Fraser's term) not "operative at the centre of the universe,"⁶⁵ then man's moral claim to the final realization of his being and the conservation of his highest moral values, would be for ever denied him, and a "paralyzing discord would be introduced into the heart of human life."⁶⁶ While we may agree that this atti-

63. Bernard, p. 358; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 447.

64. Cf. Bernard, p. 359 n.; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 447 n.

65. A. Campbell Fraser, *Biographia Philosophica*, p. 304.

66. G. Galloway, *Principles of Religious Development*, 1909, p. 304.

tude of mind accords with Kant's theistic faith, yet his mode of expressing it does not appear to be as convincing. His argument depends upon a conception of teleology and mechanism that cannot fully establish the ultimate unity of the world of experience and morality in the being of God. A detailed criticism would require a much ampler treatment than is warranted here. But one or two points require notice.

Kant's dualistic standpoint has not been overcome. He contrasts mechanism and teleology as though they were distinct and separate explanations of nature, the one objective and constitutive and the other merely subjective and regulative. The inter-relation of objects and events in experience is nature; but the harmonization of particular laws of nature in the light of ends is merely a subjective interpretation of the facts to meet the needs of man's intelligence. We cannot assert with "knowledge" (as Kant limits the term) that nature herself organizes her own forms of life; that natural organic processes are created and develop in accordance with an inner principle. When it comes to affirming what we can put forth as scientific knowledge, Kant falls back upon a merely formal or logical teleology, which only concerns results and not causal agents. But Kant does seem to get beyond "formal teleology"⁶⁷ in the *Critique of Judgment* and reach a conception of organic teleology, implying that nature herself is purposive, that there is a principle of inner finalism after the analogy of life as we know it in our own immediate experiences. Here the organism is its own cause and effect, the whole determines the relations and inter-de-

67. Cf. R. A. C. MacMillan, *Crowning Phase of the Critical Philosophy*, 1912, p. 240.

pendence of the parts. The parts and the whole are reciprocally means and ends. This conception was an immense advance beyond mechanism. Nature then unfolds a creative synthesis. She is not a complex of mechanical reactions and inter-actions of parts indefinitely strung out, but develops her processes from within in accordance with a principle of inner finalism. But Kant stayed his own hands. This could only be a subjective interpretation of nature: it did not manifest nature as she was in herself—as a Ding-an-sich. That could not be according to the faculty of cognition; it was but the reflection of the practical consciousness. Man fashioned an instrument for a higher interpretation of natural processes in the light of his freedom, or faculty of framing ends for himself and striving to realize them in action. Mechanism, then, still holds good as the only explanation possible of nature as phenomenon. Teleology is merely a means of explanation to satisfy the subjective needs of man's nature, which possesses an inevitable bent for systematization. Hence we do not add to our knowledge of phenomena: there is no means of surpassing what the understanding reveals to us. Kant's standpoint is, after all, that of the scientific spectator. A higher form of coherence is inwrought into the fabric of nature, but that is merely due to the removal of the limitations of sense. From the logical or theoretical point of view, Kant regards nature as a mere mechanism as established in the Critique of Pure Reason. From a subjective or psychological point of view, he regarded the "same territory of experience" as having some meaning for reason: it has a value for the practical consciousness. But this does not enable us to peer into workings of the "machine," *i.e.*, by means of it we can-

not reach a higher synthesis that is objective and constitutive. Accordingly, as Dr. MacMillan, following Stadler, puts it, "its sole significance for Kant is that of an additional heuristic principle in the extension of nature as a mechanical principle."⁶⁸ Kant himself affirms that "understanding and reason exercise two distinct legislations on one and the same territory of experience without prejudice to each other."⁶⁹ But whereas one is constitutive, the other is merely regulative. Thus Kant interprets the operations of nature in the light of a designedly-working cause after the analogy of what we experience in our moral consciousness. He reads these teleological principles of activity into nature, and our consciousness of them is practical only.

According to Kant, then, purposes in nature are not directly known to or by us; we interpret nature as purposive in order to satisfy the needs of reason, and to overcome a defect in our discursive understanding, for which nature is a mere mechanism. In other words, the world of nature is regarded as in itself a separately existing realm of fact, completely organized independently of the human mind. Superficially it does appear that nature is "opposite to" man as an intelligent being, *i.e.*, something presented to him as from the outside. Man may be said to view nature *ab extra*. Its modes of working and processes operate with machine-like precision in accordance with a routine that is rigidly determined. Man's consciousness is outside all these operations. They are recorded for and by him as one who merely looks on at them as events, or under whose disinterested notice they have momentarily

68. *Ibid.*, p. 307.

69. Bernard, p. 11; Hartenstein, v. 5, p. 181.

come. If this were a final view, the world of natural processes or events would have no value for man. Such a viewpoint is possible for him because of the remarkable—and yet in itself quite ordinary—fact that he is able to abstract himself as conscious being from the world of things he observes and set himself over against it as though existing apart. But when he realizes the import of this wonder-working power of his mind—the power of reducing conglomerates to simple constituents, of abstracting phases and parts and treating them as things subsisting of themselves—it soon appears that it is only by means of this process of abstraction that the world of nature can come to its own, can reveal itself in the conscious life of man. It cannot, therefore, subsist of itself as existing apart absolutely from man's intelligence.⁷⁰ It is only through such intelligence that it can attain its fitting place in the world-scheme. The external world as abstracted from consciousness is therefore not a self-dependent reality, but merely an abstraction from the larger whole, which must necessarily include consciousness. Hence an interpretation of nature as an integration of events coming to be and passing away with machine-like dependability is not the whole significance of it. For we must advance to the further question of what value is this natural world to the intelligence for and by which it is known. Can it also be given a value in and for itself? Is it intrinsically and objectively what it appears to man to be? Does what man knows of it constitute a fixed unalterable

70. Of course, not in absolute independence. Man is organic to nature. Man and nature are not absolutely separated from one another. Nature is "independent" of man as subject in so far as man is not nature's creator, but her interpreter. Cf. Professor Pringle-Pattison, *Idea of God*, 1917, p. 211.

71. Omitted.

realm of fact which is real and complete out of all knowable relations with any other form of being?

We cannot accept nature as possessing an independent value after this fashion. For whatever value nature has is due to its significance for man, in and through whom it stands revealed. Truly the individual man is right in insisting that the world of nature does not exist because of him; the external world is not a creation of his intelligence; its existence is not solely dependent upon his perception of it. But this does not carry with it the conclusion that it exists out of all relation to him, or that it is merely related to him by way of presentation to his consciousness *qua* cognizing it. We cannot divorce it entirely from his higher interests as a being who strives to co-operate with nature's powers to fulfil his own ends, or seeks for a higher understanding of its processes in terms of his own understanding, and hopes after a fuller and completer life. The universe cannot, even from man's standpoint, be broken up into unrelated parts, nor can the conscious life of man be the mere result of processes set going or stimulated by an outward world of objects. Nor can we admit that the self-conscious personality is a being apart from the world of nature or merely an epiphenomenon dissociated from reality. Man's own higher development can only emerge through a qualitatively-varying contact with an external world that rises in value for him as he is able to discover within it or make plastic to himself a more highly integrated organic net-work of forces. We can therefore hold to belief in the reality of an external world as ministrant to man's advance and as co-operating with him in the unfolding of his personal life. This acceptance of nature's reality is not due to inference;

it is based upon the solid foundations of immediate experience. Its reality is given within man's experience, and it is his task to interpret what this experience reveals to him. We must therefore admit the intelligibility of nature, as otherwise it cannot be explained in terms of our consciousness. It responds to man's interpretation of it; and where it does not respond, there is lack of insight on his part. But with advance of understanding of its structure and processes, man correspondingly adds to his own powers of control or direction. Were nature unintelligible or unresponsive to man's intelligence, reciprocal relations between the human mind and nature, and the growing together of man and nature into a higher synthesis of reality would not be possible. Now the fact that nature is intelligible compels us to accept an intelligent cause as its origin, for the cause must at least suffice to account for the effect. And an intelligent cause must be one that acts in view of ends—is purposive and “purposeful.” If we believe in our own rationality, we are irresistibly drawn to this conclusion. In Earl Balfour's words we may affirm that “all creeds which refuse to see an intelligent purpose behind the unthinking powers of material nature are intrinsically incoherent.”⁷² But we cannot remain here. It is essential that we penetrate more deeply into the nature of things. While we must needs have faith in the reliability of nature, we are also under a rational necessity to postulate that this intelligent cause is moral and can be trusted. Such, then, is the fundamental pre-supposition on the basis of which we analyze experience, and record in terms of our intelligence what we find there. “We must hold that

72. A. J. Balfour, *Theism and Humanism*, 1915, p. 257.

reason, and the works of reason have their source in God; that from Him they draw their inspiration; and that if they repudiate their origin, by this very act they proclaim their own insufficiency.'''⁷³ Only upon such an assumption can we explain that nature is teleological and manifests an intelligent principle, reciprocating with that in man. Without this fact of reciprocity in intelligibility, nature cannot be shown to be other than man, having a reality of its own. We do not make nature rational: we discover a rational principle in nature, because we ourselves are rational. Hence man is nature's interpreter. So we may hold with Kant that man is nature's final end, though differing somewhat from the assumptions upon which he worked.

Lastly, through freedom, Kant informs us, we are enabled to subordinate mechanism to teleology, and unite them in an ultimate ground beyond the world; and thus overcome the initial separation of the realms of the theoretical and the practical. In the latter, the moral law commands the realization of the highest good for man. This implies that freedom or morality must be capable of effects in the world of the understanding, and that mechanism subserves in some way the principle of teleology. Mechanism and teleology cannot be absolutely severed; there must be a common ground in which they are harmonized. Accordingly, Kant's original assumption of separate realms for knowledge and morality would appear to break down. It cannot bear the weight of the facts which an analysis of our practical experience reveals to us. But, as we have seen, this is not Kant's actual solution, though it seems to be a conclusion which he regards as necessary for his

73. *Ibid*, p. 274.

practical philosophy. Kant rather left mechanism to one side on its own, as it were, and did not take it up as a subordinate factor into a teleological explanation of nature as a whole for human reason. Its subordination implied that it could not accomplish what teleology was called upon to do, though it had to carry out finally the latter's behests, but only from the standpoint of an outsider. It does not play the part of an integral factor in a teleological foundation of the universe, including man's relation to nature.

We shall now conclude this digression in teleology with an endeavour to fill up the lacuna in Kant's solution. Mechanism implies the reign of law in the external sense of continuous succession; and by means of it, as an explanatory principle, the universe is resolved into a system of relations quantitatively determined. Natural causality involves sequence, and what science regards as causes and effects are the antecedents and the consequents in the endless succession of events in space and time. Natural laws, then, are uniformities of co-existence and sequence: and the elements which these laws integrate are external to one another. But how does this conception of orderliness and regularity in natural processes come about? Nature herself as a mere system of interrelated phenomena cannot give rise to it. The principles of unity cannot be perceived in nature: their source and origin must be looked for elsewhere—in the understanding, as Kant has shown us. Accordingly, mechanism, if it be intelligible, must go beyond itself. It is the resultant of the constructive intelligence of man. It implies an interacting consciousness. Nature as a mechanism is the construction of man's organizing self-consciousness. It just expresses

the nature of natural processes as viewed by man in terms of the understanding. Mechanism, therefore, cannot explain itself: it requires the conception of an intelligible principle. In this respect Kant made an important advance upon Hume; but it was unfortunate that he ended his analysis at this stage, and limited it to what obtained for the theoretical consciousness, and thus left us with the inert world of mechanism.

He insisted that between the world of nature as such and the world of morality there could be no continuity. Hence he leaves aside the lower world (of which he believes we have positive knowledge as being independently real) and seeks to construct another answering to the needs of the practical consciousness. This is the direct result of his diremption of what is presented to the mind as object for knowledge from what the mind unfolds from within itself as being of intrinsic worth. There is then on the one hand a natural order or kingdom of necessity which is positively real and can be known to and for the observing consciousness. It is a world of discrete quanta integrated by a self-organizing intelligence. Its reality is independent of human needs. It is a closed system, complete in itself, existing as something distinct from man's intelligence though observable by him, known to him through sense-perception. On the other hand there is an independent world of human interests, real for man practically, but dissociated from nature. It has no basis in hard fact. It grows from within man's own self-conscious life, and for his own satisfaction he is led to project it outwardly, as indicating the sort of objective world in which he would fain bask, and from which he would draw his aspirations to live. Accord-

ingly, it would seem that the subject as theoretical functions as distinct from the subject as practical. Kant, as we have seen, adumbrates a deeper or underlying unity in which both functions are synthesized as one; but when he is confronted with the task of declaring against the independence of the realm of naturalism, he stays his hand, and reveals a subjective foundation for the realm of ends which, for practical purposes, would give it all the security it requires. And so man would not lose anything thereby. But we cannot be satisfied with such a solution, as we have already indicated; and, further, it renders lop-sided the relation of God to the universe. His existence is necessary, it is maintained, for the realization of man's ideals, which, being of abiding worth, cannot be foreclosed against man's moral aspirations. To deny this hope to man's moral striving would be tantamount to the admission of an unbridgeable hiatus between the world of moral ideas and the world of perceptual fact. Only in so far as the moral realm is firmly rooted in the Divine order and given a stability that an impartial Reason cannot gainsay, is it possible to maintain its independence over against the encroaching preserves of irrefutable scientific facts.

But is this break in the continuity of development within the universe absolutely unavoidable? May it rather not be due to the partial views of an abstracting intelligence which, because of its finitude, cannot work from the point of view of the whole as an integrated unity? Even if we must perforce commence with the simplest facts of sense-perception, may we not nevertheless advance stage by stage as the given becomes more and more complex, and admit the legitimacy of

qualitative differences or degrees in the realm of reality, and unfold an inner connection from the standpoint of teleology between all the various sub-realms as we progress upwards? It would take us too far out of our present course to deal in detail with this way of meeting the problem. But enough has been said to make clear that from our position there is no absolute diremption (as Pringle-Pattison^{73a} puts it) "between man's nature as an ethical being and the apparently non-moral nature of the world from which he springs." "The specifically human experiences cannot be taken as an excrescence on the universe, or as a self-contained and unde-rived world by themselves with no root in the nature of things. Man is, after all, the child of nature, and it is on the basis of natural impulses, and in commerce with the system of external things, that his ethical life is built up. Hence the characteristics of the ethical life must be taken as contributing to determine the nature of the system in which we live." "There is no system, no whole of being, no real fact at all, till the external gathers itself up, as it were, into internality, and existence sums itself in the conscious soul."

What all this means in fact is that Kant's dualistic starting-point requires revision. Experience certainly implies the dualism of subject and object; still they do not belong to separable worlds, but are constituent factors of reality itself. But the subject has the unique experience of knowing itself immediately. The fact of the subject as observing and as acting must be given. What it observes and how it observes, how it acts and what it acts upon, are but means of its own self-development and of its own recognition of itself as real. With-

73a. A. S. Pringle-Pattison, *Idea of God*, 1917, pp. 212, 213, 215.

out the consciousness of an order of being existing in opposition to the self, as well as co-operating with it for its own unfolding, there could be no consciousness of self at all. The subject of experience knows itself immediately through its own inner activity and through its own ideas of what exists in relation to it. These facts are fundamental; and were they not recognized immediately for what they are, there would be no means of making them understandable to one's self. The self of another we experience through immediate contact with its own modes of outward perceptual manifestation. But at the same time we are aware of its own unity; for these various experiences of the presence of another self are not without inner relation to the other self, and they are not without an inner relation to one's own self. Indeed, without the admission of this self-unity, whether for one's self or for another, whether consciously expressed or not, knowledge of, or reaction in terms of, another self would not be possible.^{73b} The subject also knows a world of things and beings as inter-related in terms of principles of unity which ultimately are the products of man's intelligence. By reflection such knowledge may be realized as only possible in reference to the cognizing self. But in actual knowing or reacting to what is known (apart from reflection on how the knowing occurs) there is no marked obtrusion of the self. And, indeed, a scientific view of the world is usually presented in this fashion. And as universal principles are forthcoming to account for the processes of the material world in all the varying phases of it (whether formulated for particular sciences or

^{73b}. Cf. W. R. Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, 1918, pp. 266-68.

presented synoptically for the whole of them as integrated into a possible order of nature), there is a tendency to regard these principles as subsisting of themselves as a system of relations which does not need to go outside itself for its own justification; that is, there is a tendency to regard them as self-dependent or complete apart from all human reference. But while it must be admitted that these universal relations can only subsist as between things which are real and which exist independently of man's self as knowing, yet without reference to this self they could not be rendered intelligible.

Without giving a detailed investigation, it may be accepted that the self to which the material environment is thus presented—even though it be an orderly system and cannot be completely formulated by man—is also the same self which interacts with that environment. By means of an external world the self finds an outward expression of its own needs and aspirations to live. It must learn to insinuate itself (as it were) in and through the surrounding material system in order that it itself may grow from within and unfold its contents. And self-development is nothing if it is not development of practical interests—progress in moral experience, for the world of nature is a medium for “soul making,” and moral conduct as determined by ideals expresses itself in and through the world as it is. Thus the self as knowing and the self as acting are not disunited through distinguishable. Indeed, it is the one subject that is both practical and theoretical, and accordingly adopts two different points of view towards the world as object. In scientific knowledge the object is considered as though existing apart from the subject;

but the abstract nature of such knowledge is realized when the subject, as an experient or agent, is brought in, and treated as a participant in the whole of reality. Thus it may be said that the knowledge of the object is ultimately dependent upon knowledge of the subject as practical, for the self-active experient interacts with what abides in the world of nature. And so it is necessary for the subject to interpret nature and utilize natural processes for the expression of its own purposes and interests.

Hence nature as a mechanical process of events is not without practical significance for man. This practical point of view brings to light a more concrete situation than that with which science is concerned, for herein mechanism must needs play a subordinate role, as instrumental towards the satisfaction of man's practical needs. We have indicated that a mechanical interpretation of nature implies ideal construction. And accordingly we feel bound to ask, seeing that we are self-active experients—what is the significance of this constructive organization of things which we call nature? The self-activity of consciousness must have some reason for this mental effort—especially one on such a large scale. For what purpose is this intelligent activity put into effect? Being rational, we must ask these questions of ourselves; we cannot avoid them. A conception of nature as a self-acting world cannot satisfy this demand, for, as we have insisted, it is neither self-acting nor complete in itself. Even Kant shows that the phenomenal world does not constitute the whole of reality. It is apparent that we must transcend mechanism, if we would seek an ultimate view. As an interpretation of nature, it rests upon a postulate of uniformity or deter-

minism which, as Kant has it, must be presupposed in all experience. Mechanism, then, is not a fact of nature, but an hypothesis which man uses to explain nature, as a system of changes within the objective factor in experience; but it is a system which he cannot reduce to ultimate unity, for the process is always incomplete. There is ever a remainder for him. Now this hypothetical character of the mechanical interpretation of nature implies that it can be rendered subservient to man's higher interests. By means of it he can determine the quantitative modes of natural processes with accuracy and depend upon them in prediction. And although such calculability only relates to observed quantitative relations which are abstracted from the things or beings, which in their totality are more than the summation of quantities, yet with such knowledge of mechanical movements in nature he can determine how far they may be of use to him in working out environmental changes, or how far and in what ways he must adjust his own actions to conform with what is unalterably fixed in *rerum natura*. The mechanical postulate is, then, a resultant of man's own intellectual activity, but at the same time it is an instrumentality for the working out of his purposes as a causal agent. The systematization of the processes of nature has accordingly a deeper significance for man than a mere mathematical calculation: it has a teleological foundation in his practical consciousness. This knowledge of himself as a self-acting being man cannot get from nature; it comes from his immediate experience of himself as conative. He strives to realize what he has purposed to do, and to constrain nature to conform to his designs. It may resist his efforts. Through experience he learns what

are his limits and how far he can make various aspects of nature subserve his will. By such activities he seeks to reduce nature's processes to laws and to present them as integrated within a system. But he does not succeed all the way. There is much that is beyond his province to grasp and to control. Nevertheless, in so far as he does accomplish his purposes, nature has value for him. It is instrumental for the realization of what he has purposed to achieve. In his own life as a self-developing being what he believes to be of value is realized and comes to fruition.

III. MORAL ORDER AND THEISM.

It is clear, then, that if we would lay hold on reality we must not allow the relations to conceal or be substituted for what is related. We must go direct to the phenomena, the things or beings that are related and made manifest through the relations. And so we have the means at hand to verify the correctness of the laws or relations integrating phenomena in the world of nature. But, as we have urged, this same world is instrumental towards moral development, towards the fulfilment of man's purposes. If this be so, we cannot, of course, find in the external world that which is "behind" or "manifest in" the relations constituting a moral order; we cannot go to it for a demonstration of the fact of moral striving. The moral order exists nowhere except in persons; and the world of moral values or the moral law is a world of minds in inter-relation with one another. Here we reach a higher realm of reality than the material world and one which subsumes the lower,—a world of moral experience the knowledge of which depends upon "the inter-action of

mind with mind.''⁷⁴ This does not mean that the real universe consists of an infinite number of isolated "centres of experience," which are composed into an association of individuals by means of relations set up between them. They must already exist within a whole and interact upon one another and determine their relations to one another in and through the unity of the whole.⁷⁵ Were reality not ultimately a unity, there could not be any secure foundation for the harmonious development of individuals in inter-communication with one another. That is a rational presupposition without which human experiences would not be intelligible. Each individual being has a nature of his own, and through intercourse with other beings acting as stimuli and reacting upon him, he develops his own nature from within. According to Lotze,⁷⁶ there is a sympathetic "rapport" between the individuals, and this implies a unity in which they all inhere as self-developing beings. They only exist as members of a community, and are not real in themselves apart from the society to which they belong. They are distinct from one another, and unique, as individuals, but not in absolute separation. This is only possible on the assumption of a unifying principle immanent in both the individuals and the community. But the full significance of this unity is not revealed within a mere aggregate of inter-acting individuals. The bare assertion of unity is not sufficient to exhaust the reality of the oneness. The unity

74. J. Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, 3rd Ed., 1906, v. 2, p. 279.

75. This is what Professor Pringle-Pattison has strongly insisted upon throughout the whole of his Gifford lectures on the *Idea of God*.

76. Cf. Lotze, *Metaphysic*, tr., 2nd Ed., 1887, v. 1, pp. 225-29; also *Microcosmus*, tr., 1885, v. 2, pp. 665 ff.; cf. also in *re* Ward, *Realm of Ends*, pp. 215-224.

which obtains between an unlimited number of individuals must be such as transcends the whole of them as well as dwells within them. There is no contradiction between a system of individuals developing their own nature from within and the conception of an ultimate ground for the whole, which is an *ens extra mundum*. Indeed, "the doctrine of a supramundane cause not only does not exclude the idea of an internal principle of action in nature, but it may almost be said to require it,"⁷⁷ for otherwise an ultimate principle of unity would not be distinguished from that which it unifies and renders coherent. The world of individuals is not complete within itself, and forces the contemplation of a ground that transcends it. "Interacting minds, however great their potentialities, cannot by generalizing their experiences, create a common world for themselves. For this process presupposes the existence of the common world in which they meet and interact."⁷⁸ And the conception of an ultimate ground for such a world leads to theism. The world of man and nature, then, thus grounded in God, has a teleological significance. There must be a supreme end for which the whole exists, and the strivings of all self-active beings must conform to that ideal and co-operate towards its ultimate realization.

Such a conception of the unity of the world of nature and man implies that the individual centres of activity set ends before themselves, and endeavour on their own initiative to realize them. They are not determined to do so from without, for they are free and self-determining. The idea of freedom is inseparable from a teleological universe. Caprice and chance are ruled out,

77. P. Janet, *Final Causes*, tr., 2nd Ed., 1885, p. 341.

78. G. Galloway, *Philosophy of Religion*, 1914, p. 428.

for the development of the whole works towards a supreme end. Blind necessity which obtains in mechanism has no part nor lot in it, neither has a blind or irrational liberty of action, if such a thing could be. But the freedom of the individuals, or self-determining beings, is limited by their dependence upon the supreme ground of all. Their spontaneity is not absolute, but is restricted to the extent of this dependence. There is first the dependence upon the ultimate ground for their being and inter-dependence of the individuals with other individuals within the whole. The world is under a divine order which we may call the moral order, the purpose of which is that each self-conscious individual in it may realize his highest moral good, and co-operate with others in developing the common good. But each individual is free to work out his own destiny in accordance with his own moral nature—the capacity of that nature being determined for him by his creator. His moral freedom consists in the fact that he may or may not choose to put forth his full effort towards the highest end of his being, and to that extent temporarily thwart the attainment of the divine end of the universe. But such a failure may be made by God to accomplish the moral order. Though evil abound, good may yet more abound, and finally overcome man's lapses from morality. It were better to dwell within a world of free agents, with a possibility of choosing the evil and passing over the good, rather than the whole should be predetermined to one line of action and direction without any rational significance. In the moral order of the world man has his part to play. He is free to choose, and his decision need not be without guidance. And if he heed the demands of the moral law, and act in faith-

ful obedience to it, the realization of the final end may well be left in higher hands, provided that he believes that his progress towards it shall be conserved, and so limit the extent of contingency that bars the pathway to his attainment of a holy will. Man and God then are joint workers in the lifting up of the world towards a higher plane, in which through freedom we each may work together with all for the highest good of the whole, and in which nature shall conform to the purposes of the divine order, and harmonize with the moral efforts of mankind.

Kant himself had visions of such a moral order. When he let go and cut himself adrift from his theoretical moorings, we find him setting up the conception of the highest good as a commonwealth of ethical beings, wherein each and all work for the common good of all, and unite in overcoming everything which tends towards disintegration.⁷⁹ The moral law is paramount; each fulfils it unconditionally. And, as this ethical supremacy of law necessitates a joint working out of a higher order of society, which is completely under moral laws, and in which virtue obtains in its plenitude and happiness is enjoyed by each and all, a common good thus possesses the souls of men. It is, as Kant calls it, a duty *sui generis* (*Pflicht von ihrer eignen Art*),⁸⁰ one owed by the whole human race to itself; for the highest good of mankind is not merely something to be participated in by individuals as such, but is a common good through which the best in each comes to fruition in the common happiness of all. Each member of the commonwealth of good works along paths that converge

79. *Hartenstein*, v. 6, p. 190.

80. *Hartenstein*, v. 6, p. 195.

towards the supreme ideal, which makes itself felt in everyone and is the "grand passion" of everyone's life. Its consummation is not possible, where each looks merely to his own things, and not to the things of others. As Kant says,⁸¹ "The highest moral good is not realizable only through the striving of particular individuals each for his own moral perfection, but demands for its realization a union of these same persons as a whole, in which and through the unity of which it alone can be brought about. But the idea of such a whole as a universal commonwealth under moral laws is an idea totally different from all other moral laws (which concern only what we know to be in our power), viz., to aim at a whole the realization of which we do not know whether it be in our power or no. This, then, is a duty different from all others, both in kind and in principle." Thus each man must act with the undivided strength of his own person and in undivided union with all his fellows. What Herbart⁸² has applied to the individual, we would apply also to him as one of a whole acting as a whole. "In all we do and strive for, in the lowest as well as in the highest, we are (even metaphysically regarded), in every instance, a whole. In the worst as well as in the best, what we achieve we achieve as a whole. And this is just because there can be, on our part, no separation, no partition, and no alienation of our being." Thus each man must go ahead in his moral task as if all depended upon his own initiative, yet withal remembering the while that he is not alone; for Another is with him, and he a greater

81. *Ibid.*

82. Herbart, *Werke*, 1851, v. 9 (*Bemerkungen ueber die Ursachen, etc.*), p. 26.

than man. Here, then, we realize a complete community of moral interests, and a freedom to unfold our personality in fulness. And, as the whole is based upon universal moral legislation, thus the highest good may truly be said to root itself in the moral law.

INDEX.

INDEX

- Absolute, 154, 156-7n, 158.
 Abstraction as Process, 182n, 210.
 Antinomy of Practical Reason. *See* Highest Good; elements.
 Autonomy of Will. *See* Will.
 Bache, K., 18.
 Baillie, J., 114.
 Balfour, Earl, 212-3.
 Barbour, G. F., 64, 100, 123, 141.
 Bentham, J., 124, 130.
 Bosanquet, B., 130, 149, 155-56, 158.
 Bradley, F. H., 119, 149.
 Caird, E., 9, 14, 17, 67, 69, 84, 90, 97, 148, 152, 169, 183, 188, 190.
 Caldwell, W., 151.
 Categorical Imperative. *See* Imperative.
 Categories of Understanding, 27, 40, 44, 93-4.
 Causality, 34, 38-40, 43, 143n, 214. Two kinds of, 44ff, 188n, 197, 202.
 Cohen, H., 25, 65, 125.
 Collingwood, R. G., 205.
 Commonest Understanding, 15, 47n, 51, 54, 55, 149n.
 Compatibility. *See* Heterogeneity of Virtue and Happiness.
 Consciousness, Theoretical and Practical, 34, 39, 216, 220.
 Consistency of Moral Principle, 41, 63ff, 66n, 80ff, 96ff, 136ff, 140, 192ff.
 Cresson, A., 41, 47, 89.
 D'Arcy, C. F., 164.
 Death, 152, 168.
 Delbos, V., 13, 14, 17, 18, 40.
 Desire, 7ff, 11ff, 27, 94.
 Dewey, J., 83.
 Disposition, Moral, 150, 153-4, 160ff, 167.
 Dualism, 82, 96-7, 153, 181, 193, 201, 207ff, 217.
 Duration, Endless, 146ff., 151ff., 160ff.
 Duty, 37ff., 47ff., 111, 114, 128, 226.
 End, Moral, 32, 64n, 70n, 75, 79, 87-8, 176, 226.
 Endless Duration. *See* Duration.
 Epicureans, 180n.
 Eternal. *See* Time and Timeless.
 Ethical Commonwealth. *See* Commonwealth.
 Ethical Theism, 204.
 Evil, 29, 119-20, 132, 225.
 Ewald, O., 148.

Extended Law. *See* Moral Law, extended.

Faith, Things of, 180, 184n.

Feelings, Moral, 48, 53, 109-10, 183.

Fichte, 39, 154.

Final Purpose, 199-200, 208, 226.

Fischer, K., 133.

Fouillée, A., 47.

Fraser, A. C., 206.

Freedom, 3, 19, 22ff., 27, 34, 41, 82, 105, 184ff., 202ff., 213, 225. Negative basis, 23-4; positive, 20.

Freedom and Nature. *See* Nature and Morality.

Galloway, G., 160, 164, 206, 224.

Garve, 70.

Gibson, W. R. Boyce, 151, 157.

God, Existence of, 106, 116n, 153, 161n, 181-2n, 189n., 216.
As Judge and Law-giver, 118, 121, 126-7, 138, 161, 182, 187.

Deus ex Machina, 189-90.

Moral Argument, 125, 165, 172ff., 202ff.

Physico-teleological Proof, 203.

As ground. *See also* Nature and Morality.

Good, Idea of, 27, 29, 32, 53, 71, 225.

Good and Evil, Discrimination between, 117, 119-20, 125, 128, 149n, 166, 205, 225.

Green, T. H., 10, 18, 51.

Hägerström, A., 64, 70, 74, 79, 90-1, 96, 125ff., 132ff.

Happiness, 9, 62ff., 73n, 92, 100, 109, 119, 128, 131-3, 137, 141, 172. *See also* Highest Good, elements.

Hedonism, 63, 134, 136ff.

Hegel, 153, 154, 162.

Hegler, A., 65, 70, 76.

Herbart, 25, 227.

Heterogeneity of Virtue and Happiness, 112ff., 125ff., 130, 183, 185ff., 190.

Highest Good, Command to Realize, 70, 86-7, 142, 203.

As Determining Principle, 70ff., 80ff., 89n, 227.

Elements (virtue and happiness), 101ff.; how connected, 103ff., 112ff.

See also Heterogeneity.

Hobhouse, L. T., 120.

Holiness, 56, 90-1n, 144ff., 157, 162, 167, 169, 189n, 226.

Ideal, Moral, 30, 35ff., 146, 150, 169-70, 191-2, 227.

Immortality, 144ff.

Conditional (by grace), 147n, 167.

Naïve belief in, 149n, 169-70n.

Postulate linked with God's existence, 153, 161-4.

Imperative, Categorical, 5ff., 17, 25, 92, 174n.

Individuality, 156n, 157n.

Individuals, 223-4.

Intuition, 15.

Intuition, Intellectual, 147, 150.

James, W., 148, 157.

Janet, P., 47, 200, 224.

Judgment, Reflective, 196.

Kant:

Critique of Pure Reason, 3, 9, 27, 68, 106, 125, 132, 141.

Relations of the Critiques, 3, 68, 83-4, 97, 132-4, 181.

Grundlegung (Fundamental Principles of Ethics), 25, 26-7, 68.

Critique of Practical Reason; Relations between Analytic and Dialectic, 33, 41, 46, 64ff., 73ff., 80ff., 96, 112.

Critique of Judgment, 97, 134-5, 194ff.

Religion within Limits of Pure Reason, 68, 78, 86, 93, 154.

Metaphysics of Morals, 119, 128.

Philosophy of Law, 119, 120n.

Idea for Universal History, 173-4n, 187.

Lose Blätter; ed. Reicke, 161n, 184.

Reflexionen; ed. Erdmann, 82.

Vorlesungen; ed. Heinze, 120; ed. Politz, 124.

Kingdom of Ends. *See* Commonwealth.

Knowledge, Meaning of term, 41, 207.

Koppelman, W., 64, 66, 73.

Laurie, S. S., 168-9.

Law, formal as unifying sensible and supersensible, 39ff., 97, 105-6.

Leibniz, 129, 170.

Liebmann, O., 39.

Locke, J., 124.

Lotze, H., 148, 223.

McDougall, W., 12, 64, 116.

Mackenzie, J. S., 83, 120.

MacMillan, R. A. C., 207.

McTaggart, J. M. E., 149.

Man and Nature. *See* Nature.

Man as End of Creation, 97ff., 213.

Man's Finitude, 157, 159n, 167, 182n, 189n, 216.

Martineau, J., 165.

Maxims, 5.

Mechanism, Principle of, 194ff., 201ff., 207ff., 214ff., 220ff.; subordinate to teleology, 197, 203, 213-4.

Mellone, S. H., 68.

Mendelssohn, 168n.

Meredith, George, 123.

Messer, A., 14, 27-8, 86, 124, 160-1.

Mill, J. S., 124.

Moore, G. E., 139.

Moral Action, 26ff., 72, 77ff.

Moral Determination. *See* Moral Law, Determining Principle.

Moral Disposition. *See* Disposition.

Moral Knowledge. *See* Commonest Understanding.

Moral Law:

As Determining Principle, 6, 9, 15ff., 19, 31, 36, 57, 61ff., 74ff., 93, 175ff., 192ff., 226.

As Abstraction (formal), 18, 37, 55, 81, 83, 96, 193.

As Causality, 38, 40, 44.

Consequences of Moral Determination, 79, 84, 90ff., 95, 133, 177, 183.

As Extended, 63, 70ff., 87ff.; justification of, 95ff.

As Original (factum), 17, 23, 25, 47n, 189n, 204.

Universality of, 16, 62, 85.

Moral Necessity, 19.

Moral Order, 187, 216, 222ff.

Morality and Nature. *See* Nature.

Motive, 12-13, 47ff., 88ff.

Nature:

As Organic to Man, 45, 210n, 211.

As Intelligible, 182n, 212-3, 224.

Final Purpose of, 97, 199, 204, 208, 213.

Nature and Man, 172ff., 186, 199, 206, 209-10, 221.

Nature and Morality, 40ff., 99-100, 178ff., 188, 194, 200ff., 217; God as ground of their unity, 188ff., 199ff., 203, 224.

Necessity and Freedom. *See* Freedom.

Neumark, D., 82.

Nietzsche, F., 148.

Noumenal. *See* Phenomenal.

Object of Desire (sense), 7, 27-8, 62-3, 71ff., 74n, 76n, 184n, 185, 192.

Object of Pure Will (good), 27, 28, 70n, 71ff., 185.

Object of Practical Reason (summum bonum), 37, 63, 70-1, 73ff., 76n, 88-9, 184n.

Obligation. *See* Duty.

Paulsen, F., 15, 64, 66, 82, 130, 164.

Personality, Moral, 49-51, 54-5, 200, 211.

Phenomenal and Noumenal, Relations of, 40ff., 82-3, 105, 197, 202, 208.

Philosophy as Wisdom, 66, 67.

Plato, 64.

Pleasure and Pain, 8ff., 33ff., 53, 110, 177ff.

Postulate, 146n, 179n.

Practical Principles, 4ff., 121.

Pringle-Pattison, A. S., 35, 39, 67, 114, 151, 157, 159, 170, 210, 217, 223.

Progress in Time. *See* Duration, Time.

Punishment, 118ff., 122ff., 129.

Purposiveness. *See* Teleology.

Rashdall, H., 112, 116, 164.

Realization. *See* Moral Action.

Reason, Moral, 35, 50-1, 206, 213.

- Religion and Moral Law, 49, 143, 149.
 Renouvier, C., 133.
 Respect, Feeling of, 21, 47ff., 53, 87, 91.
 Reward, 114ff., 122ff., 129, 138, 170-1.
 Right and Wrong, 25, 121ff.
 Rigorism 14, 47n.
 Royce, J., 157, 158.
 Ruge, A., 148, 186.
 Ruysen, T., 17, 67, 82.
 Sanctions, 116n, 119n, 124n.
 Schiller, 14, 183.
 Schopenhauer, 17, 47, 64, 136.
 Schwarz, H., 27.
 Self, 11ff., 35, 156-7n, 216ff., 223.
 Sensible and Supersensible. *See* Phenomenal.
 Seth, J., 61, 119, 169, 183, 190.
 Sidgwick, H., 114, 116, 122.
 Sorley, W. R., 117, 218.
 Spencer, H., 124.
 Spinoza, 64, 165n.
 Stählin, L., 38.
 Stewart, H. L., 123, 162.
 Stoics, 180n.
 Stout, G. F., 12.
 Strecker, R., 27, 47.
 Summum Bonum. *See* Highest Good.
 Teleology, 194ff., 207ff., 213ff.; subjective, 195ff.; physical, 197-9; moral, 99, 200.
 Theism, 165n, 169-70n, 205, 222ff.
 Time and Timeless, 151, 152, 157ff.
 Type as Symbol, 38-9, 43ff., 105ff.
 Utilitarianism, 33, 124, 130.
 Value, 210-11, 222.
 Virtue, 64, 68, 85, 117, 131, 139, 164. *See also* Highest Good.
 Ward, J., 10, 148, 151, 157, 159, 171, 223.
 Webb, C. C. J., 49, 66, 165.
 Welfare, 30ff., 104.
 Will:
 Autonomy of, 20ff., 47, 49, 63.
 Heteronomy, 22.
 Good Will, 26-7, 53, 139-40.
 Wisdom. *See* Philosophy.
 Wishing, 83, 132.
 Wordsworth, 147.
 Worthiness of Happiness. *See* Virtue.
 Wrong. *See* Right.
 Wundt, W., 37, 120.

S. 71. 5

